Research Article
BibTex RIS Cite

Richard Swinburne’s Defence of Dualism

Year 2020, Volume: 18 Issue: 1, 318 - 343, 30.06.2020
https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.722374

Abstract

Richard Swinburne is one of the most important figures in philosophy of religion who took special interest in the soul. Also he is one of the most prominent defenders of dualism –also known as mind-body dualism or substance dualism– that regards humans as composed of two different substances called body and the soul. He defended the dualist view against contemporary problems of dualism and contributed to it with his three books, namely The Evolution of the Soul; Mind, Brain and Free Will and Are We Bodies or Souls? alongside with other publications. In this paper, I will introduce Swinburne’s version of Cartesian dualism and critically investigate whether it provides us some reasons to believe in the soul. For this reason, I will examine the two principle arguments Swinburne offers in the explanations of dualism –one of them is known as the conceivability argument and the other is based on an imaginary scenario from transplants– along with their critics. To sum up, the main point drawn in this paper will be Swinburne’s arguments for dualism along with some of their critics. 

References

  • Armstrong, David M.. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1. Basım, 1968.
  • Baggini, Julian. Ego Aldatmacası: Seni Sen Yapan Nedir?. çev. İstem Erdener. İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2015.
  • Baker, Lynne Rudder. “Swinburne on Substance Dualism”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6/2 (2014), 5–15.
  • Blackmore, Susan. Bilinç: Çok Kısa Bir Başlangıç. çev. Oğuz Akçelik. İstanbul: İstanbul Kültür Üni. Yayınevi, 2019.
  • Bloom, Paul. “Natural-Born Dualists”. Edge.org. Erişim 14 Nisan 2020. https://www.edge.org/conversation/paul_bloom-natural-born-dualists
  • Dennett, Daniel C.. Aklın Türleri. çev. Handan Balkara. İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1. Basım, 1999.
  • Descartes, René. Meditasyonlar. çev. Çiğdem Dürüşken. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2015.
  • Gazālī, Ebū Ḥāmid Muḥammed. Tehāfutu’l-felāsife. çev. Mahmut Kaya - Hüseyin Sarıoğlu. İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2014.
  • Gasparov, Igor. “Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness”. Forum Philosophicum 18/1 (2013), 109-123.
  • Goetz, Stewart - Taliaferro, Charles. A Brief History of the Soul. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
  • Herodotos. Tarih. çev. Müntekim Ökmen. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019.
  • Hofstadter, Douglas. Ben Bir Garip Döngüyüm. çev. İlkay Alptekin Demir. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2015.
  • Holt, Jim. Dünya Neden Var?. çev. Ebru Kılıç. İstanbul: Aylak Kitap, 2013.
  • Hume, David. İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme. çev. Ergün Baylan. Ankara: Bilgesu Yayıncılık, 2009.
  • Jacquette, Dale. Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness. Cornwall: Continuum, 2009.
  • Jaworski, William. “Swinburne on Substances, Properties, and Structures”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014), 17-28.
  • Lewis, David K.. “Survival and Identity”. The Identities of Persons. ed. Amélie O. Rorty. 17–40. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
  • Lowe, E. Jonathan. “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism”. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. ed. Jonathan Loose vd.. 168-182. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2018. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119468004.ch11
  • Lowe, E. Jonathan. “Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 29 (1991), 87-107.
  • Nagel, Thomas. “Yarasa Olmak Nasıl Bir Şeydir?”. çev. Füsun Doruker. Aklın G’özü. ed. Daniel C. Dennett vd.. 377–390. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008.
  • Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
  • O’Connor, Timothy - Kimble, Kevin. “The Argument from Consciousness Revisited”. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. ed. Jonathan Kvanvig. 3/110–142. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • Olson, Eric T.. “Swinburne’s Brain Transplants”. Philosophia Christi 20 (2018), 22-29.
  • Parfit, Derek. “Personal Identity and Rationality”. Synthese 53/2 (1982), 227-241.
  • Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
  • Rickabaugh, Brandon - Evans, C. Stephen. “Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism”. Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. ed. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris. 231-256. New York: Lexington Books, 2018.
  • Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
  • Swinburne, Richard. “Cartesian Substance Dualism”. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. ed. Jonathan Loose vd.. 133-152. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2018. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119468004.ch9
  • Swinburne, Richard. “How to Determine Which is the True Theory of Personal Identity”. Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?. ed. Georg Gasser vd.. 105-122. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
  • Swinburne, Richard. Mind, Brain, and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1. Basım, 2013.
  • Swinburne, Richard. “Response to Reviewers”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6/2 (2014), 51-63.
  • Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. New York: Oxford University Press, 2. Basım, 1997.
  • Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. New York: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2. Basım, 2004.
  • Swinburne, Richard. “What Makes Me Me? A Defense of Substance Dualism”. Contemporary Dualism: A Defense. ed. Andrea Lavazza vd.. 139–154. New York: Routledge, 2014.
  • Williams, Bernard. “The Self and the Future”. Philosophical Review 79 (1970), 161-180.
  • Yalçın, Şahabettin. Modern Felsefede Benlik. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1. Basım, 2009.
  • Yılmaz, Aykut Alper. “Richard Swinburne. Are We Bodies or Souls?”. Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 60/2 (2019), 425-432.
  • Zimmerman, Dean W.. “Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind”. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 113-122. New York: Macmillan, 2007.
  • Zimmerman, Dean W.. “Materialism, Dualism, and ‘Simple’ Theories of Personal Identity”. Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?. ed. Georg Gasser vd.. 206-236. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Richard Swinburne'ün Düalizm Savunusu

