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Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi



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Değerli okuyucular, kıymetli araştırmacılar,

Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi'nin 27/2 sayısı ile karşınızdayız. Dergimiz bilimsel kriterlerden, yayın ilkelerinden ve etik değerlerden ödün vermeden yoluna devam etmekte; kendisine hedef olarak belirlediği A sınıfı dergilerin yer aldığı indekslere girme yolunda emin adımlarla ilerlemekte, alanında öncü olma rolünü sürdürmek için yoğun bir gayret göstermektedir. Dergimizin görünürlüğü, makalelerimizin taranabilirliği ve atıf sayılarımız her geçen gün artmaktadır. Bu süreçte dergimizin eski adına yapılan atıfların birleştirilmesi yapılmış olup atıf sayımız 2021 ve 2022 yıllarında 40'a ulaşmıştır. 2023 yılında yayınlanan makalelere yapılan atıf sayımızın bu rekoru egale edeceğini ümit ve temenni ederken birleştirme işlemini yapan Yazım Desteği ekibine de teşekkürlerimi sunuyorum.

Her yıl 15 Haziran ve 15 Aralık tarihlerinde, 2 sayı ve 1 özel sayı yayınlamayı görev edinmiş olan dergimiz, yeni yayın döneminde de yoğun bir ilgi ve teveccühe mazhar olmuştur. Bu sayıda dergimize din bilimlerinin farklı alanlarında birbirinden değerli 87 araştırma makalesi gelmiştir. Her bir makale dergimizin yayın ilkeleri doğrultusunda incelenmiş ve gerekli şartları sağlayan makaleler hakem sürecine dahil edilmiştir. Değerlendirmeler neticesinde bu makalelerin 55 tanesi reddedilmiş, 27 makale kabul almıştır. Bunlardan İngilizce kaleme alınan 4 makale özel sayımızı oluşturmaktadır.

Dergimize makale gönderen bütün araştırmacılara, hakemlerimize, üst düzey fedakarlıklarıyla akademik yayıncılığa katkı sunan editöryal ekibimize ve mizanpaj görevini üstlenen üniversitemiz Elektronik Dergi Ofisi'ne teşekkür ediyorum. Üniversitemiz idaresine, fakülte dekanlığımıza, yazı işleri müdürlüğümüze ve rektörlük basımevine minnet duyduğumu ayrıca belirtmek isterim. Bu vesileyle üniversitemizin kuruluşunun 50. yılını kutlarım.

Dergimiz editörlüğünde bayrak değişimi olmuştur. Dergimizin 2022'dan beri editörlüğünü yapan ve Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi'nin bu günlere ulaşmasında önemli katkısı olan fakültemiz öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Adem Çiftçi hocamız görevinden ayrılmış; bu sayıdan itibaren editörlük görevi şahsıma tevdi edilmiştir. Bu görevin kıymet ve mesuliyetinin farkındayım. Çünkü bizden önce bu görevi üstlenen editör hocalarımız dergi yayıncılığı alanında ulusal ve uluslararası arenada öncü bir misyon üstlenen Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi'ni önemli bir seviyeye, prestijli bir konuma taşımışlardır. Bu vesileyle derginin kuruluşundan bugüne, görev alan bütün editörlerimize, özellikle Dr. Abdullah Demir, Dr. Sema Yılmaz ve son olarak Doç. Dr. Adem Çiftçi hocalarıma katkılarından ötürü şükranlarımı sunuyorum.

Dergimiz yayın kurulunda gerçekleştirdiğimiz istişareler neticesinde aşağıdaki hususun önümüzdeki sayıdan itibaren uygulanması kararlaştırılmış ve bu hususlar dergi sayfamızda ilan edilmiştir. Önümüzdeki sayıdan (Haziran 2024) itibaren uygulanmak üzere,

i. Haziran ve Aralık dönemlerine kabul alan İngilizce makalelerin Aralık'ta İngilizce Özel Sayı olarak yayınlanmasına karar verilmiştir.

Siz değerli okuyucularımızı hürmet ve muhabbetle selamlarım. Yeni sayımızda görüşmek dileğiyle...

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FROM THE EDITOR

The Latest Issue of Cumhuriyet Theology Journal: Volume 27 Issue 3 (English Special Issue)

Dear Readers and Researchers,

We are here with issue 27/2 of Cumhuriyet Journal of Theology. Our journal continues on its way without compromising scientific criteria, publishing principles, and ethical values; It is taking firm steps towards entering the indexes containing Class A journals, which it has set as its target, and is making intense efforts to maintain its role as a pioneer in its field. The visibility of our journal, the searchability of our articles, and our citation numbers are increasing day by day. In this process, citations to the old name of our journal were combined and our number of citations reached 40 in 2021 and 2022. While I hope and pray that the number of citations to articles published in 2023 will equal this record, I would also like to thank the Writing Support team who carried out the merging process.

Our Journal, which has undertaken to publish 2 issues and 1 special issue on 15 June and 15 December every year, has received intense interest and favor in the new publication period. In this issue, our journal received 87 valuable research articles in different fields of religious sciences. Each article was examined following the publication principles of our journal, and articles that met the necessary conditions were included in the referee process. As a result of the evaluations, 55 of these articles were rejected and 27 articles were accepted. Of these, 4 articles written in English constitute our special issue.

I would like to thank all the researchers who submitted articles to our journal, our referees, our editorial team who contributed to academic publishing with their high-level sacrifices, and our university's Electronic Journal Office, which took on the task of layout. I would also like to express my gratitude to the administration of our university, our faculty deanery, our editorial office, and the rectorate printing house. On this occasion, I congratulate the 50th anniversary of the founding of our university.

There has been a flag change under the editorship of our journal. Our faculty member Assoc. Prof. Adem Çiftci has resigned from his position; as of this issue, the editorship duty has been entrusted to me. I am aware of the value and responsibility of this task. Our editors who took on this duty before me have carried the Cumhuriyet Journal of Theology, which has undertaken a pioneering mission in the national and international arena in the field of journal publishing, to an important level and a prestigious position. On this occasion, I would like to thank all the editors who have worked in the journal since its establishment, especially Dr. Abdullah Demir, Dr. Sema Yılmaz, and finally Assoc. Prof. Adem Çiftçi. I would like to express my gratitude to them for their contributions.

As a result of our consultations with the editorial board of our journal, it was decided to implement the following issues starting from the next issue and these issues were announced on our journal page. To be implemented starting from the next issue (June 2024),

i. It has been decided that the English articles accepted for the June and December periods will be published as a Special Issue in December as English.

I greet you, our valued readers, with respect and affection. Hope to see you in our new issue...

Ass. Prof. Hamit Demir

Editor

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Evaluation of Generation Z and Influencer Interaction in the Scope of Religious and Cultural Values

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ABSTRACT

Social media, where popular culture is created and strengthened, religious issues are discussed and people openly share their preferences, is a tool that directly affects young people today. Therefore, Generation Z is under the influence of influencers on social media tools more than family, values, religion and cultural education during adolescence. In light of all this information, the purpose of this research is to investigate the effects of intense influencer interaction created by Generation Z through social media tools on religious and cultural values. The importance of this research is to deepen the social understanding of the impact of Generation Z and influencer interaction on religious and cultural values and to develop a perspective on the subject. With the basic judgment that young people are the next generation, this issue is seen as important in terms of shaping the future. The method of the research is in-depth interview. In-depth interviews were conducted and data was collected with 15 Generation Z members who actively use social media and follow influencers. In-depth interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format. Within the scope of the study, 8 basic questions were determined and it was aimed to expand the answers by asking related questions depending on the answers given to these questions. These people were selected by simple random sampling and all of them are undergraduate university students. Gender and socio-economic status are not a means of discrimination within the scope of this research. However, 9 of the 15 people are female and 6 are male. Although all students reside in different provinces, they all continue their education at universities in Istanbul. Although socio-economic status was not prioritized in the study, it was deemed necessary for the individual to have a smart mobile phone and to interact with influencers by actively using social media tools. According to the results of the research, interviewees clearly stated that influencers' opinions are important to them. No significant differences based on gender were detected. The main gender-based difference here is the diversification and change of influencers followed. It is thought that social tastes and tastes based on gender are effective here. Interviewees also revealed that influencers share posts that are far from religious and cultural values. In particular, following non-Turkish influencers of this age group causes them to become alienated from their own culture and religion and admire foreign religions and cultures. As a result of all the interviews, it is possible to say that Generation Z, who follows influencers and actively uses social media, moves away from religious and cultural values and approaches their lives within the framework of more non-religious and popular culture elements. In general, when all the results are evaluated, individuals during the youth period, with the influence of social media and influencers, tend to remove religious elements from their lives and adopt a secular lifestyle by taking it as an example.

Keywords: Religion Sociology, Social media, Generation Z, Influencer, In-depth interview

Z Kuşağı ve Influencer Etkileşiminin Dini ve Kültürel Değerler Kapsamında Değerlendirilmesi

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ÖZ

Popüler kültürün oluşturulup güçlendirildiği, dini konuların konuşulduğu ve insanların açık bir şekilde tercihlerini paylaştıkları sosyal medya bugün gençleri doğrudan etkileyen bir araçtır. Dolayısıyla Z kuşağı ergenlik döneminde en fazla aile, değer, din ve kültürel eğitimden daha fazla sosyal medya araçlarındaki influencer etkisi altındadır. Bütün bu bilgiler ışığında; bu araştırmanın amacı, Z kuşağının sosyal medya araçları aracılığıyla oluşturduğu yoğun influencer etkileşiminin dini ve kültürel değerlere olan etkilerini araştırmaktır. Bu araştırmanın önemi, Z Kuşağı ile influencer etkileşiminin dini ve kültürel değerlere olan etkisine ilişkin toplumsal anlayışı derinleştirme ve konuya ilişkin bir bakış açısı geliştirilmesinin sağlanmasıdır. Gençlerin gelecek nesiller olduğu temel yargısıyla bu konu geleceğin biçimlendirilmesi açısından önemli görülmektedir. Araştırmanın yöntemi derinlemesine görüşmedir. Sosyal medyayı aktif kullanan ve influencer takip eden 15 Z kuşağı mensubu ile derinlemesine görüşmeler yapılmış ve veri toplanmıştır. Derinlemesine görüşmeler yarı-yapılandırılmış biçimde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında 8 temel soru belirlenmiş ve bu sorulara verilen yanıtlara bağlı olarak ilişkili sorular sorularak yanıtların genişletilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Bu kişiler basit tesadüfi örneklem yöntemi kullanılarak seçilmiş olup hepsi lisans düzeyinde üniversite öğrencisidir. Cinsiyet ve sosyo-ekonomik durum bu araştırma kapsamında bir ayırt etme aracı değildir. Ancak 15 kişinin 9'u kadın ve 6 tanesi de erkeklerden oluşmaktadır. Tüm öğrenciler farklı illerde ikamet etmesine karşın hepsi İstanbul'daki üniversitelerde öğrenimlerini sürdürmektedir. Çalışmada sosyo-ekonomik durum öncelenmemekle beraber bireyin bir akıllı cep telefonuna sahip olması ve sosyal medya araçlarını aktif kullanarak influencerlar ile etkileşim içerisinde olması gerekli görülmüştür. Araştırmanın sonuçlarına göre; bu yaş grubundaki görüşmeciler açık bir şekilde influencerların görüşlerinin kendileri için önemli olduğunu belirtmiştir. Araştırma kapsamında cinsiyet ayırt edici bir unsur olmamasına karşın cinsiyet dayalı öne çıkan bir farklılık saptanmamıştır. Buradaki cinsiyete dayalı en temel farklılık takip edilen influencerların çeşitlenmesi ve değişmesidir. Cinsiyete dayalı sosyal beğeni ve zevklerin burada etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Görüşmeciler influencerların dini ve kültürel değerlere uzak paylaşımlarda bulduklarını da ortaya koymuşlardır. Özellikle bu yaş grubunun Türk olmayan influencerları takip etmeleri de onların kendi kültürleri ve dinlerine yabancılaşarak yabancı din ve kültürlere hayranlık duymasına neden olmaktadır. Bütün görüşmelerin sonucunda, influencer takip eden ve sosyal medyayı aktif kullanan Z kuşağının dini ve kültürel değerlerden uzaklaşarak yaşamlarını daha din dışı ve popüler kültür öğeleri çerçevesinde yaklaştıklarını söylemek mümkündür. Genel olarak tüm sonuçlar değerlendirildiğinde, sosyal medya ve influencer etkisiyle gençlik döneminde bireyler dini öğeleri yaşamından uzaklaştırarak seküler bir yaşam tarzını örnek alarak benimsemiye yaklaşımı göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Din sosyolojisi, Sosyal Medya, Z Kuşağı, Influencer, Derinlemesine görüşme

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Introduction

In today's digital age, the influence of social media and online platforms has become increasingly significant in shaping the behavior and attitudes of younger generations. Generation Z (Gen Z), those born between the mid-1990s and early 2010s, are no exception to this trend. They are known to be tech-savvy and highly influenced by social media and online platforms.

Influencers, individuals with a large following on social media, have become increasingly popular among young people in recent years. They have the ability to shape opinions, attitudes, and behaviors of their followers. This has led to concerns about the impact of influencer interaction on the cultural and religious values of young people, particularly in countries where religion and culture play a significant role in daily life. With the rise of social media influencers and their ability to reach vast audiences, it is essential to examine how they interact with Gen Z, particularly concerning religious and cultural values.

In recent years, research has focused on the impact of social media influencers on the attitudes and beliefs of Gen Z.¹ Literature reveals that the studies focus on social media and young people. Apart from this, studies on influencers and young people did not fully address cultural and religious elements. Considering all these, this research is important because it deals with the influence of the influencer on the Z generation from a religious and cultural perspective. However, there is still limited understanding of how these interactions affect religious and cultural values. This topic is particularly crucial as Gen Z is becoming more diverse and multicultural, making it essential to evaluate how influencers interact with this demographic.

When we look at the literature on the subject, it is noted that the concept of youth is used more than the term Generation Z.² The common feature of these studies is that the impact of social media on Generation Z, specifically religion, is addressed with a more general approach. The concept of influencer youtuber is mentioned only in one place in the doctoral thesis written by Sarıtunç (2021). Sarıtunç claimed that these people, who are increasing day by day in the social media environment, have an impact on young people's view of religious life.³ Apart from these, there is no study in the literature that examines the relationship of social media and young people with religion using the phrase Generation Z, similar to this research.

¹ Li, Chen – Zhong, Zhang “Influence of social media on the attitudes and beliefs of Generation Z: An exploratory study”. *Journal of Advertising Research* 60 / 2 (2020) 140; Pew Research Center, “On the cusp of adulthood and facing an uncertain future: What we know about Gen Z so far” (Accessed 04 May 2023) Pew Research Center, “In U.S., decline of Christianity continues at rapid pace” (Accessed 02 May 2023) Pew Research Center, “Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018” (Access 02 May 2023) Mine, Oyman – Semra, Akıncı, “Sosyal Medya Etkileyicileri Olarak Vloggerlar: Z Kuşağı Üzerinde Para-Sosyal İlişki, Satın Alma Niyeti Oluşturma ve Youtube Davranışları Açısından Vloggerların İncelenmesi”, *Akdeniz Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi* 32 / 1 (2019) 452.

² bk. Nida Sümeyya Çetin, *Gençlerin Dini Kimlik İnşasında Medyanın Rolü* (Ankara: Akademisyen Yayınevi, 2021); Berrin Sarıtunç, *Üniversite Gençliğinin Din ve Değerler Eğitimi Açısından Sosyal Medya Deneyimi (Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Örneği)* (Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2021); Fatma Dolunay Öztürk, *Sosyal Medyanın 12. Sınıf Öğrencilerinin Dini Bilgileri Üzerindeki Etkileri* (Eskişehir: Osmangazi Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2021)

³ Sarıtunç, *Üniversite Gençliğinin Din ve Değerler Eğitimi Açısından Sosyal Medya Deneyimi (Bursa Uludağ Üniversitesi Örneği)*, 91.

The problematic of this research revolves around the evaluation of the interaction between Generation Z and influencers in the context of religious and cultural values. The aim is to understand the influence of Influencer interaction on the formation, development and potential conflict of religious and cultural values of Generation Z. This study aims to provide insights into how social media influencers can positively or negatively influence Gen Z's religious and cultural values and how to mitigate potential negative effects. The findings of this study will help inform future research and provide practical recommendations for influencers, marketers, and religious organizations.

The method of the research is in-depth interview. In this context, in-depth interviews were conducted with 15 Generation Z members who actively use social media and follow influencers.

1. Approach of Generation Z to Cultural and Religious Values

As stated earlier, the Z Generation, also known as Gen Z or Zoomers, refers to individuals born between the mid-1990s and the early 2010s. This generation has grown up in a world of rapid technological advancement and cultural globalization, which has had a significant impact on their approach to Turkish culture and religious values. Although the influencer interaction of the Z generation will be discussed in terms of Turkish culture and Islamic religion in this study, the researches show that similar situations are experienced all over the world. Therefore, while examining the literature, the situation in the whole world as well as in Turkey has been discussed.