Year 2020, Volume: 18 Issue: 1, 318 - 343, 30.06.2020
https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.722374

Abstract

Richard Swinburne, çağdaş din felsefesinin önde gelen isimlerinden olup özellikle ruh meselesine eğilmiş bir felsefecidir. O, insanın ruh ve beden olmak üzere iki farklı cevherden oluştuğunu öne süren düalist görüşün günümüzdeki önemli savunucularındandır. Kaleme almış olduğu Ruhun Evrimi (The Evolution of the Soul),  Zihin, Beden ve Özgür İrade (Mind, Brain and Free Will) ve Bedenler miyiz yoksa Ruhlar mı? (Are we Bodies or Souls?) gibi müstakil eserlerin yanı sıra makale ve kitap bölümleriyle de düalizmi, Descartes’tan itibaren ortaya çıkan yeni problemlere karşı savunmuş ve bu görüşü çağdaş zihin tartışmaları ekseninde güncellemiştir. Ben de bu çalışmada, ilk olarak Swinburne’ün düalizmini, Descartes’ın cevherci düalizmiyle aralarındaki bazı farklara da dikkat çekerek, ele alacağım. Akabinde, onun düalizmi savunmak adına ileri sürdüğü –biri “kavranabilirlik argümanı” (conceivability argument) olarak bilinen ve diğeri ise hayali bir beyin nakli vakasına dayanan– iki temel argümanı ve bu argümanlara yöneltilen bazı eleştirileri inceleyeceğim. Kısaca çalışmamın ana odağı, Swinburne’ün düalizme yönelik iki temel argümanı ve bu argümanlara yöneltilen bazı eleştiriler olacaktır.