According to a study conducted by the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Z Generation is less interested in traditional Turkish cultural practices and more drawn to global trends and pop culture. They tend to consume media from all over the world, including American movies and TV shows, K-pop music, and social media influencers from various countries.⁴ Religious values also appear to have less impact on the Z Generation's worldview than previous generations. A survey conducted by the Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts found that only 18% of Turkish Gen Z members identified as *very religious*, compared to 37% of their Gen X parents.⁵

On the other hand, this issue has become controversial for the whole world. Pew Research Center has done a research on the subject. According to this research, it was stated that the decrease in religious affiliation among young people is a global phenomenon and influencer interaction is only one step of it. The study found that young people across the world are becoming less religious, with many citing reasons such as a lack of trust in religious institutions and a desire for personal freedom.⁶

According to another study, members of Generation Z are less likely to identify as religious than previous generations. In the United States, for example, 40% of Gen Zers identify as religiously unaffiliated, compared to 29% of millennials, 21% of Gen Xers, and 16% of Baby Boomers.⁷ Another study conducted in Australia found that while members of Generation Z still value aspects of traditional

⁴ Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism, "The Cultural Habits of the Z Generation in Turkey" (Accessed 8 May 2023).

⁵ Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts, "Youth in Turkey: Culture, Values and Attitudes" (Accessed 8 May 2023).

⁶ Pew Research Center, "In U.S., decline of Christianity continues at rapid pace" (Accessed 02 May 2023).

⁷ Pew Research Center, "On the cusp of adulthood and facing an uncertain future: What we know about Gen Z so far" (Accessed 04 May 2023).

religious beliefs, such as spirituality and community, they are also more open to questioning and exploring alternative perspectives.⁸ Similarly, a study conducted in Indonesia found that members of Generation Z are more likely to value individualism and personal freedom over traditional cultural and religious values.⁹

After evaluating the researches in the world and their results, examining the researches done in Turkey will be a guide in this study. A study conducted by Erciyes University in Turkey examined the attitudes of Generation Z towards religion. The results showed that while most members of this generation still identify as Muslim, they are more likely to question traditional religious practices and beliefs.¹⁰

A study conducted in Yalova University by Kavlak and Akova explored the relationship between religiosity and social media use among Generation Z. The results showed that while social media use can have a positive impact on religious beliefs and practices, it can also lead to a decrease in religious commitment and an increase in exposure to alternative viewpoints.¹¹

However, it's important to note that these findings should not be generalized to all members of Generation Z, as values and beliefs can vary widely based on factors such as cultural background, upbringing, and individual experiences. On the other hand, research both in Turkey and in the world clearly shows that Generation Z is generally distant from religious and cultural values. In general, this situation may be related to the fact that the Z generation spends more time in social media, influencer interaction, digital games, virtual environments, etc. than cultural elements and religious images. For this reason, in connection with the study, in the next title, the literature on the effects of the influencer interaction of the Z generation on religious and cultural values is examined.

2. Religious and Cultural Effects of Influencer Interaction on Generation Z

This generation is characterized by their overuse of technology, social media, and their reliance on influencers for information and guidance. As a result of this, influencer marketing has become an increasingly popular strategy for companies looking to reach this demographic. In this context, one of the most significant effects of influencer sharing on Generation Z is its impact on their purchasing behavior. Several studies have found that Gen Z is more likely to purchase products recommended by influencers than those recommended by traditional advertising methods.¹² Influencer marketing allows companies to reach Gen Z through social media platforms where they spend most of their time, and influencers' recommendations help establish trust and credibility for the products they endorse. For example, a study by Ki and Kim found that influencers' product recommendations have a significant

⁸ Christine Robinson, "But First, Spirituality: Spirituality and Religious Education in Western Australian Catholic Early Learning Contexts", *Journal of Religious Education* 14 / 2 (2023) 269-281.

⁹ Said Imam Ghazali et al., "Problematizing Gen-Z Muslims' Historical Literacy About the Pandemic and Its Impact on Muslim Worship Practices", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 26/1 (2021) 321-334.

¹⁰ Filiz Öztürk – Mustafa Genç, "Understanding the religious attitudes of Generation Z: A study on university students in Turkey", *Journal of Education and Practice* 11/23, 117-124.

¹¹ Kavlak Ebru – Akova Sibel, "Y ve Z Kuşağının Kahve Kültürünün Popüler Kültür Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi", *Namık Kemal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksek Okulu Dergisi* 4/2 (2022) 1-33.

¹² Ross Gordon et al., "A framework for sustainable marketing", *Marketing theory* 11/2 (2011) 152.

positive impact on Gen Z's purchasing intentions, with this effect being stronger for higher-priced items.¹³ Similarly, Gordon et al. found that Gen Z consumers perceive influencer marketing as more authentic and trustworthy than traditional advertising, leading to a higher likelihood of purchasing products recommended by influencers.¹⁴

In addition to its impact on purchasing behavior, influencer sharing can also affect Gen Z's brand loyalty. Studies have found that Gen Z consumers are more likely to be loyal to brands recommended by influencers.¹⁵ This loyalty is due to the trust and credibility established by the influencers' recommendations and their personal connection to their followers. For example, Khamis et al. found that Gen Z consumers are more likely to trust and be loyal to brands recommended by influencers who align with their values and interests.¹⁶ Similarly, Lee and Watkins found that influencers' recommendations can lead to increased brand loyalty by creating an emotional connection between the brand and the consumer.¹⁷

While influencer sharing can have a positive impact on Gen Z's purchasing behavior and brand loyalty, it can also affect their perception of influencer marketing as a whole. Some studies have found that Gen Z consumers are becoming increasingly skeptical of influencer marketing, as they are aware of the sponsored nature of many influencer posts.¹⁸ For example, Brinkman found that Gen Z consumers perceive influencer marketing as inauthentic and fake, leading to a lack of trust in the influencers and the products they endorse.¹⁹ Similarly, Chen and Li found that the perceived authenticity of the influencer has a significant impact on Gen Z's trust and purchase intentions.²⁰ All these researches show that the Z generation is closer to popular culture rather than their own culture. All these studies were conducted with individuals in the researchers' countries. Therefore, individuals exhibit a behavior closer to popular culture with the influence of social media tools rather than the cultural environment in their physical environment. Another prominent observation is that popular culture directs the individual to consumption and keeps them away from value judgments in real life. Popular culture products marketed through influencers are in demand by Generation Z. Considering the close relationship between religion and culture, consumption, in other words, with the influence of popular culture, it is seen as a possible result that Generation Z, who moved away from their own culture, will also move away from religious values.

¹³ Chung-Wha (Chloe), Ki- Youn-Kyung Kim, "Investigating the mechanism through which consumers are "inspired by" social media influencers and "inspired to" adopt influencers' exemplars as social defaults". *Journal of Business Research* 144/1 (2022) 270.

¹⁴ Gordon et al, "A framework for sustainable marketing", 155.

¹⁵ Susie, Khamis, et al. "Self-branding, 'micro-celebrity' and the rise of Social Media Influencers". *Celebrity Studies* 1 / 1 (2016) 14-16; Jung Eun, Lee- Brandi, Watkins, "YouTube vloggers' influence on consumer luxury brand perceptions and intentions". *Journal of Business Research* 69 / 12 (2016) 5753-5760.

¹⁶ Khamis, et al. "Self-branding, 'micro-celebrity' and the rise of Social Media Influencers", 15.

¹⁷ Lee-Watkins, "YouTube vloggers' influence on consumer luxury brand perceptions and intentions", 5760.

¹⁸ bk. Wouter J. Brinkman, "Generation Z and Influencer Marketing: A Consumer Perspective". *Journal of Advertising Research* 60/1 (2020); Yuanfu Chen – Xuesong Li, "Do Influencers Help to Enhance the Perceived Authenticity of User-Generated Content? A Study of Generation Z Consumers", *International Journal of Advertising* 39/1 (2020).

¹⁹ Brinkman, "Generation Z and Influencer Marketing: A Consumer Perspective", 23.

²⁰ Chen-Li, "Do Influencers Help to Enhance the Perceived Authenticity of User-Generated Content? A Study of Generation Z Consumers", 18.

According to a study by the Pew Research Center, social media use is associated with a decline in face-to-face communication skills, empathy, and trust in others, particularly among younger generations.²¹ This erosion of social skills can lead to a disconnection from cultural heritage and a lack of understanding of the values and traditions that are important to different communities. Furthermore, the promotion of certain products or lifestyles by influencers can reinforce negative cultural stereotypes and undermine the efforts of communities to preserve their cultural heritage. For example, the portrayal of Native American culture in fashion campaigns can perpetuate stereotypes and undermine efforts to preserve and promote traditional Native American culture.²² Additionally, the use of social media and influencers can lead to a loss of critical thinking skills and independent thought, as individuals become more reliant on others' opinions and recommendations.²³ This loss of critical thinking can lead to a further erosion of cultural values, as individuals may not have the tools or skills to evaluate the impact of certain behaviors or decisions on their cultural heritage. Therefore, it is important to understand the potential negative effects of social media influencers on cultural values, particularly among Generation Z.

On the other hand, several studies have been conducted in Turkey to explore the effects of social media and influencers on the cultural and religious understanding of young people. A study by Taşdelen examined the role of social media influencers in shaping the cultural values and beliefs of young people in Turkey. The study found that influencers have a significant impact on the cultural understanding of young people, particularly in the areas of fashion, beauty, and lifestyle. According to the results of this study, young people are alienated from national culture and religious values. Instead of religion and cultural values, they prefer to position their lives more instantly and on entertainment.²⁴

A study by Arıcan ve Arıcı explored the negative impact of social media and influencers on the cultural and religious understanding of young people in Turkey. The study found that exposure to non-traditional lifestyles and values on social media can lead to a decline in religious and cultural values among young people.²⁵ As it can be understood from here, young people find the views of social media phenomena important instead of values such as religion and culture.

A similar research was conducted by Varsak. This research basically examined the impact of young people's social media use on their religious beliefs and behaviors. Within the scope of the research, 760 students were reached. According to the results of the study, a decrease in religious beliefs and behaviors was determined with the increase in social media use. According to the study investigating culture and religion together, the effect of the intensity of social media use on young people's distance from their own cultural values has been determined.²⁶

²¹ Pew Research Center, "Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018", 9-13.

²² University of Sheffield. "Fashion brands must do more to tackle stereotypes of Native Americans", (Accessed 03 May 2023).

²³ Jenkin Thomas, "Is Instagram ruining your life?", (Accessed 05 May 2023).

²⁴ Birgül Taşdelen, "Dijital Çağın Yeni Trendi Sosyal Medya Etkileyicileri: Vloggerların Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Satın Alma Davranışı Üzerindeki Etkisi", *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Science* 19/3 (2020) 1071-1098.

²⁵ Sümeyra Arıcan – Handan Arıcı, "Sosyal Medyanın Gençlerin Din Algısına Etkileri." *Pamukkale Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 8/2 (2021) 1062-1106

²⁶ Varsak, Osman, "Sosyal Medyanın Dinî Yaşantıya Etkileri: Bursa İl Merkezindeki Lise Öğrencileri Örneği", *Din ve Bilim - Muş Alparslan Üniversitesi İslami İlimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 5/1 (2022), 87-108.

These studies, along with the ones mentioned earlier, provide a comprehensive understanding of the effects of social media and influencers on the cultural and religious understanding of young people in Turkey. On the other hand, studies both in Turkey and in the world clearly reveal that the Z generation is much more open to the influence of social media and influencers.

3. Method

First a basic research question was determined and then related questions were formed. During the interview, the study was supported with semi-structured questions. At the same time, some basic questions were asked to the interviewees before the interview in order to find suitable interviewees. Interviews were continued with those who gave appropriate answers to these basic questions, and ended with those who did not. In this context, in-depth interviews were conducted with 15 people. The main problem is to understand whether the interaction of the Z generation with influencers distances them from the religion of Islam and Turkish culture. Throughout the research, the researcher conducted the interviews one-on-one. Each interview lasted approximately 1-2 hours, depending on the scope of the interviewer's answers.

Within the scope of semi-structured in-depth interviews, 8 basic questions were asked to the interviewees, and the interview was deepened by asking parallel questions to these questions during the interview. The basic questions of the research are;

1. How many influencers do you follow?
2. Can you evaluate the influencers you follow based on Turkish culture and religious structure?
3. Can you evaluate the posts of the influencers you follow within their religious and cultural context?
4. Have you purchased any products recommended by influencers you follow? Can you evaluate influencer influence on your purchasing opinions?
5. In your opinion, what religious and cultural codes do your friends around you behave against due to the influence of social media?
6. Could you evaluate the impact of social media and influencers on individuals' opinions within the scope of Turkish culture and Islamic religion? Are you a religious person who performs religious rituals? If yes, are your views and lifestyle shaped by influencers? If yes, how?
7. What is the role of your peer circle in choosing the influencers you follow on social media?
8. Are you physically distant from your family? Can you evaluate its relationship with your presence in the social media environment?

4. Findings and Analysis

There are always videos of influencers in the discover sections of social networks so that people can follow more influencers. Therefore, whether people want it or not, if they use social media, they are definitely exposed to influencer shares. When a member of the Z generation is exposed to these, it is possible to be affected faster and to follow similar posts. In general, it has been observed that the Z generation is more affected by what they see and hear. As a result, it is possible to say

that they are influenced by more influencers than they follow along with their exposure to social media tools.

Influencers serve a common and subsequently formed culture, whether they are Turkish or foreign. It is possible to say that especially Turks are influenced by foreign influencers and share. In this context, it continues its life under the umbrella of a common culture formed by the effect of globalization in the world. It is possible to call this culture consumer culture or popular culture. In this context, *I position Influencers very differently from my family and the society I live in. They themselves constitute a reality. I think this reality is far from religion and Turkish culture. I am aware and I try to control myself* statements support these views. However, this statement belongs to only one of the 15 interviewees. The remaining 14 people stated that they care about their influencer sharing, that they enjoy them very much and that they care more about what they say than their family. At the same time, there is an interviewee who stated that there is no place for religion and national culture in this new world: *It cannot be said that they are not suitable for Turkish culture and religious structure, as they do not directly share content related to Turkish culture and religious structure. I think religion and culture no longer matter in this new world. The important thing is to somehow exist and be successful. I can say that the influencers also do this very well.* As can be understood from these view, it is possible to say that the main problem is the lack of culture and religion in influencer posts. The abstraction of individuals from everything is based on influencer shares. This is not *atheism* being talked about here. The main thing to draw attention to is the absence of religion. It is possible to say that there is a more neutral attitude. According to the answers of the interviewees, influencers base their posts on consumption, happiness, entertainment, popular culture elements, beauty, wealth, and perfection by excluding religion or culture completely. Therefore, it is possible to say that influencers have built a world and that this world has certain rules.

All interviewees stated that influencers aim to politicize the public. In fact, influencers express their views on politics, just like an opinion leader. Therefore, this shows that they are aware of their own effects. It would not be wrong to say that they aim to shape the political views of their followers by imposing their own views. On the other hand, an interviewer stated that influencers shared special videos about the need to respect everyone, especially during Ramadan, within the scope of Islam, and that people should respect everything, not just religious rituals. This statement actually supports the idea of establishing a neutral judicial system in society.

In the context of the views of the interviewees who evaluated the influencer interaction in terms of religion and culture, it is possible to say that, in general, with this interaction, the young people sympathize with the views imposed by the influencers. They stated that this situation is basically related to the fact that the people around them follow and care about the same people. In this context, it is thought that influencer follow-up and influence are also related to peer selection. Since the closeness between peers directly affects the choice of influencer, young people follow the influencers and shape their lives in line with their suggestions. One of the interviewees said: *All my friends follow influencers and dress, travel, talk and act like them. If I don't follow the same influencers and exhibit the same behaviors, I may be ostracized by my friends.* Another view that supports this is: *I usually choose and follow influencers according to my own taste and perspective, but if there are influencers that I often hear from my peers with similar lifestyles, I definitely follow them as well. Because we talk about their*

posts and sometimes exchange ideas. Another example of this is: *Sometimes I care about and adopt the ideas that my friends share with me, assuming they are their own. But then I see an influencer on social media has a similar opinion.* Accordingly, instead of developing their own ideas, individuals present what they hear from influencers as their own ideas. Therefore, peer selection and interaction should also be evaluated in the context of influencer interaction.

Another important issue is that influencers emphasize Western codes instead of cultural or religious codes. The interviewees stated that the influencers presented Western examples as the best and that these influenced them. One interviewee even stated that he preferred not to go to family visits during religious holidays, influenced by the opinions of an influencer he followed. Because the influencer he followed used the following statements: *Holidays should not become a ritual of visiting relatives, if people cannot rest and have a holiday, when will they. Eid is the ideal time for a person to go on vacation and have fun.* However, another interviewee stated that when the influencers he followed stated that religions consisted of holidays, Ramadan and religious holy days, what is important is to be tolerant, not religion and religious rituals, and he agreed with these ideas. Within the framework of all these views, it is possible to say that the members of the Z generation are affected by these judgments and that influencers build and present a lifestyle and idea structure.

Another interviewee said: *I wear headscarf and I follow influencers that fit my opinion. For example, there are influencers I follow who wear headscarves and have very beautiful make-up. I even started to tie my headscarf just like her.* This view is also quite remarkable from a religious point of view. Therefore, it is clear that influencers have an impact on the views of individuals with all perspectives. A person who fulfills his religious duties and is also an influencer appeals to consumption and a certain lifestyle, similar to the others. This is an indication that influencers are diversifying to appeal to everyone.

At the same time, influencers advertise certain products based on their own preferences. In fact, these characteristics can have an encouraging effect on young people. Young people are influenced by almost all the shares of influencers such as clothing, food, beverage, vacation, living space and try to integrate them into their own lives.

Another interviewee said: *Even when influencers post about religion, there is always a related product or reference. I haven't seen them make a religious post just to express an opinion. As it can be understood from here, even religious values are made a part of commodity culture. At the same time, all of the interviewees stated that they bought at least one of the products recommended by the influencers they follow. This clearly reveals the influence of the influencer. Influencers, who share a certain lifestyle, clothing style, make-up, hair, home, decoration, on every imaginable subject, easily cause buying behavior in their followers. This explains why Gen Z is becoming more and more alike day by day, both in ideas and in appearance. One interviewee used the following statement: As I see the products shared or praised by influencers outside, or when I see other people sharing them, I believe that they are good. Sometimes, more than one influencer can share certain products. In this case, my confidence grows even more. I also feel the need to share them with my friends or on my social media page. There are 8 interviewees who gave similar answers. Therefore, we can say that young people serve to spread the style and style shared by influencers.*

It should be noted that there are a lot of young people who are affected by influencers, as they openly reveal their lifestyles, homes, boy/girl friends, preferences and opinions in all their posts. For example, establishing relationships with the opposite sex at a young age and living in the same house, the presentation of clothes that commodify the female body, and the sharing of information by ignoring privacy attract the attention of the interviewees. 10 of the interviewees stated that they found these to be correct and that they did not bother them. At the same time, they added that these are no longer important in this age and that a more modern and contemporary life should be prioritized. However, when the Turkish culture, family structure and religious beliefs are taken into account, on the contrary, these are situations that are not welcome and should not happen.

12 of the interviewees clearly stated that they take influencers as an example and emulate their lifestyle. In fact, all of them used the expression *it is impossible not to be affected by influencers*. Therefore, influencers have a high impact power. It is not an exaggeration to say that all cultural expressions that have become common among young people today are shared by influencers on social media. For example, all of the young people stated that they celebrated Halloween (or some even Christmas) because they saw influencers. This shows that Christian and Western culture was transmitted by influencers and became widespread among young people.

At the same time, influencers are accepted because they share friendly and sincere posts. They even negate and corrupt religious and cultural codes by transforming them from negation into a different form. Therefore, the following impression is formed in people's minds that *influencers respect every idea, they have no bad intentions*. This strengthens their sphere of influence. However, since influencers normalize many issues in their minds, the interviewees state that they are not against and even respect the Turkish culture and religious structure.

The interviewees stated that their friends on social media also influence each other. For example, Generation Z spends more time with their friends in social media tools than face to face. Their likes, shares and interests are clearly visible on social media tools. Therefore, a Z generation member who follows the influencer actually shares it with all his/her friends on social media tools. In this sense, we can say that young people also affect each other's influencer choices. 10 of the interviewees openly stated that they notice and follow influencers through their friends' posts. The most important reason why young people are affected by these influencers is their consumption-supportive posts. For example; issues such as discount coupons, free gifts, redirected pages, discounted product information make influencers attractive to young people. On the other hand, the discover sections of social media tools allow people to see the posts of influencers that they do not follow but followed by the people they interact with.

It is worth noting that students studying outside the city become more open to social media influence as they move away from their families. All but 2 of the interviewees stated that they used social media tools more intensively when they were away from their families. Therefore, it is important to note that when individuals disconnect from physical communication and spend more time in virtual environments, the rate of their exposure increases. This situation causes the information obtained from new media to be reflected more in the person's life in the process. All interviewees spend significant time on social media. It is quite natural for individuals to be

influenced by the cultural activities of influencers they have just met on social media, rather than the cultural activities in their physical environment.

Another important issue is the relationship between the rate of social media usage and religious rituals (such as prayer, fasting, reading the Quran). 5 of the young people clearly stated that they are committed to their religion and perform rituals whenever possible. On the other hand, 5 young people stated that they have a respect for religion inherited from their family, but they do not fulfill religious rituals. 2 of them revealed that they did not belong to any religion and 3 of them revealed that they cared about all religions. When asked about the increase in social media use or the impact of influencers' religious views and perspectives on their lives, it was revealed that all but three of them were affected. All 3 of them stated that they sometimes felt reluctant to fulfill their religious obligations. The most emphasized thing among the interviewees is that the individual should live the religion within him/herself, what is important is that the person's heart is clean. One of the interviewees expressed his views with the following statements: *In this era, I think religions should not be separated. All religions talk about the same thing. My belief in religion is decreasing day by day. I want to earn a lot of money and be happy. I think influencers guide us. I care about their opinions. They are happy and make a lot of money. I envy their lives. This is the new world and we must all adapt to it.* These sharp statements clearly reveal that the individual is under influence.

The interviewees' views on issues such as compassion, helpfulness, carrying out cultural and religious activities, individuality and social benefit are generally that they all prioritize individuality and that prominent cultural phenomena such as compassion and helpfulness are disappearing in this time. In particular, the individual's perception of material and consumption as important causes emotional weakness. It causes the person's spiritual feelings to be damaged and, over time, distance from cultural and religious phenomena. Even the habits of young people who are more interested in material facts than spiritual facts in daily life are changing. All of the interviewees clearly stated that they care about consumption and that the desire for consumption directs their lives today. They also added that social media had an impact on this.

As a result of all these interviews, it can be said that influencers have a high influence on young people. Young people are not fully conscious of this change, as they change their religious and cultural perceptions in general. Influencers and peers alike influence the views of young people. All young people care about the opinions of the influencers they follow and buy products depending on their recommendations and carry out various activities in their lives. Influencers who share discount codes, especially at times such as New Year's Eve, Halloween, Christmas, highlight such Christian and Western customs. Almost all of the interviewees stated that they celebrate such days. There are certain influencers who are popular among young people in general. This, in fact, causes the views and behaviors of young people to resemble each other over time. Influencers cause the commodification of everything with their lifestyles, posts and advertisements. This is the most important reason for alienation and cultural/religious corruption, especially among young people. *I think influencers are showing everyone, religious or secular, that it's possible to be whatever they want. Thanks to influencers, young people can express themselves politically, religiously and culturally as they wish.* As can be understood from this statement of an interviewer, the influence of influencers in shaping the general life is powerful and shocking.

Discussion and Conclusion

Important data has been obtained within the scope of in-depth interviews conducted with 15 members of Generation Z concerning religious and cultural values. It is possible to clearly state that the interviewees are influenced by influencer posts. Influencers offer their followers a new reality and a constructed lifestyle. These individuals try to impose their constructs on their followers. Additionally, as influencer posts heavily focus on consumption within the framework of popular culture, young people tend to detach themselves from their own cultural and religious values, considering them insignificant. It is important to only respect every perspective and have a perspective that is free from religious/cultural elements.

This study also emphasizes that influencer influence occurs in conjunction with peer influence. Peer interaction takes place both face-to-face and on social media platforms. As a result, young people end up following the same influencers on average and discussing the same topics. Moreover, due to the fact that social media and the internet have allowed the emergence of influencers not only in Turkey but also in the West, these individuals value the opinions of Western influencers. In fact, Turkish individuals even create similar content to that of Western influencers. This leads to the emergence of Western codes and the assimilation of young people into this culture. Consequently, the lifestyle, opinions, relationships, and preferences of Generation Z are shaped by influencer influence. Influencer posts that commodify the female body, influenced by Western culture, can also have an impact on young people.

In general, it is possible to say that Turks are influenced by foreign influencers. Within this context, they continue to live under a common cultural umbrella created by globalization. This culture can be referred to as consumer culture or popular culture. One of the interviewees supports these views by stating: *I position influencers differently from my family and the society I live in. They create their own reality. I believe this reality is far removed from religion and Turkish culture. I am aware of it and I try to control myself.* However, this statement belongs to only one of the 15 interviewees. The remaining 14 individuals expressed that they value influencer posts, enjoy them more than their families' opinions, and pay more attention to what influencers say. There is also an interviewee who states that there is no place for Turkish culture and religious structure in this new world: *It cannot be said that they are not suitable for Turkish culture and religious structure, even though they do not directly share content related to Turkish culture and religious structure. In my opinion, in this new world, religion and culture no longer have any significance. What is important is to exist somehow and be successful. I can say that influencers do this very well.* These opinions also indicate that the fundamental problem lies in the cultural and religious indifference displayed in influencer posts. The isolation of individuals from everything has been the basis of influencer posts. The term *atheism* is not mentioned here. It is more accurate to say that the focus is on the absence of religion. A more neutral attitude can be identified. What is important and imposed in influencer posts are phenomena such as *consumption, happiness, entertainment, elements of popular culture, beauty, wealth, perfection.* The interviewees particularly emphasized these phenomena in their responses. Therefore, it is possible to say that influencers have constructed a world and this world has certain rules.

According to the results obtained, it is possible to clearly see the effects of the intense influencer interaction created by Generation Z through social media tools, which is the main purpose of this research, on religious and cultural values. Individuals, especially during university periods, move away from their families and family values and become more open to the effects of social media. An individual falls within the cultural influence of wherever and with whom he/she spends the most time. Social media communication, which has over time surpassed physical communication, especially among Generation Z, covers an important part of daily life. As a result, it seems natural that young people are influenced by these environments where they spend a long time.

Culture and religion include many rituals. The influence of family and social environment has an important place in shaping a person's spiritual life.²⁷ The findings of the study clearly reveal that the Influencer effect on young people disconnects them from spiritual life and causes them to become more worldly. Young people, who are constantly exposed to entertainment and consumption elements during the time they spend on social media tools, believe that they will have a good time thanks to consumption. Generation Z, who has moved away from their families over time and increased their interaction time on social media, has started to secularize by prioritizing material life in order to have more fun and be like the Influencers whose lives they emulate. Studies in the literature revealing the negative impact of social media on cultural life indicate that young people are moving away from religion and becoming morally corrupt. Cultural values that are accustomed to in the traditional cultural society structure have been damaged by the influence of Influencers on social media. Values that stand out in traditional culture, such as privacy, contentment, sacrifice, humility, cooperation and solidarity, also suffered from this destruction.²⁸

There are also various previous studies in the literature that support the findings of this study. One of these was realized by Arıcı. According to the findings of this research, social media constitutes an important area of influence in young people's alienation from religious beliefs and values.²⁹ Similarly, according to the results of the study conducted by Yazıcı, social media use distances individuals from religious life. The most basic finding of this research is that the increase in young people's use of social media increases their material perception, leading to an increase in the importance they attach to worldly interests.³⁰ At the same time, the finding of another study conducted by Ghazni is that the use of social media turns religion and values into a consumption commodity and alienates individuals from religious life.³¹ A similar study conducted by Kurttekin

²⁷ Varsak, "Sosyal Medyanın Dinî Yaşantıya Etkileri: Bursa İl Merkezindeki Lise Öğrencileri Örneği", 106.

²⁸ Asiye Kakırman Yıldız, "Sosyal Paylaşım Sitelerinin Dijital Yerlilerin Bilgi Edinme ve Mahremiyet Anlayışına Etkisi", *Bilgi Dünyası*, 2/13(2012), 541.

²⁹ Handan Yalvaç Arıcı – Sümeyra Arıcan, "Ergen Din Tasavvurunun İnşasında Sosyal Medya", *Kalemname*, 12(2021), 88.

³⁰ Tuğba Nur Yazıcı, *Gençlerin Sosyal Medya Kullanım Sıklıkları İle Materyalistlik Eğilimleri Arasındaki İlişkinin İncelenmesi*, (İstanbul, Üsküdar Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2018), 85.

³¹ Didem Gazneli, "Tüketim Toplumu Bağlamında Türkiye'de Yeni Medyanın Muhafazakârlığın Dönüşümü ve Dinî Değerlerin Metalaşması Üzerine Etkisi" (Aydın: Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2020), 151-152

concluded that social media causes identity confusion by alienating young people from spiritual values.³² The findings of this research differ from others in terms of influencer effect.

Today, individuals are under significant influence in digital spaces due to reasons such as popular culture and the corruption of culture. This effect is increasing day by day. The increase in time and interaction spent on social media tools also leads to an increase in impact. Young people's physical distance from their families and influencer communication in social media environments can cause religious and cultural changes in their lives. Today, young people are based on the lifestyles of influencers rather than the culture imposed on them by their families. Their view of life, interpretation of religious values, sense of entertainment and pleasure are under the influence of influencers. Accordingly, it would not be an exaggeration to say that Islamic identity has degenerated and the new generation has grown up lacking basic values such as identity and culture.

In conclusion, one of the most important findings of the study is that influencers have turned even religious values into part of the meta-culture and influenced their followers' purchasing behavior. This demonstrates the influence power of influencers and their effects on their followers. Additionally, it is evident that influencers openly share their lifestyles and preferences, and young people are influenced by these posts.

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³² Kurttekin, Fatma, “Bilişim Çağında ‘Gençlik, Din ve Değer’ Konularını Ele Alan Makaleler Üzerine Bir İnceleme”, *Eskiyeni*, 45(2021), 791.

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Determination of the Establishment, Development and Activity Areas of the French Institute of Oriental Studies: Inalco

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ABSTRACT

Language is a fundamental phenomenon that enables the expression of thoughts, the transmission of knowledge, and social interaction. Language education is an activity that facilitates cross-cultural communication and helps individuals gain the skills to communicate effectively worldwide. Knowing multiple languages opens one up to different cultures and perspectives. Government officials in France, who intend to be a civilized and interactive society that does not want to lag behind in the world order they live in, have taken significant steps in the field of language education. In 1795, they established Inalco, a specialized institution for Eastern languages, and began training experts who would learn the languages spoken in the Islamic world, including Ottoman Turkish. Since its inception, Inalco has systematically expanded its range of languages, incorporating Turkish, Arabic, Chinese, Persian, Hindi, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Hebrew, and many other Eastern languages. Those who learn and speak these languages help France maintain strong ties with the East and continue to engage with the states in that region, whether remotely or closely.

With a history spanning approximately four centuries, Inalco has not only been a center for language education but also stands as a leading institution among Oriental studies, nurturing numerous orientalists and providing opportunities for the production of works in various fields. In line with its mission, the institution has specialized in Eastern languages and civilizations for an extended period, producing pioneering figures whose work promotes cultural interaction and fosters intercultural understanding. Expanding its scope continually through its institutional experience, Inalco now conducts research on almost every world language and civilization. With its expertise in language and culture and its deep-rooted history, Inalco is recognized as a respected institution globally.

Language experts trained at Inalco have actively participated in the French government's diplomatic and trade relations by providing translation services to officials. They have also maintained instructional positions to teach their respective languages to the younger generations and played significant roles in promoting an understanding of the cultures they were engaged with. Although their primary work was in the field of oriental studies, they have been instrumental in uncovering, evaluating, and categorizing elements of Eastern culture, thus contributing to the preservation of these cultural aspects. Many Eastern scholars, such as Silvestre de Sacy, Louis Bazin, Régis Blachère, Louis Massignon, and others, have been nurtured here, serving both their own countries and Eastern culture. However, it's a fact that there hasn't been enough research on institutions like Inalco in academic circles. Therefore, after introducing Inalco's establishment, operation, and fields of activity, this study will focus on Inalco's mission as an Oriental studies institution. The study which was created through field research, observation, and information obtained from authoritative sources, aims to fill this research gap.

Keywords: İslamic History, France, Oriental Studies, Inalco, Language Education.

Fransız Şarkiyat Kurumu Inalco'nun Kuruluş, Gelişim ve Faaliyet Alanlarının Tespiti

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ÖZ

Dil, düşüncelerin ifade edilmesini, bilgi aktarımını ve sosyal etkileşimi sağlayan temel bir olgudur. Dil eğitimi ise kültürler arası iletişimi kolaylaştıran ve dünya genelinde etkili iletişim kurma becerisi kazandıran bir faaliyettir. Birden fazla dil bilmek, farklı kültürlere ve bakış açlarına açık olmayı sağlar. Yaşadığı dünya düzeni içerisinde çağın gerisinde kalmak istemeyen, uygar ve etkileşimli bir toplum olma niyetini taşıyan Fransa hükümet yetkilileri dil eğitimi konusunda ciddi adımlar atmıştır. 1795 yılında Doğu dilleri üzerine uzmanlaş Inalco'yu kurarak başta Osmanlı olmak üzere İslâm dünyasının konuştuğu dili öğrenen uzmanlar yetiştirmeye başlamıştır. Kuruluşundan itibaren sistemli bir şekilde dil yelpazesini genişleten Inalco, Türkçe, Arapça, Çince, Farsça, Hintçe, Japonca, Korece, Rusça, İbranice ve daha birçok Doğu dilini bünyesine katmıştır. Bu dilleri öğrenen ve konuşan kişiler sayesinde Fransa, Doğuyla olan münasebetini güçlü tutmakta ve burada bulunan devletlerle uzaktan yahut yakından temas içerisinde kalmayı sürdürmektedir.