References

  • Armstrong, David M.. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1. Basım, 1968.
  • Baggini, Julian. Ego Aldatmacası: Seni Sen Yapan Nedir?. çev. İstem Erdener. İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2015.
  • Baker, Lynne Rudder. “Swinburne on Substance Dualism”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6/2 (2014), 5–15.
  • Blackmore, Susan. Bilinç: Çok Kısa Bir Başlangıç. çev. Oğuz Akçelik. İstanbul: İstanbul Kültür Üni. Yayınevi, 2019.
  • Bloom, Paul. “Natural-Born Dualists”. Edge.org. Erişim 14 Nisan 2020. https://www.edge.org/conversation/paul_bloom-natural-born-dualists
  • Dennett, Daniel C.. Aklın Türleri. çev. Handan Balkara. İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1. Basım, 1999.
  • Descartes, René. Meditasyonlar. çev. Çiğdem Dürüşken. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2015.
  • Gazālī, Ebū Ḥāmid Muḥammed. Tehāfutu’l-felāsife. çev. Mahmut Kaya - Hüseyin Sarıoğlu. İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu, 2014.
  • Gasparov, Igor. “Substance Dualism and the Unity of Consciousness”. Forum Philosophicum 18/1 (2013), 109-123.
  • Goetz, Stewart - Taliaferro, Charles. A Brief History of the Soul. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
  • Herodotos. Tarih. çev. Müntekim Ökmen. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2019.
  • Hofstadter, Douglas. Ben Bir Garip Döngüyüm. çev. İlkay Alptekin Demir. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2015.
  • Holt, Jim. Dünya Neden Var?. çev. Ebru Kılıç. İstanbul: Aylak Kitap, 2013.
  • Hume, David. İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme. çev. Ergün Baylan. Ankara: Bilgesu Yayıncılık, 2009.
  • Jacquette, Dale. Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness. Cornwall: Continuum, 2009.
  • Jaworski, William. “Swinburne on Substances, Properties, and Structures”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2014), 17-28.
  • Lewis, David K.. “Survival and Identity”. The Identities of Persons. ed. Amélie O. Rorty. 17–40. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
  • Lowe, E. Jonathan. “Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism”. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. ed. Jonathan Loose vd.. 168-182. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2018. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119468004.ch11
  • Lowe, E. Jonathan. “Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind”. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 29 (1991), 87-107.
  • Nagel, Thomas. “Yarasa Olmak Nasıl Bir Şeydir?”. çev. Füsun Doruker. Aklın G’özü. ed. Daniel C. Dennett vd.. 377–390. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008.
  • Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
  • O’Connor, Timothy - Kimble, Kevin. “The Argument from Consciousness Revisited”. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. ed. Jonathan Kvanvig. 3/110–142. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  • Olson, Eric T.. “Swinburne’s Brain Transplants”. Philosophia Christi 20 (2018), 22-29.
  • Parfit, Derek. “Personal Identity and Rationality”. Synthese 53/2 (1982), 227-241.
  • Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
  • Rickabaugh, Brandon - Evans, C. Stephen. “Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism”. Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. ed. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris. 231-256. New York: Lexington Books, 2018.
  • Swinburne, Richard. Are We Bodies or Souls. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.
  • Swinburne, Richard. “Cartesian Substance Dualism”. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. ed. Jonathan Loose vd.. 133-152. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2018. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119468004.ch9
  • Swinburne, Richard. “How to Determine Which is the True Theory of Personal Identity”. Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?. ed. Georg Gasser vd.. 105-122. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
  • Swinburne, Richard. Mind, Brain, and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, 1. Basım, 2013.
  • Swinburne, Richard. “Response to Reviewers”. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6/2 (2014), 51-63.
  • Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. New York: Oxford University Press, 2. Basım, 1997.
  • Swinburne, Richard. The Existence of God. New York: Oxford Clarendon Press, 2. Basım, 2004.
  • Swinburne, Richard. “What Makes Me Me? A Defense of Substance Dualism”. Contemporary Dualism: A Defense. ed. Andrea Lavazza vd.. 139–154. New York: Routledge, 2014.
  • Williams, Bernard. “The Self and the Future”. Philosophical Review 79 (1970), 161-180.
  • Yalçın, Şahabettin. Modern Felsefede Benlik. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1. Basım, 2009.
  • Yılmaz, Aykut Alper. “Richard Swinburne. Are We Bodies or Souls?”. Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 60/2 (2019), 425-432.
  • Zimmerman, Dean W.. “Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind”. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 113-122. New York: Macmillan, 2007.
  • Zimmerman, Dean W.. “Materialism, Dualism, and ‘Simple’ Theories of Personal Identity”. Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?. ed. Georg Gasser vd.. 206-236. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
There are 39 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Religious Studies
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Aykut Alper Yılmaz 0000-0003-3905-018X

Publication Date June 30, 2020
Submission Date April 17, 2020
Acceptance Date June 23, 2020
Published in Issue Year 2020 Volume: 18 Issue: 1

Cite

APA Yılmaz, A. A. (2020). Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu. Kader, 18(1), 318-343. https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.722374
AMA Yılmaz AA. Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu. Kader. June 2020;18(1):318-343. doi:10.18317/kaderdergi.722374
Chicago Yılmaz, Aykut Alper. “Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu”. Kader 18, no. 1 (June 2020): 318-43. https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.722374.
EndNote Yılmaz AA (June 1, 2020) Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu. Kader 18 1 318–343.
IEEE A. A. Yılmaz, “Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu”, Kader, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 318–343, 2020, doi: 10.18317/kaderdergi.722374.
ISNAD Yılmaz, Aykut Alper. “Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu”. Kader 18/1 (June 2020), 318-343. https://doi.org/10.18317/kaderdergi.722374.
JAMA Yılmaz AA. Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu. Kader. 2020;18:318–343.
MLA Yılmaz, Aykut Alper. “Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu”. Kader, vol. 18, no. 1, 2020, pp. 318-43, doi:10.18317/kaderdergi.722374.
Vancouver Yılmaz AA. Richard Swinburne’ün Düalizm Savunusu. Kader. 2020;18(1):318-43.