Yaklaşık dört asırlık geçmişiyle Inalco, bir dil eğitimi merkezi olmanın yanında şarkiyat kurumları içerisinde önde gelen, sayısız oryantalist yetiştirip çeşitli sahalarda eserlerin yazılmasına imkân tanıyan bir kurumdur. Kuruluş, misyonuna uygun olarak uzun süre Doğu dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerine uzmanlaşmış öncü isimleri yetiştirip çalışmalarıyla kültürel etkileşimi teşvik etmiş ve kültürler arası anlayışı geliştirmeye yardımcı olmuştur. Kurumsal tecrübesiyle ilgi alanını hep genişleten Inalco günümüzde neredeyse tüm dünya dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerine çalışmalarını devam ettirmektedir. Artık dil ve kültür alanındaki uzmanlığı ve köklü geçmişiyle dünya genelinde saygın bir kurum olarak kabul edilmektedir.

Inalco'da yetişen dil uzmanları Fransız hükümetinin diplomatik ve ticari ilişkilerinde aktif rol alarak bu konularda yetkililere tercümanlık hizmeti sunmuşlardır. Aynı zamanda uzman oldukları dillerin yeni nesillere öğretilmesinde öğretici pozisyonlarını korumuşlar ve ilişkide oldukları kültürlerin tanınmasında da önemli roller üstlenmişlerdir. Her ne kadar yaptıkları iş şarkiyat hizmeti olsa da Doğu kültürüne ait mirasın gün yüzüne çıkartılmasında, değerlendirilmesinde ve tasnifinde yer alarak bu kültürler için öğelerin korunmasında yardımcı unsur olmuşlardır. Silvestre de Sacy, Louis Bazin, Régis Blachère, Louis Massignon vb. birçok Doğu bilimci burada yetişerek hem kendi ülkelerine hem de Doğu kültürüne hizmet etmişlerdir. Ancak akademik ortamda Inalco ve benzeri kurumlar üzerine yeterli kadar çalışmanın olmadığı da bir gerçektir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada, Inalco'nun kuruluşu, işleyiş şekli ve faaliyet alanları tanıttıldıktan sonra bir şarkiyat kurumu olarak misyonu üzerinde durulacaktır. Saha araştırması, gözlem, yetkili mercilerden alınan bilgi ve belgelerle oluşturulan çalışmanın alandaki boşluğu dolduracağı düşünülmektedir.


Anahtar Kelimeler: İslam Tarihi, Fransa, Şarkiyat, Inalco, Dil Eğitimi.

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Introduction

While the origins of Oriental studies or, in a more modern understanding, Orientalism are assumed to date back to the 9th and 10th centuries, it has to be said that this is a misleading estimate, even if it is well-meaning. In reality, the West's active interest in the riches of the East can be traced back to periods even before the Common Era. The dazzling allure of the Eastern civilizations prompted the Greek and Roman civilizations to embark on numerous campaigns to assert influence over the East, some of which were conducted under the guise of religious endeavors. This enduring interest has taken various forms throughout history, serving purposes such as anti-Islamic sentiments and missionary activities during the Middle Ages. Subsequently, it gained momentum through the Crusades, the Renaissance, and the Reformation movements, but underwent a significant transformation after the 1789 French Revolution. During Europe's process of modernization and the simultaneous colonization of the world, the interest in other communities underwent significant variations. Therefore, Orientalism, which could not evolve into a systematic production in earlier periods, began to be perceived as an academic field of study from the 18th century onwards. In this sense, its history coincides with the development of social sciences and is profoundly influenced by the intellectual and academic activities of the time. Orientalist research has also made positive contributions to the preservation of humanity's cultural heritage. Well-intentioned efforts have been made by individual experts in Orientalism. However, it is evident that Orientalism, as a discourse, has serious issues.

Although the Orientalist efforts organized by Western powers may appear similar on the surface, they contain inherent differences. French Orientalism, with its distinct characteristics, is defined by the studies conducted by French intellectuals and academics on the cultures, languages, histories, and civilizations of the East. During this period, France took a significant interest in the East, leading to various research endeavors, travels, and intellectual pursuits aimed at discovering and understanding the East.

In France, the establishment and continuation of certain Orientalist institutions became a state policy. Notable among these are the Collège de France, founded in 1530, the Institut de France established in 1635, and the Société Asiatique (Asian Society) founded in 1822. In the present day, the origins of Inalco (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales/National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilizations), an important Orientalist institution, can be traced back to the establishment of École des Langues Orientales Vivantes (School of Living Eastern Languages) in 1669 by the French statesman Jean-Baptiste Colbert (d. 1683).¹ In addition to educational activities, Inalco has been a pioneer in organizing conferences and symposiums. Following the first Orientalist congress in Europe held in Paris in 1873, the city became a prominent hub for Orientalist studies, particularly from the early 19th century to the end of World War II. As a result, the process of institutionalization in the realm of Orientalism began well before these dates in France, which is considered one of the important centres of Orientalism.

French Orientalism contains academic studies across various disciplines. These studies have been conducted in fields such as linguistics, history, literature, archaeology, art history, anthropology, and religious studies. In its early stages, the focus was primarily on regions including the Ottoman Empire's

¹ Faruk Bilici, "Fransa", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 1996), 13/190.

area of influence, the Middle East, North Africa, and India. In this context, a wide range of activities emerged, including the establishment of educational and research institutions, Orientalist societies, and a spectrum of publications ranging from the publication of essential Islamic sources to translation activities, research works, dictionaries, and encyclopedias. French Orientalists, through studying and translating Eastern languages and cultures, conducting historical and archaeological research, and seeking to understand the social, political, and religious structures of Eastern societies, have accumulated significant knowledge.

On an academic level, the ultimate goal of understanding the East was to contribute to the construction of a powerful and prosperous France. As interest in the wealth of the East grew in 16th-century Europe, particularly due to the Ottoman Empire, seen as the largest state of the era, campaigns to learn Ottoman Turkish and other languages used in the Islamic world began. Inspired by the Venetian model, which was to send its citizens to Istanbul to learn Turkish starting from 1551, other states, including France, were influenced to adopt policies in line with the trends of the time. Following this model, concrete steps were taken to educate interpreters proficient in Eastern languages and scholars knowledgeable about the East. Inalco is one of these institutions, and this article aims to shed light on its history and mission. Given its long history and the multitude of scholars it has hosted, promotional efforts have been conducted approximately every fifty years, mainly through works written in French. Therefore, there is a clear need for comprehensive studies that introduce institutions like Inalco from various perspectives. Additionally, it is important to understand the stages of the institution's development, its fields of activity, and its foundations within the context of Oriental studies. Naturally, conducting field research is essential to establish such a study on solid ground. Therefore, this study has been crafted through interactions with experts and authorities in relevant institutions, particularly on-site (in Paris) at Inalco and other related organizations' libraries.

1. Foundation and Historical Development

Inalco is commonly known as an institution established on March 30, 1795, during the French Revolution (1789-1799). However, while this is partially accurate, its origins actually date back further.² One of the preliminary steps can be traced to the establishment of the Collège de France by French scholar Guillaume Budé (1467-1540).³ At a time when France's King Francis I (1494-1547) recognized the need for qualified translators in diplomacy and economy, French intellectuals were also insistent on preserving ancient languages. This dual need led to the idea of establishing a language school in France.⁴ Having close ties to the royal court due to his family's high-ranking positions, Budé took on roles as a notary and secretary to the king after studying civil law. King Francis I, who encouraged and supported developments in arts and literature, called upon Budé to engage in literary and philological matters when

² Pierre Labrousse (ed.), *Langues O' 1795-1995, Deux siècles d'histoire de l'École des Langues Orientales* (Paris: Éditions Hervas, 1995), 21.

³ Marie-Madeleine de La Garanderie, "Guillaume Bude, a Philosopher of Culture", *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 19/3 (1988), 379.

⁴ Luce Marchal Albert, "La Dédicace Du de Philologia (1532) de Guillaume Budé", *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 67/1 (2005), 109.

he ascended the throne.⁵ The king, influenced by Budé, enacted a law in 1530 to establish the Collège des Lecteurs du Roi (The Royal Readers' College), known as Collège de France, dedicated to literature and philology.⁶ Since then, this college began providing specialized education in Eastern languages.

By the year 1669, the significance of establishing a language school became even more evident. Heavy taxes imposed by the Turks, coupled with the low quality of French goods, inadequacies in marketing products, and shortcomings in price determination, had left France lagging behind other European nations in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁷ The mistrust and ill-treatment towards local translators who interpreted negotiations with the Ottomans were also concerning. Consequently, during the reign of France's King Louis XIV,⁸ Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), a prominent statesman who held a crucial ministry position, found himself compelled to carry out a series of economic reforms to strengthen France's economy and trade.⁹ These periods were marked by significant efforts of France to increase its influence in the East.¹⁰




Image 1: Report from the French Consul in Aleppo to Colbert, detailing the challenges faced in commercial relations.

On November 18, 1669, a new language school was proposed with the recommendation of Colbert. With the encouragement of the Trade Council, it was decided that every three years, six children aged nine or ten would be sent to the Capuchin/Jesuit Monasteries in Istanbul and Izmir.

⁵ Gilbert Gadoffre, *La Révolution Culturelle Dans la France des Humanistes* (Geneve: Droz, 1997), 218.

⁶ M. Jean Leclant, "Discours", *Institut de France (Célébration du bicentenaire de l'École des Langues orientales)* 1 (1995), 4; Albert, "La Dédicace Du de Philologia (1532) de Guillaume Budé", 110.

⁷ Robert Mantran, "À Vorigiine de Lecole Nationale Des Langues Orientales / Vivantes : L'ecole Des Jeunes de Langues", *Institut de France (Célébration du bicentenaire de l'École des Langues orientales)* 1 (1995), 9.

⁸ Louis-Dieudonné de France, also known as Louis XIV, is the longest-reigning king in the history of France. He ruled from 1643 to 1715 as the monarch of the Kingdom of France. He is also referred to by the French as Louis Le Grand or le Roi-Soleil.

⁹ François Luchaire (ed.), *L'Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales* (Paris: Comité National d'Evaluation (CNE), 1991), 9; Bernard Hourcade, "Iranian Studies in France", *Iranian Studies* 20/2 (1987), 4; Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 21.

¹⁰ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 21.

These children were referred to as “Jeunes de Langues,” meaning “Language Youths.” The plan was for the students to receive education partly in Paris and then in Istanbul. Before the six children, aged nine or ten, set off for education in Istanbul, they received schooling at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, which was established in 1563.¹¹ The first generation educated in this school mostly consisted of children of French diplomats or merchants operating in the Ottoman Empire or Christian regions of the East.¹² However, the language education did not proceed as intended. Only the school in Pera (Beyoğlu/Istanbul) continued its education activities partially. Yet, there was insufficient infrastructure for Arabic and Persian lessons there.¹³ These children, who continued their studies through a sort of scholarship, did not yield the expected benefits and ended up participating in significant missionary activities.

With the opening of language schools in Istanbul by France, Austria, Poland, and a few other countries aimed at training translators, studies on Ottoman Turkish took on an institutional dimension in the late 17th century. Indeed, the famous work “Bibliothèque Orientale” by Barthélemy d'Herbelot de Molainville (1625-1695) marked a significant step. The author was cataloging manuscripts in the royal library and working on a trilingual dictionary encompassing Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. Among these three languages, European scholars had a keen interest.¹⁴

In the year 1700, a wealthy woman donated 10,000 livres under the condition of supporting young Armenians trained for Catholic missions in Turkey. In response, Louis XIV reorganized the Lycée Louis-le-Grand, enabling twelve Armenian children to continue their education there. By 1705, the school had around ten students aged between 14 and 28, with seven being Greek and three being Armenian.¹⁵ In 1721, it was decided that students at the School of Interpreters would be selected exclusively from among the French or, more accurately, in succession, from children born in France and families of established merchants.¹⁶ The curriculum then focused on Latin, Ancient Greek, Turkish, and Arabic.

French orientalist Louis-Mathieu Langlès (1763-1824) expressed his dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the courses offered at the Royal College in the year 1790 in a paper titled “A Petition to the National Assembly.” Consequently, he proposed the idea of establishing a new school for Oriental languages that would be more suitable for fulfilling the goals of diligent individuals, rather than merely satisfying a king's pride.¹⁷ However, such a project did not have a favorable chance of being accepted

¹¹ Leclant, “Discours”, 4.

¹² Antoine Gautier - Marie de Testa, *Drogmans, diplomates et ressortissants Européens auprès de la Porte Ottomane* (İstanbul: Les Editions Isis, 2013), 31.

¹³ The Capuchins were in charge of the school and their expenses were covered by the Marseille Chamber of Commerce. This was an early example of non-tertiary education and collaboration with the private sector. See. Luchaire, *L'Institut National des Langues*, Students of the Jesuits (Armenian, Greek, Syrian origin) in Paris also attended the classes of this school.

¹⁴ For more detailed information see Alexander Bevilacqua, *Şark Kütüphanesi: İslam ve Avrupa Aydınlanması*, çev. Kenan Çapık (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2020), 57-104.

¹⁵ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 21.

¹⁶ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 22.

¹⁷ “Notice historique sur l'École spéciale des langues orientales vivantes”, 1883 (Bibliothèque nationale de France, Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Littérature et art, 4-X-476), IV.

in the year 1790. The harsh criticisms directed towards existing schools had already unsettled many individuals. As a result, Langlès could not find the support he needed for his proposal.¹⁸

A few years later, a more suitable opportunity arose. In the 1790s, due to the government's policies resulting in the closure of many schools, the shortage of translators had become so serious that finding suitable candidates for vacant positions was extremely difficult. In 1794, French politician and former Catholic priest Joseph Lakanal (1762-1845) presented a report advocating the establishment of a state school.¹⁹ In 1795, the Revolutionary Assembly passed a Decree by Law to establish “L'École Spéciale des Langues Orientales-Langues O” or the Special School of Oriental Languages, abbreviated as “Langues O.”²⁰ The school was founded under the umbrella of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (French National Library) and was located on Rue Neuve de Parette-Champs, with the mission of teaching living Eastern languages to young individuals interested in politics and trade.²¹ The initial languages taught at the school were Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Malay.²² These languages were fundamental to the training of embassy secretaries and interpreters, and many of the researchers who learned them would later become renowned scholars. The institution steadily grew throughout the 19th century, with the addition of new languages. It merged with the school established in 1669 by Colbert to train translators in Oriental languages (L'École des jeunes de langues). In 1874, the school moved to a mansion at the corner of Rue Saint-Pierre.²³

In 1868, the school's name was changed to the Special School for Living Eastern Languages (École Spéciale des Langues Orientales Vivantes). In 1873, the school, known as *Langues'O*, moved from its dependence on the National Library and relocated to an old aristocratic palace on Rue de Lille. In the same year, it began to establish its own book collection.²⁴ In 1914, the school was renamed as the National School for Living Eastern Languages, known by its abbreviation École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes (Enlov)²⁵, and it retained this special status until 1968 when the student movement led to its integration into the university sector as the *Living Eastern Languages University Centre*. During this period, the school's scope expanded further to include African languages, Native American languages, and languages from other regions. Due to the inadequate space on Rue de Lille, some departments were shared with institutions in Paris.

¹⁸ “Notice historique sur l'École spéciale”, V; Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 23-24.

¹⁹ “Notice historique sur l'École spéciale”, III-VIII; Leclant, “Discours”, 3.

²⁰ Mantran, “À Vorigiine De Lecole Nationale Des Langues Orientales / Vivantes : L'ecole Des Jeunes De Langues”, 9-12; Gernot U. Gabel, “200 Jahre Langues'O”, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 146/2 (1996), 1.

²¹ M. Louis Bazin, “Silvestre de Sacy”, *Institut de France (Célébration du bicentenaire de l'École des Langues orientales)* 1 (1995), 20; Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 25-26.

²² Marie-Claire Bergère - Angel Pino (ed.), *Un Siècle d'Enseignement du Chinois à l'École des Langues Orientales (1840-1945)* (Paris: L'Asiathèque, 1995), 28. The most common six languages in the East: Greek, Slavic, Arabian, Persian, Armenian ve Turkish. see. Gautier - Testa, *Drogmans, diplomates et ressortissants Europeens aupres de la Porte Ottomane*, 32.

²³ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 3.

²⁴ Gabel, “200 Jahre Langues'O”, 1.

²⁵ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 34.



Image 2: Inalco on June 1, 1910, with administrator Paul Boyer, which established the first Russian platform, at the centre.

In 1968, the institution had fallen behind the higher education standards of that time. It needed to evolve from being a short-programmed organization for studying Eastern languages and become an autonomous structure with the status of an institute within higher education. By 1971, the institution, previously affiliated with Sorbonne Paris University, changed its name to the National Institute of Languages and Civilizations of the East (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, abbreviated as Inalco), a name that remains in use to this day.²⁶ The addition of *Institut* and *Civilization* to the name signifies a significant step in the institution's evolution. With this name change, Inalco shifted its focus to a broader scope, becoming an international reference point for language instruction, research, and cultural studies. In other words, this transformation aimed to reflect the goal of offering an academic program that not only taught languages but also delved into Eastern cultures. Thus, Inalco maintained pedagogical autonomy and gained financial independence on one hand, while also being associated with the university due to its ability to confer national diplomas.

In 1984, Inalco achieved the status of a *grand établissement*, which translates to *major institution*. The term *grand établissement* refers to a special status granted to specific higher education institutions in France. This status signifies a certain level of autonomy and administrative independence for the institutions.²⁷ Inalco's attainment of the *grand établissement* status provided the institution with greater academic and administrative autonomy. This paved the way for Inalco to become more recognized and prestigious on both domestic and international levels.

Moreover, the *grand établissement* status facilitated the allocation of a broader budget and resources to Inalco. This status could contribute to Inalco gaining more recognition and prestige both nationally and internationally. As a specialized institution in linguistics, cultural studies, history, and related fields, this status enables Inalco to have a larger impact and engagement, allowing it to establish a more distinguished position.

²⁶ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 35.

²⁷ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 36.

In 2010, Inalco became a founding member of Sorbonne Paris Cité. Sorbonne Paris Cité is a consortium composed of various universities, research institutions, and educational establishments in Paris. The purpose of this consortium is to promote academic excellence through collaborative efforts, support student and staff mobility, and create a broader education and research network.

After being spread across multiple buildings, in 2011, all of Inalco's facilities and the Bulac Library were consolidated into a single building located at Rue Des Grands Moulins 65 in the 13th arrondissement of Paris, near the National Library. Today, Inalco carries out all of its courses in a single place in Paris.



Image 3: A weathervane on the roof of Inalco's building on Rue de Lille, summarizing the institution's activities.²⁸

Inalco, officially inaugurated in 1795, has undergone numerous name changes and expanded its scope over time. It has evolved into an institution focused on various languages and civilizations. Continuously evolving, Inalco provides a rich educational and research environment in fields such as linguistics, literature, history, arts, and social sciences. It plays a critical role in raising highly qualified professionals with deep knowledge of Eastern languages and cultures. Having officially celebrated its 200th anniversary in 1995 and now having surpassed 228 years, the institution in its current form represents the culmination of six centuries of effort and experience.

2. Management/Organization Structure

When Inalco was initially established, like other schools, it was necessary to form an administrative structure. As a first step, an administrator was appointed to the position of *administrator*. Following the regulations introduced after 1795, in addition to the administrator, the role of an assistant administrator (*administrateur-adjoint*) was created. In theory, the assistant

²⁸ The weather vane on the roof of the research center symbolizes the alliance of civilizations. The crane, representing immortality in ancient China, along with the snake, a symbol of time in Africa, adorn it. The moon, with its ancient associations, stands for the Arab world. Meanwhile, the palm, an emblem of victory in the Greco-Roman antiquity, ultimately evokes the Western world.

administrator was supposed to assist the administrator, step in for them when they could not perform their duties, or take over their position after their term ended. However, the assistant administrator played almost no institutional role in the life of the institution until 1971.²⁹

With the reforms implemented in 1971, Inalco became part of the French higher education system. Its institutional structure took shape as an institute affiliated with the “Université de Paris III Sorbonne Nouvelle,” known as Paris III University. From this point onwards, Inalco established a governance structure with a selected Board of Directors comprising 40 members, and René Sieffert, a professor of Japanese, was elected as its president. Following these changes, the highest authorities in the institution were appointed as *président*, not *Administrateur*.³⁰

Table 1: Inalco Administrators and Presidents from Foundation to Present³¹

Years of Service	Name	Field of Expertise
1796 - 1824	Louis-Mathieu Langles	Persian
1824 - 1838	Antoine-Isaac Silvestre de Sacy	Arabic
1838 - 1847	Pierre Amede Jaubert	Turkish
1847 - 1864	Charles Benoit Hase	Modern Greek
1864 - 1867	Joseph Reinaud	Arabic
1867 - 1898	Charles Schefer	Persian
1898 - 1908	Charles Barbier de Meynard	Turkish, Persian
1908 - 1936	Paul Boyer	Russian
1936 - 1937	Mario Roques	Romanian
1937 - 1948	jean deny	Turkish
1948 - 1958	Henri Masse	Persian
1958 - 1969	André Mirambel	Modern Greek
1969 - 1971	André Guimbretiere	
1971 - 1976	Rene Sieffert	Japanese
1976 - 1986	La Bastide Henry	Middle Eastern Civilization
1986 - 1993	François de Labriolle	Russian
1993 - 2001	André Bourgey	Middle Eastern Civilization
2001 - 2005	Gilles Delouche	Thai
2005 - 2013	Jacques Legrand	Mongol
2013 - 2019	Manuel Franck	Southeast Asia
Since 2019	Jean-François Huchet	East Asian Economy

As can be understood from the table, Inalco administrators continued to hold their positions until the end of their lives. This might have been influenced by the difficulty of finding individuals trained at the professorial level and the respect for experience. After the shift to a presidential system, vice presidents began to take on more active roles. However, during this period, it was also

²⁹ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 42.

³⁰ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 35.

³¹ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 41.

necessary for financial matters to be handled by an expert, namely a general secretary. Until 1953, newly appointed teachers took on the secretarial duties at Inalco. After 1971, its budget was managed by the financial director of Paris III. Finally, in 1990, a general secretary position was established at Inalco.³² With the institute's institutionalization, Inalco's governing bodies are as follows:

1. **Board of Directors (Conseil d'administration):** It is the highest decision-making body of Inalco. Comprising 40 members including university staff, students, academics, and representatives, the Board of Directors is responsible for the institute's strategic management and makes significant decisions.
2. **Executive Committee (Bureau):** Positioned beneath the Board of Directors, the Executive Committee deals with daily affairs and supports the institute's management.
3. **Technical Committee (Comité Technique):** Consists of representatives from the staff and members appointed by the management, this committee provides consultation and recommendations on personnel-related matters.
4. **Academic and University Life Council (Conseil des études et de la vie universitaire):** Makes decisions on academic matters, reviews curricula, course content, and academic policies.
5. **Scientific Council (Conseil scientifique):** Composed of academics, this council contributes to the institute's scientific strategy, and evaluates research and educational programs.
6. **Research Committee (Commission de la recherche):** Evaluates research projects and shapes the institute's research policies.
7. **Student Life Council (Conseil de la vie étudiante):** Represents students and organizes social activities and student services.

3. Service Buildings

Inalco's main service area is primarily in France. It is a university and research institute focused on various languages and civilizations based in France. However, over this long period, it had to operate in numerous main and ancillary buildings.

These main buildings can be summarized under three titles:

Language School: In 1795, when the Special School of Oriental Languages (L'École Spéciale des Langues Orientales) was established,³³ it began its activities on Rue Neuve de Parette-Champs in Paris.³⁴ From 1796 to 1834, this building was located in a sort of shack with small windows that provided inadequate lighting in a small courtyard. Unfortunately, it wasn't elegantly or comfortably situated around the National Library. Nevertheless, this location offered the advantage of proximity to Oriental manuscripts.³⁵

³² Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 41.

³³ Mantran, "À Vorigiine De Lecole Nationale Des Langues Orientales / Vivantes : L'ecole Des Jeunes De Langues", 9-12; Gernot U. Gabel, "200 Jahre Langues'O", *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 146/2 (1996), 1.

³⁴ Bazin, "Silvestre de Sacy", 20; Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 25-26.

³⁵ "Notice historique sur l'École spéciale", XII.

Research House (La Maison de la Recherche): The Special School of Oriental Languages moved to a mansion located at the corner of Rue des Saints-Pères and Rue de Lille in 1874. The building, inspired by a classical spirit with preserved features of the northern wing, which were remnants of a 13th-century inn, consists of different extensions made at different times. Construction work that began in the mid-18th century was completed in 1935. Despite its gradual construction, the entire building exhibits a strong architectural coherence. The recorded student enrolment was 50 in 1938, 250 in 1948, approximately 860 in 1958, and over 1200 in 1968. However, by that time, the building in Rue de Lille was no longer sufficient, and the search for additional buildings became necessary.³⁶ The lack of space due to the increasing number of students was a significant problem. Acquiring a new location, obtaining new resources, and changing the institution's legal status were definitely required to establish a notable position in higher education. By 1968, the existing status was no longer compatible with the prevailing university conditions. After 1971, Inalco quickly obtained permission to move to a building constructed in Clichy, then later moved to another building built in Asnières. At the same time, it also retained a space in Dauphine. As a result, apart from its main building on Lille Street, Inalco occupied spaces in other university-owned locations that were either subleased or shared with others.³⁷

Languages and Civilizations Centre (Le Pôle des langues et civilisations): This campus-style building is located at 65 Rue des Grands Moulins, 75013 Paris. The building is a modern structure situated in the 13th district of Paris, along the banks of the Seine River. It was created through a construction project completed in 2001. The former flour factory, Grands Moulins de Paris, was restored to become a modern facility. The renovated building offers a spacious campus area with contemporary architecture.

4. Fields of Activity

4.1. Language Teaching

The primary goal of Inalco is to educate language experts, diplomats, and individuals skilled in international relations and proficient in oriental languages.³⁸ These languages were neglected in France until the early 17th century and were nearly abandoned by the period of revolution.³⁹ When the school was founded in 1795, its main objective was to train interpreters and translators who could address France's diplomatic and commercial needs in the East.⁴⁰ As the academic staff and library expanded, various languages were added to the curriculum. Initially, only Arabic, Persian, and Turkish were taught, but over the years, the educational program was expanded to teach 12 Eastern languages. By the year 1900, education was provided in 20 different languages at the school.

³⁶ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 35.

³⁷ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 36.

³⁸ Bergère - Pino., *Un Siècle d'Enseignement du Chinois*, 28.

³⁹ "Notice historique sur l'École spéciale", III; Luchaire, *L'Institut National des Langues*, 9.

⁴⁰ Gautier - Testa, *Drogmans, diplomates et ressortissants Europeens aupres de la Porte Ottomane*, 32.

This number doubled until World War II, and currently, Inalco teaches at least 100 languages spoken in Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Eastern Europe.⁴¹

The school started with a male teaching staff, but gradually included women as well, and the first female students graduated in 1888. In 1919, a scholarship was granted to a student for the first time. By 1930, women represented 23% of the student body and 25% of the alumni. The first female teacher to enter the archives was Kantchoclovski, who was appointed for Russian in 1910. Remizov-Douguello became the first teacher to offer free lessons in Russian and Slavic paleography in 1926.⁴²

By 1971, Inalco had become an educational and research institution offering international and comprehensive education in recognized languages and civilizations. Thus, its mission was defined as “to teach students the living languages, geography, history, constitutions, and political, economic, and social life of the relevant countries so that they can practice their profession abroad.”⁴³ After 1971, its affiliation with Paris III granted the institution a dual identity and profoundly changed its status due to the constitution of 1969. While Inalco maintained pedagogical autonomy and gained financial autonomy, it also became part of the university due to its ability to issue national diplomas.⁴⁴ President René Sieffert, after 1971, established the *Centre de préparation aux échanges internationaux* (CPEI), a professional program designed to align Inalco with the university’s new functions.

During François de Labriolle’s presidency (1986-1993), significant changes took place at Inalco, in particular the creation of a new status specifically for teaching staff and assistants. The institution gained the authority to confer bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees under its own seal. More recently, under the presidency of André Bourgey (1993-2001), Inalco acquired the ability to conduct *habilitation* (a high-level academic exam) programs to guide research, thus solidifying its status as a full-fledged educational institution.⁴⁵

Today, Inalco provides education and conducts research not only on the languages of Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, Africa, and the Americas but also on the geography, history, institutions, and political, economic, and social life of the relevant countries.⁴⁶ As an academic institution specialized in languages, it offers diverse and high-quality language programs. Students are given the opportunity to receive education in a wide range of languages spoken in these regions, along with the opportunity of choosing between various options for language learning.⁴⁷ Language learning programs are offered at different levels, from beginner to advanced, thus ensuring that every student can receive education tailored to their grammar proficiency.

Inalco utilises contemporary and effective methods for language education. Language courses emphasize a balanced approach to grammar, speaking, listening, reading, and writing skills. The

⁴¹ Gabel, “200 Jahre Langues’O”, 1.

⁴² Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (Inalco), “Qui sont les premières diplômées et enseignantes des Langues O’ ?” (Accessed 27 July 2023).

⁴³ Luchaire, *L’Institut National des Langues*, 9.

⁴⁴ Labrousse, *Langues O’ 1795-1995*, 35.

⁴⁵ Labrousse, *Langues O’ 1795-1995*, 36.

⁴⁶ Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (Inalco), “L’Institut” (Accessed 23 July 2013).

⁴⁷ Bergère - Pino (ed.), *Un Siècle d’Enseignement du Chinois*, 30.

students are also educated in cultural and social aspects of Eastern civilisations alongside the language education they receive. Language education at Inalco is carried out by experienced and expert teachers. The teaching staff consists of instructors who are proficient in the relevant languages and specialize in language teaching. Language laboratories are available to support language learning process, allowing students to practice, enhance their language skills, and strengthen their language proficiency. Upon completion of language learning programs, students are awarded with various language certificates, which are recognized and respected internationally.

Inalco offers education from undergraduate to doctoral levels, providing professional courses focused on more than 100 languages and civilizations. It offers students advanced education with a research-oriented approach.⁴⁸ With approximately 3,000 different courses offered across five educational centres around Paris, Inalco stands as one of the largest educational institutions worldwide dedicated to Eastern languages and cultures. The institution's educational activities are as follows:

Undergraduate Programs: Inalco offers various undergraduate programs focusing on different languages and cultures. These programs generally include linguistics, literature, history, and cultural studies courses.

Master's and Doctoral Programs: Inalco provides a range of programs at the master's and doctoral levels across various disciplines. These programs aim to specialize in linguistics, literature, history, cultural studies, and other related fields. The intention is to equip students with research skills, engage in thesis work, and attain advanced knowledge in the relevant areas.

Language Courses: Inalco offers a variety of language courses for those who want to learn a new language or enhance their existing language skills. Taught at different levels, these courses allow students to improve their language proficiency and deepen their cultural understanding.

Inalco's classrooms are equipped with modern teaching technologies, facilitating interactive learning environments for students. As of today, Inalco has 9,000 students from 120 different nationalities, engaging in 3,000 courses alongside teachers and students.⁴⁹ With over 80,000 alumni worldwide, the institution's extensive network provides job opportunities in international trade, import-export, marketing, logistics, finance, and business consultancy to those within the network. Moreover, Inalco students can explore job opportunities in defence industry, communication, humanitarian aid, intercultural mediation, economic intelligence, journalism, multilingual engineering, SEO expertise, natural language processing, translation and interpretation, cultural action, guided interpretation, transportation companies, heritage preservation, and more. Alumni hold positions as linguists, diplomats, CEOs of major companies, members of parliament, and various other roles.

⁴⁸ Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (Inalco), "L'Institut".

⁴⁹ Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (Inalco), "Réseau Inalco Alumni" (Accessed 20 June 2023).




Image 4: A map demonstrating Inalco's scope today.⁵⁰

4.2. Academic Research and Development

As an academic institution, Inalco focuses on research, education, and publication activities in various fields. While initially focusing language education, it also recognized the importance of understanding culture and civilization codes as a path to become a proficient translator, therefore paying attention importance to research activities as well. As students spent their time getting acquainted with different cultures, instructors also kept their desire to thoroughly learn the languages and cultures within their expertise alive. Many professors authored books on grammar and cultural elements in their respective fields, incorporating them into the curriculum. In 1971, the academic activities were regulated with Inalco's new institute status. In line with its mission, Inalco supported the academic activities of students and researchers in fields like linguistics, literature, culture, history, and social sciences.

During the 1980s and 1990s, Inalco established research centres that developed various programs and launched a total of 15 journals, including at least five successful ones.⁵¹ With over 100 languages taught and a faculty of 300 teacher-researchers, Inalco engaged in current debates to establish intercultural dialogue, address societal issues, and deal with political, economic, social, and environmental conflicts. Utilizing resources in local languages, it provided in-depth historical analysis and sociological reflection unique to the French academic world.

With more than 100 languages and cultures taught, students and teachers from over 120 nations, and research projects in more than 100 countries, Inalco has steadfastly become an international institute for over two centuries. Inalco values various forms of collaboration which include maintaining and enriching a global communication network with foreign universities and institutionalizing relationships with partners.

⁵⁰ Please refer to the catalogue prepared by Dr. Mariana Losada: [studyinfrance](#), "Inalco_presentation_ChooseFrance" (Accessed 25 July 2013).

⁵¹ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 36.

In Inalco, the research aims to bridge cultural and disciplinary areas. It focuses on combinations that yield scientific productivity, including studying languages alongside the history, geography, institutions, and political, economic, and social life of relevant countries and regions. Researchers and research teams here prefer to work with a thematic and interdisciplinary approach, often situated simultaneously in major global regions. The research staff is based on 14 teams, half of which work in partnership with CNRS and IRD research organizations.

In conclusion, Inalco actively conducts research in linguistics, literature, culture, history, social sciences, and related fields. Researchers in relevant disciplines engage in projects, publish articles, and participate in conferences and national/international research networks. Articles are typically published in academic journals and publishing houses. These articles contain researchers' and academics' works in their respective fields, theoretical and methodological approaches, discoveries, and conclusions.

4.3. Library

Although it can be thought that Inalco, being an institution focused on language and research, would not prioritize first rate library services, it was necessary for the organization to have a library to carry out its tasks. Therefore, the founding of the library date back to the founding of Inalco and is closely intertwined with it. As the institution evolved and established its own archive, it successfully integrated a functional library within its structure. Although this library was formed by Inalco, it eventually separated from it for more effective utilization. Nevertheless, it never got away from Inalco's reach, maintaining the stance of being two different but united entities.

On November 18, 1669, when the Young Languages School, the first of its kind, was established in Istanbul with Colbert's initiative, some books and manuscripts which were granted to the library of this school were used as the first teaching materials. During the same period, manuscripts and books prepared for students, brought from the Middle East also proved useful.⁵² These dates coincide with the time when Antoine Galland, a French orientalist and archaeologist (1646-1715), who was the first European to translate *One Thousand and One Nights* (*Les mille et une nuits*), was commissioned by the King of France to collect books from the East. A skilled translator with education in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, Galland began collecting manuscripts and ancient coins, particularly in Istanbul. He even mentioned, "Buying books here is easier than buying from anywhere else in the world. There are many bookshops, and every day new books take their place on the shelves, sold to the highest bidder."⁵³ This indicates that cultural knowledge from the East, especially in Istanbul, was being transferred to the West, and specifically to France (Paris).

In 1795, when the Special School for Eastern Languages was established, the library was moved to the national Rue de Richelieu. In 1838, a catalogue of the works in the library was created,⁵⁴ and a budget of 5,000 Francs was allocated for acquiring manuscript works.⁵⁵ During this period, the courses of the School of Eastern Languages were offered in a quite modest venue which belonged

⁵² Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 44.

⁵³ Bevilacqua, *Şark Kütüphanesi*, 57.

⁵⁴ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 44.

⁵⁵ Luchaire, *L'Institut National des Langues*, 9.

the National Library. By 1867, the School of Eastern Languages had only a few books that were critical for explaining some Arabic, Persian, and Turkish texts, and professors and students had no alternative options beyond these books.⁵⁶ There was a total of 300 volumes in the room where only educational classes were held.




Image 5: Front page of a copied manuscript, from the Istanbul's Young Languages School.

In 1873, the school had around 4,000 volumes in its library, all of which were related to the languages and history of the modern East. These volumes included many texts in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Chinese, and Japanese, printed in the East, and the books were open for everyone to use.⁵⁷ By 1874, when the institution permanently moved to Rue de Lille, it was time to establish a proper library. The works obtained before this date were referred to as the old collection. After moving to Rue de Lille, the library saw an acceleration in the development of financial resources. Starting from 1875, Wladimir Brunet de Presle (1809-1875), a 19th-century French Hellenist, Byzantinist, and historian who was a translator in Greek and academician, donated a total of 1,600 volumes. This way, the library was formed, and by 1898, more than 50,000 hardcover works obtained from Europe were collected. Collections based on languages were established from 1930 onwards.⁵⁸ By 1945, the library administratively separated from the school. In the early 1970s, following the split of University of Paris, the library gained an inter-university status.

La Bibliothèque interuniversitaire des langues orientales (Biulo), or the Interuniversity Library of Oriental Languages, was historically associated with Inalco and specialized in Eastern languages. The term "Orient" in its name goes beyond the concept of near, middle, or far, and includes the entirety of Oceania, all of Asia, Central, Eastern, and Northern Europe, the Slavic world, and the native civilizations of the American continent.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ E. Lambrecht, *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque de l'École des Langues Orientales Vivantes* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1897), V.

⁵⁷ "Notice historique sur l'École spéciale", LII.

⁵⁸ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*, 45.

⁵⁹ Labrousse, *Langues O' 1795-1995*.

Biulo, previously affiliated with Sorbonne Paris III University, gained a separate legal status as of 1971. Its central office was located on Rue de Lille in the 7th arrondissement of Paris, adjacent to Inalco. In 2001, when Inalco was seriously in the process of acquiring a new building, its staff and collections were integrated into La Bibliothèque Universitaire des Langues et Civilisations (Bulac), the Library of University Languages and Civilizations, in 2010. This library, integrated into the Inalco building, houses thousands of rare books and manuscripts.⁶⁰ Presently, it holds around 750,000 books and 12,189 periodical publications in approximately 100 different languages.⁶¹

Bulac owns a rich library collection, serving as a wide-ranging information source for students, researchers, and academics. The library has a wide collection of works of linguistics, literature, culture, history, and social sciences. The collection contains books, journals, articles, thesis, electronic resources, and other materials published in various languages.⁶² The collection is organized and indexed according to modern cataloguing standards, facilitating easy access to desired materials for users. With online catalogues and search tools, the library provides users with the capability to find and request resources efficiently.

4.4. Printing-Publishing

Inalco has emphasized on book publishing almost since its establishment. Operating in an environment where printing technology was becoming widespread, it aimed to pioneer the publishing of both periodical and non-periodical works. Starting from 1875, funds were allocated to the school for the publication of books related to Eastern languages and the countries where these languages were spoken. This process was promptly initiated, with the bookseller and publisher Ernest Leroux (1845-191) working as the school's publisher.⁶³ Later on, Inalco established its own publishing house.

“Presses de l’Inalco” is a publishing house managed by Inalco that handles Inalco’s publishing activities. Established in 1996, the publishing house has since been publishing a wide range of academic books, journals, and other publications focusing on cultures in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. The purpose of this publishing house is to support the works of academicians and researchers, specializing in Inalco’s areas of expertise and to disseminate knowledge on an international scale. *Presses de l’Inalco* offers publications encompassing a broad spectrum of academic content in fields such as linguistics, history, anthropology, literature, sociology, and other social sciences.

The publishing house functions as an important platform for researchers and academics worldwide who work on Eastern languages and civilizations. Additionally, by supporting cultural interaction and knowledge sharing on international level, it contributes to acquiring more knowledge about Eastern cultures and enhancing understanding of them. The goal of “Presses de l’Inalco” is to contribute to the extending of scientific research and cultural understanding.

⁶⁰ The collection includes materials in various languages, with particularly significant holdings in Arab-Islamic languages (55,000 volumes), Chinese (30,000 volumes), Japanese (30,000 volumes), Slavic languages (80,000 volumes), South and Southeast Asian languages (22,000 volumes), as well as Western languages (80,000 volumes).

⁶¹ Gabel, “200 Jahre Langues’O”, 1.

⁶² Lambrecht, *Catalogue de la Bibliothèque*, VI.

⁶³ “Notice historique sur l’École spéciale”, LIII.

5. Orientalism And Inalco

Orientalism has various definitions, but it can be understood as the Western interest in and attempt to understand the language, religion, history, and cultures of the East. This concept gained importance particularly during the 18th and 19th centuries as Western interaction with the East increased and studies about the East were conducted in various disciplines. Orientalism recognizes that the East encompasses a vast geographical and cultural diversity. When referring to the East, it goes beyond mere geography to include different countries, languages, religions, traditions, and ways of life. This diversity is a crucial element in comprehending the complexity and richness of Eastern cultures.

Orientalism also acknowledges that there are some commonalities among Eastern cultures. For instance, many Eastern societies have interacted with each other throughout history and shared similar religious, philosophical, or artistic motifs. Orientalist studies encompass efforts to highlight these shared elements and to understand the structure of Eastern societies. However, when discussing Orientalism, having a critical perspective is also important, for the reason that certain Orientalist approaches have faced criticism for portraying the East as exotic, underdeveloped, or foreign, emphasizing Western superiority. After all, Orientalism is a discipline that includes two fundamental aspects: diversity and unity, in the context of studies about Eastern cultures and societies. Adopting a critical perspective when approaching this discipline is essential to understand and evaluate the rich and diverse cultures of the East.⁶⁴

Humanist and scholarly/academic Orientalism particularly focuses on the Islamic field, more specifically on cultural areas where Arabic, Turkish, and Persian are used.⁶⁵ According to Orientalists, while it is acceptable to criticize Islam, attacks on the religion of Prophet Muhammad are often seen as a disguise for an enmity against all other religions. Thus, the traditional depiction of Prophet Muhammad is regarded as a supposititious perception.⁶⁶

Inalco's role is very prominent in grasping the Eastern history and civilisations, development of and gaining new perspectives on this understanding, and emergence of the science known as "oriento-Sharqiyat". The Ecole des Jeunes de Langues (Youth Language School) arranged the training of interpreters from the late 17th century onwards. This heritage was subsequently taken over by the Ecole des Langues Orientales (School of Oriental Languages), which gained a particularly prestigious reputation at a very early stage.⁶⁷ In this context, Inalco, while examining languages, cultures, histories, and societies from various regions from an academic perspective, became a part of orientalist studies and contributed to the academic foundation of Orientalism. In general, Inalco clung to academic methods and an objective perspective as a principle. Researchers

⁶⁴ M. Henri Laurens, "La Place de L'Orientalisme Dans L'Emergence des Sciences Humaines, A La Fin Du XVIII Siecle", *Institut de France (Célébration du bicentenaire de l'École des Langues orientales)* 1 (1995), 13.

⁶⁵ Laurens, "La Place de L'Orientalisme Dans L'Emergence des Sciences Humaines, A La Fin Du XVIII Siecle", 13.

⁶⁶ Laurens, "La Place de L'Orientalisme Dans L'Emergence des Sciences Humaines, A La Fin Du XVIII Siecle", 16. For a detailed understanding of the portrayal of Prophet Muhammad in French Orientalism, you may refer to the following sources: İsmail Metin, *Fransız Oryantalizminde Hz. Muhammed İmajı* (İstanbul: Kitap Dünyası, 2022).

⁶⁷ Mantran, "À Vorigine de Lecole Nationale Des Langues Orientales / Vivantes : L'ecole Des Jeunes de Langues", 12.

in such institutions aim to enhance intercultural understanding objectively by taking critiques of Orientalism into account and striving to understand Eastern cultures within their own dynamics.

Inalco has a tradition of over 300 years in the field of Asian studies and has been a significant place for the education of numerous significant orientalists throughout history.⁶⁸ Orientalism is generally known as an interdisciplinary field that focuses on Eastern languages, cultures, histories, and other related areas. Inalco has hosted many experts and researchers in these fields and contributed to the development of orientalism. Here are some famous orientalists who have emerged from Inalco:

Antoine Isaac Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838): Made significant contributions to Eastern languages by conducting comparative studies between languages and cultures. He is also one of the pioneering figures who introduced the Arabic language to the West and advocated for the translation of Arabic literature into French. He made a substantial contribution to the spread of knowledge about Arab culture by translating Arabic grammar and literary texts into European languages. He also worked on Persian, Turkish, and other Eastern languages and translated works in these languages. The works of Silvestre de Sacy contributed to the improvement of Orientalism and increase in the interest towards Eastern cultures in Europe.⁶⁹

Antoine-Pierre-Louis Bazin (1799-1863): A recognized French sinologist and specialist in Eastern languages, Bazin is particularly known for his studies in Chinese language and literature. He played a role in establishing Chinese language courses at the School of Living Oriental Languages (École des Langues Orientales Vivantes) by focusing on teaching Mandarin dialect.

Louis Massignon (1883-1962): A significant figure in French Orientalism and Islamic studies, Massignon is a prominent figure associated with Inalco, who also considerably influenced later generations of orientalists. He is known for his research on the Islamic religion, Arabic literature, and the Kurdish language. He particularly focused on Islamic mysticism, notably the works of Hallâj-i Mansûr and Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî.⁷⁰

Régis Blachère (1900-1973): A French orientalist who was also a member of the Institut de France. Blachère served as a professor of Arabic language and Islamic law at Inalco. In 1935, he was appointed as the Arabic language instructor at the École des Langues Orientales Vivantes (School of Living Oriental Languages) and later in 1950, he left the institute to become the head of the Chair of Medieval Arabic Language and Literature at Sorbonne University. He conducted important research on the Arabic language, Islamic law, the Quran, and the life of Prophet Muhammad.⁷¹

Gustave E. von Grunebaum (1909-1972): A German-born American orientalist and Islamic scholar, Grunebaum received education in Arabic language and Islamic culture at Inalco. He authored significant works on Islamic history, Arabic literature, and Islamic thought.

⁶⁸ Paul van der Velde, "Re-orienting Asian Studies", *The Asian Studies Parade* (New York: Leiden University Press, 2023), 238.

⁶⁹ Bazin, "Silvestre de Sacy", 19.

⁷⁰ Examples of these works can include the following: Louis Massignon, *La Passion de Hallaj: Martyr Mystique de L'Islam* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); Louis Massignon, *Essay on the Origins of the Technical Language of Islamic Mysticism*, trans. Benjamin Clark (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997).

⁷¹ Metin, *Fransız Oryantalizminde Hz. Muhammed İmâjı*, 33-39.

Claude Cahen (1909-1991): A French Marxist orientalist and historian of Jewish origin. Cahen specialized in the Islamic Middle Ages, Muslim sources concerning the Crusades, and the social history of Islamic society during the Middle Ages. He was an expert in Turkish history and Islamic civilization and taught Turkish language and culture courses at Inalco while conducting significant research on Turkish history.

Maxime Rodinson (1915-2004): French social scientist, historian, sociologist, and orientalist, born to a Jewish family of Polish origin. He is known for his research on Islamic history, the Arab world, and the biography of Prophet Muhammad. He received education at Inalco and passed the entrance exams for the School of Living Oriental Languages in Paris in 1932, where he studied Semitic languages, Arabic, Turkish, and Ethiopian languages.⁷²

Jacqueline de Romilly (1913-2010): French classical philologist and orientalist. She learned and taught Greek and Sanskrit at Inalco. She is recognized for her contributions to research on ancient Greek culture and language.

Gilbert Lazard (1920-1998): French orientalist and Iranologist. Lazard received education in Persian and Iranian languages at Inalco. He conducted significant research in Iranian literature, linguistics, and culture.

Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont (1920-1996): A French orientalist and Sinologist, Bacqué-Grammont studied Chinese and East Asian cultures at Inalco. He is known for his works on Chinese history and literature.

Alexandre Popovic (1931-2012): A political scientist, historian, and orientalist, Popovic specialized in Balkan languages and cultures at Inalco. He conducted studies particularly on the Ottoman Empire's influence on the Balkans and the analysis of Balkan languages.

Louis Bazin (1922-2011): French orientalist and Turkologist. Bazin received education in Turkish language and culture at Inalco. He conducted research on Turkish history, literature, and folklore.

François de Blois (1949-2016): An English orientalist and Iranologist, de Blois studied Iranian languages and cultures at Inalco. He conducted significant research on ancient Iranian literature and Zoroastrianism.

Catherine Mayeur Jaouen (1964-...): Mayeur-Jaouen specialized in Chinese language and culture - studies at Inalco. She is an expert in Chinese literature, cultural history, and contemporary China.

Here are just a few of the prominent orientalists who have been educated at Inalco. There are many more scholars whose names we have not mentioned. Inalco, being a specialized institution in languages and civilizations, has contributed to the education of numerous significant orientalists throughout history.

Conclusion

Orientalism, or Oriental Studies, is more of an institutional phenomenon rather than individual endeavours. Historically, the continuity of institutionalized structures has proven to be more effective and lasting than individual efforts. In this context, Inalco, which began as a decision to

⁷² Metin, *Fransız Oryantalizminde Hz. Muhammed İmaji*, 40-49.

educate a small group of young individuals in response to the common demands of French leaders and intellectuals who sought to engage in the political and commercial environment of the East, has evolved into a significant establishment, despite facing occasional challenges, by maintaining its process of institutionalization that began in 1795. Inalco has established its academic competence and become both a language and research centre as well as an Oriental Studies institution. In fact, the increased interest and research in Eastern sciences during the 18th century led to the emergence of an academic discipline known as 'Orientalism' or 'Oriental Studies.' During this period, scholars and researchers interested in Eastern languages, cultures, and histories contributed to the development of Eastern studies in Europe. Throughout this process, European scholars and intellectuals began to engage more with Eastern countries. Diplomatic, commercial, and cultural interactions with the Ottoman Empire and other Eastern civilizations necessitated a greater understanding of Eastern languages and cultures, driving the advancement of Eastern studies.

The development of Eastern studies during this period laid the foundation for the emergence of modern social sciences and humanities. Knowledge and research about Eastern cultures served as inspiration for disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, history, linguistics, and more. Inalco achieved all of this through its historical experiences and commitment to institutionalization. Its careful selection of leaders and its democratic approach on the matter, transition to a presidential system after becoming an institute, and lastly, the appointments of vice presidents and general secretaries contributed to its well-structured institutional functioning.

Over the past fifty years, Inalco, as a language education centre, has undergone profound and significant changes. It has become a regular institution due to its status and objectives, while also excelling in a wide range of languages. Its expertise in teaching "Living/Vivantes" languages and its practical approach in teaching methods have accelerated the language and cultural transfer. With its extensive library and master's/doctoral programs, Inalco continues to raise thousands of qualified individuals. More recently, its efforts to enhance communication networks among alumnus have contributed significantly to both diplomacy and cultural exchange.

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A Mediator Between Sharia and State Law: Aḥmad al-Khamliṣhī's Legal Thinking and Contribution to Reforms¹

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ABSTRACT

With the 2004 reforms on the Moroccan Personal Status Law, the Moroccan Family Code (*Mudawwanah*) is considered one of the most egalitarian codes in the Muslim World. The reforms was a product of long-lasting public debates for decades in Morocco. Aḥmad al-Khamliṣhī has been actively involved in the debate since the beginning of the 1980s and explained that the Personal Status Law is man-made law open to interpretation, revision of which should be undertaken through *ijtihād*. Shortly after ascending to the throne, in 2001, the King Mohammed VI appointed the Royal Advisory Commission in charge to reform the Moroccan Personal Status Code. The King charged the commission for making a substantial change in the Code by respecting the main objectives of Sharia (*maqāsid al-Sharia*) and also responding to the necessities of the time and society by means of exercising *ijtihād*. He encouraged members of the commission to consider the public interest and to strive for consensus and moderation in any proposed changes. The commission worked for around two and a half years on the proposed changes, but could not reach a consensus on many issues. Everyone on the commission has, more or less, had some leaning towards either of the two main groups, namely, the reformists and traditionalists. Aḥmad al-Khamliṣhī was one of the members of the Royal Advisory Commission. He was a person who shared views of the reformist group, but also used the language of the traditionalists. He became a reference point for reformist groups with his critical but moderate views that remain within the Islamic legal framework. In this paper, I argue that al-Khamliṣhī was the mastermind behind the reforms of 2004. By applying data analysis method, this study primarily uses al-Khamliṣhī's writings, his interviews and speeches. To reveal the difference and similarities of his understanding, the literature was consulted and comparisons were made. Following a brief background, this paper will discuss al-Khamliṣhī's mediating role between text and context, his influence on the debate of family law reforms, and thus his stance on Sharia-state relations. This paper will then focus on his understanding of *ijtihād* with reference to his views on the concept of the closure of the gate of *ijtihād*, qualifications of *mujtahid* (one who is capable to deduce legal rulings from the revealed texts), and his suggestion on collective type of *ijtihād* (*ijtihād jamā'i*); as it was exercised by the Advisory Commission. Al-Khamliṣhī's methods of legal reasoning will be examined with regard to family law.

Keywords: Islamic law, Family law reform, Maqāsid al-Sharia, Ijtihād, Collective ijtiḥād, Morocco, Aḥmad al-Khamliṣhī.

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Şeriat ve Devlet Hukuku Arasında Bir Arabulucu: Ahmed el-Hamlîşî'nin Hukuk Düşüncesi ve Reformlara Katkısı

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ÖZ

Fas Ahvâl-i Şahsiyye Kanunu üzerinde 2004 yılında yapılan reformlarla birlikte Fas Aile Kanunu (Müdevveneh), İslam dünyasındaki en eşitlikçi kanunlardan biri olarak kabul edilmektedir. Söz konusu reformlar, Fas'ta onlarca yıldır devam eden uzun soluklu kamuoyu tartışmalarının bir ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Ahmed el-Hamlîşî 1980'lerin başından itibaren bu tartışmalara aktif olarak katılmış ve Ahvâl-i Şahsiyye Kanunu'nun yoruma açık insan yapımı bir kanun olduğunu ve revizyonunun ichtihad yoluyla yapılması gerektiğini savunmuştur. Kral 6. Muhammed tahta çıktıktan kısa bir süre sonra, 2001 yılında, Fas Ahvâl-i Şahsiyye Kanunu'nda reform yapmak üzere Kraliyet Danışma Komisyonu'nu oluşturdu. Kral 6. Muhammed komisyonu, Şeriat'ın temel hedeflerini (makâsîdü'ş-Şeria) gözeterek ve aynı zamanda ichtihad yoluyla zamanın ve toplumun ihtiyaçlarına cevap vererek Ahvâl-i Şahsiyye Kanunu'nda önemli değişiklikler yapmakla görevlendirdi. Bununla birlikte, komisyon üyelerini kamu yararını göz önünde bulundurmaya ve önerilen her türlü değişiklikte uzlaşma ve ılımlılık için çaba göstermeye teşvik etti. Komisyon üyeleri önerilen değişiklikler üzerinde yaklaşık iki buçuk yıl çalıştı ancak birçok konuda uzlaşmaya varamadı. Bu bağlamda, üyelerin komisyon içinde oluşan iki ana gruptan reformist ve gelenekçilerden birine, az ya da çok, meylettığı söylenebilir. Ahmed el-Hamlîşî, Kraliyet Danışma Komisyonu'nun üyelerinden biriydi. Komisyon üyeleri arasında reformist grubun değişiklik tekliflerini destekleyen ama aynı zamanda bunu gelenekçilerin benimsediği dili kullanarak yapan etkili ve önemli bir isim oldu. Nitekim, el-Hamlîşî İslam hukuku çerçevesi içinde kalan eleştirel ama ılımlı görüşleriyle aile hukukunun reformunu talep eden gruplar için bir referans noktası haline geldi. Bu çalışmada, Ahmed el-Hamlîşî'nin fihhi temellendirme ve delillendirme açısından Fas 2004 aile hukuku reformlarının arkasındaki isim olduğu savunulmaktadır. Veri analizi yönteminin uygulandığı bu çalışmada, öncelikli olarak Hamlîşî'nin eserleri, çeşitli mecralardaki mülakatları ve konuşmaları kullanılmıştır. Hamlîşî'nin anlayışındaki farklılık ve benzerlikleri ortaya çıkarmak için literatüre başvurulmuş ve benzer görüşlerle karşılaştırmalar yapılmıştır. Fas Ahvâl-i Şahsiyye Kanunu'nun reformuna dair kısa bir arka plan açıklamasının ardından bu makale, Hamlîşî'nin metin ve bağlam arasındaki arabulucu rolünü, aile hukuku reformları tartışmasındaki yerini ve dolayısıyla Şeriat-devlet ilişkileri konusundaki duruşunu incelemektedir. Daha sonra, ichtihad kapısının kapanması meselesi, müctehid olabilmenin şartları, müctehidin nitelikleri ve Kraliyet Danışma Komisyonu tarafından uygulandığı şekliyle kolektif ichtihad türü (*cemâ'î ichtihad*) hakkındaki görüşlerine atıfla Hamlîşî'nin ichtihad anlayışına odaklanılmaktadır. Son olarak, Hamlîşî'nin akıl yürütme yöntemi ve ortaya koyduğu gerekçeler aile hukuku ile ilgili meseleler örnekliğinde gösterilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslam hukuku, Aile hukuku reformu, Makâsîdü'ş-Şeria, İctihad, Kolektif ichtihad, Fas, Ahmed el-Hamlîşî.

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Introduction

Debate over family law reform was an issue reflecting the tension between the parameters of modernity and traditionalism from the first promulgation of the Moroccan Personal Status Law in 1958.² Several attempts took place to reform the law following the codification. Although, it is considered to be quite limited, the first fruitful attempt was the 1993 reforms. The 2004 reform of the law has become the most remarkable and comprehensive step in this process. The change of the reformist discourse's reference system with an increased emphasis on the necessity of exercising *ijtihād* was the key element that secured the reform. Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī was one of the members of the Royal Advisory Commission in charge to reform the Moroccan personal Status Code. Reformist and conservative groups were the main groups in the commission. Al-Khamlīshī was the one who reconciled the arguments of both groups.

Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī (b. 1935) is a prominent legal scholar and intellectual. He is currently the director of the *Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania* (2000-present) which is a higher institute for the education of imams, religious preachers and guides.³ He is one of the most frequent lecturer at the religious sessions held during Ramadan (*al-Durūs al-Ḥasaniyya*), which is a quite prestigious occasion hosted by the king. Recently, al-Khamlīshī is appointed as member of the High Council of Judiciary, 6 April 2017.⁴ He is appointed by the King as being a notable person, recognized for his competence, his impartiality and his probity, as well as for his distinguished contribution in favour of the independence of justice and of the primacy of the law in accordance with the Constitution of 2011, article 115.⁵ This can be considered as a good example showing his mediating role between Sharia law and state law locating him in higher religious and state law authorities, namely presidency of *Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania* and membership in the High Council of Judiciary.

² For details of the reform debate see Léon Buskens, "Recent Debates on Family Law Reform in Morocco: Islamic Law as Politics in an Emerging Public Sphere" *Islamic Law and Society* 10/1 (2003), 70-131; Su'ad Akhrisi, *Min Mudawwanah al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya ila Mudawwanah al-Usra: Masar al-Ta'dilat wa Matalib al-Harakah al-Nisa'iyya* (al-Rabāt: Dār al-Salam, 2005); Zhor al-Horr, *Islah Qanun al-Usra bi-l-Maghrib: Al-Masar wa-l-Manhajiyya* (Dar al-Bayda': al-Najāh al-Jadida, 2015).

³ It is the highest institution for Islamic studies founded in 1964 in Morocco.

⁴ Morocco World News, "King Mohammed VI Appoints Members of Judiciary Supreme Council" (Accessed 21 November 2023).

⁵ The High Council of Judiciary is designed according to the Constitution of 2011, article 115: It is presided over by king and composed of: of the First-President of the Court of Cassation in the status of President-Delegate [President-delegate]; of the Procurator General of the King before the Court of Cassation; of the President of the First Chamber of the Court of Cassation; of 4 representatives elected, from among them, by the magistrates of the courts of appeal; of 6 representatives elected, from among them, by the magistrates of the jurisdictions of first instance [degree]; a representation of [women] magistrates must be assured, from among the ten members elected, in proportion to their presence in the corps of the magistrature; of the Mediator; of the President of the National Council of the Rights of Man [Conseil national des droits de l'Homme]; of 5 notable persons [personnalites] appointed by the King, recognized for their competence, their impartiality and their probity, as well as for their distinguished contribution [apport] in favor of the independence of justice and of the primacy of the law, of which one member is proposed by the Secretary General of the Superior Council of the Ulema. *The constitution of Morocco of 2011*, trans. William S. Hein & Co., (2012) (Accessed 21 November 2023).

Al-Khamlīshī was raised in an Islamic traditional household in Al-Hoceima, North of Morocco. His father was a follower of the Nasiriyya Sufi order. He memorized the Qur'ān at the age of ten with his father's guiding. Al-Khamlīshī acknowledges that his father, the Qur'anic and spiritual atmosphere in the family and the peaceful Bedouin lifestyle became very influential in his life and led him to research further in Islamic studies. Al-Khamlīshī studied law at the university; following graduation he served as judge in the Court of Appeal (1960-1970). Following this occupation, he served as law professor at the University of Muhammad V for nearly thirty years in Rabat (1971-2000).⁶

Al-Khamlīshī extensively researches and writes on Islamic legal thought and personal status law. His commentary on the Personal Status Law titled *Ta'liq ala Qānun Al-Akhwāl al-Shakhsiyyah I-II* (1994) has a great importance in understanding the changed subjects of the Personal Status Law. Among others, the series of book under the title *Wijhat an-Nazar Hawla Naqd Fikr al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī wa Wasāil al-Tajdidī* [Point of View about Criticism of Islamic Legal Thought and Tools of Renewal] which was first published at 1990s has become very influential on family law reform debate and 2004 reforms.⁷ His latest remarking contribution to the literature is a commentary series on 2004 reforms titled *Min Mudawwanah al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya 'ila Mudawwanah al-Usra* [From the Personal Status Code to the Code of Family]. The first volume of the series deals with the issues of marriage and the second volume is about the dissolution of the marriage.⁸ The commentary is especially precious as it sheds light on the discussions of the Royal Advisory Commission who drafted the changes of 2004 family code.

Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī's legal thinking and his contribution to the issue of renewing Islamic law are extensively studied in Morocco. Many seminars, workshops have been held to pay tribute to al-Khamlīshī's contribution to Islamic legal thought and improvement of legal status of women. In 2011, in an conference themed *Ijtihād: Reading in the works of Professor Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī*, the participants affirmed that al-Khamlīshī is “one of the pioneers of Moroccan law reform and symbolic figure of Islamic thought and *ijtihād*”. He is considered to be “one of the first scholars to develop progressive solutions from the Sharia” to improve legal position of Moroccan women and he has “contributed to the qualitative development of legal texts relating to family” and also his research shown that “there is no contradiction between Sharia and human rights, nor between Sharia and the institutions of modern civilization with economic, political and scientific”.⁹ Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī has become a mediator between Sharia law and state law. He has become a pioneer

⁶ Rahma TV Channel, “Barnāmaj A'lamu'l-Umma: Allāma Doctor Ahmad al-Khamlīshī” *YouTube* (Accessed 21 November 2023), 00:01:00-00:14:29.

⁷ Some of the books included in this series as follows: Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī, *Usra wa-l-Tifl wa-l-Mar'a Usūl al-Fiqh wa al-Fikr al-Fiqhī* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 1998); Id., *al-Fikr al-Fiqhī wa Muntalaqāt Usūl al-Fiqh* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2000); Id., *Khalal yajib al-wa'yu bih* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2002); Id., *Limāzā Lā Narbid Bayna at-Tanzir wa-l-Mumārasa* (Dār al-Bayda': al-Najāh al-Jadīda, 2004); Id., *Jumūd al-Dirāsāt al-Fiqhiyya* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2010); Id., *al-Ijtihād: Taṣawwūrān wa-Mumārasa* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2010); Id., *Afkār li Munaqasha I-II-III* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2013, 2015, 2016); Id., *Limāzā Lam Yatahaqqaq al-Islāh al-Marghūb fihi fī Fiqh al-Mu'āmalāt* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2020).

⁸ Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī, *Min Mudawwanah al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya 'ila Mudawwanah al-Usra I-II* (al-Rabāt: Dār Nashr al-Ma'rifah, 2012, 2016).

⁹ Maghress, “Homage au Pr. Ahmed El Khamlichī: Un pionnier de la réforme de la pensée et de l'Ijtihad” (Accessed 21 November 2023).

proposing a *middle/third* way between reformist and conservative groups as well as between state and religion. It may be argued that he is the one who laid the theoretical foundations for *moderate Islam* which is the official discourse of Morocco. Considering that this discourse, especially in the west, is well received and shown as a model to the Muslim world and promoted in Africa by the Kingdom of Morocco¹⁰, Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī's role in showing possibility of co-existence of religion and state in a modern state cannot be overlooked. Indeed, since 2004 he has been participating in current public debates on abortion and inheritance law by offering a middle ground.¹¹

There is a growing interest in his writings and views in the English literature. Nayel A. Baderin dedicated two chapters to al-Khamlīshī's critics of the Personal Status Law and qualifications of mujtahid in Islamic legal theory in his PhD thesis *Identity and Authority: Changes in the Process of Debates over the Islamic Marriage Contract among Contemporary Muslim-Arab Intellectuals* (2014). Baderin's short article "The Moroccan Jurist al-Khamlīshī: Can a Woman Become a Legislator (Mujtahid)?" (2016), based on his thesis, can also be mentioned as a detached study on al-Khamlīshī. Felicitas Opwis discusses recent developments in the interpretation of the *maqāṣid al-sharī'a* in her article "New Trends in Islamic Legal Theory: Maqāṣid al-Sharī'a as a New Source of Law?" (2017). She examines al-Khamlīshī's understanding and interpretation of *maqāṣid al-sharī'a* alongside prominent scholars such as Ibn Āshūr, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, Yahyā Muhammad, and Jamāl al-Dīn 'Ati. Opwis's work particularly important in terms of the possibility of comparison among proposals and between classical doctrine and modern conceptions as well as for locating al-Khamlīshī in the debate over renewing Islamic law.

The present study aims to determine al-Khamlīshī's stance between text and context, and his influence on the debate of family law reforms in Morocco. To do this, it examines his understanding of *ijtihād* with reference to his views on the concept of the closure of the gate of *ijtihād*, qualifications of *mujtahid*, and his suggestion on collective type of *ijtihād* (*ijtihād jamā'i*). To reveal the difference and similarities of his understanding, the literature was consulted and comparisons were made with similar proposals. Woman and family law related issues are studied with regard to Al-Khamlīshī's methods of legal reasoning. This study concludes that al-Khamlīshī proposes a middle ground among various groups by utilising a collective type of *ijtihād* in national/regional character. The 2004 reforms demonstrated arguably the most remarkable example of this proposal.

1. Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī's Legal Thinking and His Salient Views

The main purpose of Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī is to find a middle ground to eliminate the tension between state and religion. His legal thinking revolves around to show the co-existence of state

¹⁰ See Miyase Yavuz, "Allah (God), al-Watan (the Nation), al-Malik (the King), and the Role of Ijtihād in the Family Law Reforms of Morocco" *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 7/2 (2016), 207-227.

¹¹ He calls for a middle/third way between secular/feminist and Islamist/traditionalist groups proposing the Qur'anic injunction "When death approaches one of you who leaves wealth, it is prescribed that he should make a proper bequest to parents and close relatives – a duty incumbent on those who are mindful of God" should be made a legal requirement. *The Qur'an*, trans. M. A. S. Abdel Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), al-Baqara 2/180. For a glimpse of on-going debates demanding legal changes in women's right related issues in Morocco, see Morocco World News, "Public debates on Moroccan abortion and inheritance law" (Accessed 21 November 2023).

and religion rather than a complete separation. For him, “it would be unwise for the state to see itself as wiser than community” adopting a complete separation between religion and the state and “it would be unwise for those who manage public affairs to disregard the values and wishes of the majority of the community, who find the spirit of their existence in their religious creed, and require them to abandon everything passed down from their fathers and forefathers”.¹² As opposed to Islamists and secularist claims on the relationship between state and religion, he argues that “the intervention of the state, and its institutional system, in religious affairs constitutes a protection of religion and the system of co-existence which is rejected by those groups that either excludes religion totally or restrict it to the teachings they provide to their followers”.¹³ In his legal thinking, this will be possible through the institution of the Commander of the Faithful (*Amir al-Mu'minin*) and *ijtihād*, which was seen in the 2004 reforms.¹⁴ He relies on the concept of *Amir al-Mu'minin* as it represents the highest religious and political authority with reference to the legal maxim *the rule of law resolves conflict* (*hukm al-hākim yarfa al-khilāf*). And *ijtihād* plays the key instrumental role in combining these two realms.

2. Institutional System of Decision-Making and the Function of Ijtihād

Al-Khamlīshī argues that the modern critic of Islamic law and allegations against it such as violation of human rights and women’s rights is due to absence of *updating fiqh* and lack of precision in specifying the authority entitled to formulate Islamic rulings (*ahkām al-Sharia*).¹⁵ By “updating” he means linking interpretation and the lived reality by abiding “the principle of *usūl al-fiqh* urging for the consideration of the consequences of law application on peoples' lives” as he views that context and prevailing culture of that specific time and place mostly affected jurisprudential rulings recorded in *fiqh* corpus we refer today.¹⁶ However, he acknowledges “updating *fiqh* does not mean completely discarding the inherited *fiqh* corpus and building up a new one...besides, the multiplicity of opinions and interpretative judgments allow for a wider choice in order to select the most appropriate one, even if only few uphold it”.¹⁷ It can be argued that his legal reasoning starts with an understanding of the ruling and its context, if it is not applicable today, searching for an alternative ruling among the existing jurisprudential views either through *takhayyur* (selection of an opinion within one of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence) or *talfiq* (selection of an opinion among the schools), and if the question is still unanswered practicing *ijtihād* according to needs and necessities of time, place and society. Needless to say, he does not uphold sectarian bigotry.

¹² Ahmed Al Khamlichi, “The Relationship between Religion and the State: the Institution of ‘Commandment of the Faithful’ in Morocco” *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 7/1 (2014), 67-68.

¹³ Khamlichi, “The Relationship between Religion and the State”, 69.

¹⁴ Khamlichi, “The Relationship between Religion and the State”, 75.

¹⁵ Ahmed Khamlichi, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia (Finalities and Purposes of the Islamic Law) with International Legislation on Refugees*, trans. Fatima Laouina (Rabat: Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2014), 9.

¹⁶ Khamlichi, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 12-13.

¹⁷ Khamlichi, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 17-18.

For al-Khamlishī “lack of precision in the reference or authority entitled to formulate *ahkām al-Sharia*” is a more serious gap than the updating issue.¹⁸ He remarks danger of contradictory and extremist fatwas in that sense. Al-Khamlishī considers today’s fatwas as cause of *fitna* (chaos; civil strife) and misrepresentation of Islam. He also uses this as a base of his justification of state law and state authority in regulation and implementation of Islamic law and proposes “a shift from a culture of individual jurisprudence to a system of institutional decision-making”. He explains as follows

“The new system neither supersedes individual jurisprudence nor refutes it. On the contrary, the institutional decision-making would be based on individual jurisprudence rulings favoring opinions that are closest to truth and reason. Institutional decision-making would spare the Muslim society the chaos of *fatwas*, manifested in contradiction and obstination in opinions. Likewise, it would shield the Ummah against the negative impact of the argument considering *Sharia* “rulings” as contradictory to “positive law”. The identification and the organization of this institution (or institutions) to be entrusted with this task would take into consideration the situation of each Muslim country.”¹⁹

On the necessity of the proposed shift, al-Khamlishī also draws attention to the distinction between *ibadāt* (worships) and *mu‘āmalāt* (inter-human relations; civil and commercial acts). He states that contradictory individual fatwas do not cause social problem in the fields of worship and ethics but they do in fields of organising society and relationships between its individuals. Multiplicity of these rulings “leads to breaking up social cohesion and ruining religious unity”.²⁰ Therefore *mu‘āmalāt* realm cannot be regulated by different individual opinions; there must one law for all within state.

He does not accept *ijmā‘* (consensus of jurists) as an absolute and separate source of law and argues that it must be restricted by place and time thus being only local or maybe regional. *Ijtihād* can be practiced for all issues of *mu‘āmalāt* regardless of existence *ijmā‘* and it can/should be revised over time and place. The principle of *promoting public welfare and preventing harm* applies all issues in the realm of *mu‘āmalāt*.²¹ According to him, *ijmā‘* must include opinions of men and women as both can practice *ijtihād*.²² By holding this view, al-Khamlishī challenges and diverges from the classical mainstream approach on *mujtahid* as well as establishment of legal and religious authority. He justifies the necessity of this shift with reference to Qur’anic principle *taklīf* (responsibility; obligation for the individual to obey the law), and *shūrā* (consultation) as it will be explained in his collective *ijtihād* proposal below.

In this proposed shift, al-Khamlishī’s conception of *ijtihād* plays the instrumental key role. He adopts *maqāsīd* (general objectives of Sharia) based Sharia understanding and *maqāsīd* based *ijtihād*

¹⁸ Khamlichi, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 13.

¹⁹ Khamlichi, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 15.

²⁰ Khamlichi, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 16-17.

²¹ Khamlishī, *al-Ijtihād*, 24.

²² See for details Nayel A. Badereen, “The Moroccan Jurist al-Khamlishi: Can a Woman Become a Legislator (Mujtahid)?” *Mathal* 5/1 (2016), 1-8.

maintains it.²³ For him, the function of *ijtihād* is to fulfill general principles of Sharia and return to Qur'anic principles, and its nature is continuous. The ultimate objective of Sharia is to bring beneficence and ward off evil. More specifically, he refers to the general provisions of Qur'ān such as *adālah* (justice), *ma'rūf* (acceptable, in a fair manner), *musāwāh* (equality), *islāh* (reform) and reliability as guiding principles of interpretation.²⁴ For al-Khamlīshī the interpretation of *maqāsid al-Sharia* “does not necessitate the norms of *tafsir* (exegetic effort) provided for in *usūl al-fiqh* and applicable only in explaining specific texts. The explanation of general principles and the way they should be applied on the realities of life can be accomplished by anyone with enough knowledge to understand the reality and present ideas to solve its problems.”²⁵ The competency of this type of *ijtihād* is generally granted to those in charge of governing Muslim community, i.e. *ulu'l-amr*, *amir al-mu'minin*, *imam* and others, for handling state institutions and policies, in the scope of *Siyāsah al-Sharia* (Legitimate governmental policy based on the Sharia). Hence, according to him, in Moroccan context, the institution of *amir al-mu'minin* regulated by constitution and law will make *ijtihād* based decisions binding for all. He also remarks the existence of various types of *ijtihād*, such as *ijtihād al-'urfī* alongside *Siyāsah al-Sharia*, which are not binding for providing linguistic evidences from the texts (*naṣṣ* pl. *nuṣūṣ*). Al-Khamlīshī here refers to *ijtihād* of *al-muhtasib* (who is in charge of enforcing public morality, monitoring public welfare and supermarkets as an administrative officer of the ruler) as an example.²⁶

Al-Khamlīshī calls revision of out-dated opinions, as they are pure product of *ijtihād*. The nature of *ijtihād* is *zannī* that is un-explicit and conjectural as, he explains, “the *mujtahid* is influenced by the surrounding conditions and circumstances, as well as by intellectual and personal characteristics through which he discerns the best signs of a sound ruling”.²⁷ If there is no explicit (*qat'ī*) ruling of Sharia on a matter it will be subject to *ijtihād* and will be open to revision. As *ijtihād* is open to revision as its own nature, here, al-Khamlīshī draws attention to the lived realities consisting of, such as culture, social relations, human rights and freedoms related discourses as a necessary part of *ijtihād*.²⁸ He uses the concept of *ijtihād al-wāqī'*, that is *ijtihād* based on the occurrence or the reality. He believes that *ijtihād al-wāqī'* and consideration of reality and people's needs are necessary, and a combination of social reality and ideals/ambitions is needed rather than

²³ *Maqāsid*-based approach to Sharia and *maqāsid*-based *ijtihād* are also adopted by many other scholars, such as Muḥammad al-Tāhīr ibn 'Āshūr, 'Allāl al-Fāsi, Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, Yusūf al-Qaradāwī, Attia, Auda, Kamali and so on, since the last century. There has been increasing number of studies dealing with *maqāsid*-based approach discussing its philosophy, methodology, practice, and foundation and scope i.e. whether it is a part of *usūl al-fiqh* or it is a different branch of study. See for example Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, *Muḥāḍarāt fī Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah*, (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Kalimah, 2010); Gamal Eldin Attia, *Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law: Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah: A Functional Approach* (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007); Jasser Auda, *Maqasid al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach* (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007); Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Maqāsid al-Sharī'ah, Ijtihad and Civilisational Renewal* (London: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2012).

²⁴ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtihād*, 38.

²⁵ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 64.

²⁶ Khamlīshī, *Jumūd al-Dirāsāt al-Fiqhiyya*, 179.

²⁷ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 44-45.

²⁸ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtihād*, 22-23; Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 46.

isolation of one another.²⁹ Therefore, he recommends taking inspiration from ethical dimensions of out-dated juristic opinions and transmitting them in a modern legal ruling. The only condition of new rulings is that they “do not contradict an express text of Sharia or one of its decisive and conclusive ruling (*qat’i*) or one of its fundamental tenants. This leaves a vast room for *ijtihād* and for the choice of rulings that ensure welfare (of society/parties/issue)”.³⁰ As in al-Khamlīshī’s understanding, *ijtihād al-wāqī’* is a context-centred practice of *ijtihād*; it relies on knowledge of facts and surrounding conditions of the case, rather than knowledge of texts, as in the text-centred *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād al-ḥukm*, that is *ijtihād* based on the ruling, strictly applies the principles and methods of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.³¹ This type of practical jurisprudence, *fiqh al-wāqī’*, and its tool *ijtihād al-wāqī’* is not only called by al-Khamlīshī but also other contemporary legal scholars.³²

3. Collective Type of *Ijtihād* (*ijtihād jamā’i’*): National/Regional Collective *Ijtihād*

The foundation of al-Khamlīshī’s collective *ijtihād* proposal lies in his critic of classical conception on the qualifications of *mujtahid* (who is capable of exercising *ijtihād* based on the sources and methods of Islamic law). For him, the qualification of being *mujtahid* is extensively discussed in the legal theory; however, the practicability of this definition has never been debated, at least in Sunni schools. The issue of his recognition by the Ummah and availability of a method for implementing his opinions are also ignored, in a way, they were properly untested.³³ This negligence, as he argues, was also the reason for various discourses on the qualifications of *mujtahid*, accordingly different types of *ijtihād* and their being fruitless.³⁴

Al-Khamlīshī argues that the reading of the revealed texts in the light of reality and experience of human civilization has clearly influenced the evolution of political thought within Muslim societies. But “we still talk about the “*mujtahid*” without paying any attention to his actual presence or absence, let alone expounding the way he should practice the issuing of binding texts with respect to all aspects and needs of society or to some of them in the event there are several legislative instances for a single society”.³⁵ Accordingly, he examines the conditions of being *mujtahid* in two aspects: Firstly, it is impossible to check practically whether the quality and nature of the specified conditions fulfilled; and secondly, there is limited way or tool to declare the fulfillment of the specified conditions. This is why, he argues, there is no example of self-declaration of being *mujtahid* in Islamic legal history and having a consensus of his contemporaries and the Ummah. He further explains that the end of declaration of being *mujtahid* created a new term *alim* (pl. *ulama*), since then *ijtihād* had been rarely practiced but *ulama* spread through *tafsir*,

²⁹ Rahma TV Channel, “Barnāmaj A’lāmu’l-Umma: Allāma Doctor Ahmad al-Khamlīshī”, 00:27:33-00:30:00.

³⁰ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 46, 61.

³¹ Frank Vogel, *Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 119.

³² See for example Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, *al-Ijtihād: al-Naṣṣ, al-Wāqī’, al-Maṣlaḥah* (al-Qāhira: Dār al-Kalimah, 2013).

³³ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 58.

³⁴ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 61.

³⁵ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 58.

hadith, *fiqh* and religious studies. This was the case started following Imam Shāfiī (d. 204/820) period and resulted with stagnation of *fiqh* and decline of *ijtihād* practices.³⁶ He also remarks that opinions of *mujtahids* are considered as divine law, absolute and unable to change and so early works (7-10 centuries A.D.) became primary sources for debates of today. He explains that in theory there is a principle which states that change of *ijtihād* provision if it does not fulfill the intended *maslaha* (benefit, interest) with it. However, there is no sign of this principle in practice as it is accepted that no *ijtihād* can repeal any other *ijtihād*. This practice constituted schools of jurisprudence (*madhhab* pl. *madhahib*) that rule the Muslim world since then.³⁷ Al-Khamlishī basically criticizes *taqlīd* (acting upon the word of another without asking for specific proof) and argues that this unrealistic approach and unachievable conditions of being *mujtahid* created *taqlīd*. He calls this blind following of *madhhab* as the cause of closure of the gate of *ijtihād*.³⁸ For him, although everything has changed in the past ten centuries *fiqh* has not changed.³⁹

As mentioned before *shūrā* (consultation) is called for by al-Khamlishī in applicability of *ijtihād* today. He states “the concept of consultation that places decision-making in general matters under the competence of every member of society. They can exercise it in the way they choose in accordance with changing circumstances.”⁴⁰ Within this context he proposes collective type of *ijtihād* explaining that “joined efforts in the understanding of texts and seeking the assistance of those who are more familiar with them and whom we nowadays call ‘specialists’” is needed”. This collective effort to interpret the text, as he argues, ensures common agreement in society and fits in custom.⁴¹ Needless to say, in his conception, collective *ijtihād* can be exercised by man and woman, as well as ulama and non-religious scholars/professional/experts.⁴²

The collective type of *ijtihād* has been called by many scholars, such as Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), Rashīd Ridā (d.1935), Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) and so on, starting from the beginning of 20th century. Although they all call for *ijtihād* to be exercised collectively, their proposal differed

³⁶ Khamlishī, *al-Ijtihād*, 13-15.

³⁷ Khamlishī, *al-Ijtihād*, 23.

³⁸ His views on *ijtihād*, *taqlīd* and *mujtahid* are shared not only by early reformists but also his contemporaries who call for change in Islamic jurisprudence and revival of *ijtihād*. It should also be noted that their arguments have been challenged particularly in last decades. Actually, there is a growing literature approaching the subject from different angles. See, for example, Wael B. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed?” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16/1 (1984), 3-41; Id., “On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of Ijtihād” *Studia Islamica* 63 (1986), 129-141; Id., “Ifta’ and Ijtihād in Sunni Legal Theory: A Developmental Account”, *Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas*, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) 33-43; Sherman Jackson, “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory: *Muṭlaq* and ‘*Āmm* in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī” *Islamic Law and Society* 3/2 (1996), 165-192; Haim Gerber, “Rigidity Versus Openness in Late Classical Islamic Law: The Case of the Seventeenth-Century Palestinian Muftī Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī” *Islamic Law and Society* 5/2 (1998), 165-195; Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, “Rethinking the *Taqlīd-Ijtihād* Dichotomy: A Conceptual-Historical Approach” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 136/2 (2016), 285-303.

³⁹ Badereen, “The Moroccan Jurist” 4.

⁴⁰ Khamlishī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 57.

⁴¹ Khamlishī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 16.

⁴² Badereen, “The Moroccan Jurist” 3.

from each other. Al-Khamlishi's conception of collective *ijtihād* is a distinct one as it differs at various shared points, i.e. formation of the commission entitled to exercise *ijtihād*, the issues that subjected to collective *ijtihād* on, and the scope of its forcefulness. For instance, Qaradāwī calls *ijtihād* to be practiced only on issues without clear evidence and if there is no *ijmā'*. As mentioned earlier, for al-Khamlishī it can be exercised on the subjects that there is an *ijmā'* on. Al-Qaradāwī calls collective type of *ijtihād* formed of Muslim ulama while retaining the individual *ijtihād* as parallel practice. However, similar to Ridā and Iqbal, al-Khamlishī thinks that collective commission can include experts from outside of ulama. Al-Khamlishī especially discusses two common characters of the proposed collective *ijtihād* commissions: independence of ulama who entitle to exercise collective *ijtihād* and their authority.⁴³ Within this context, al-Khamlishī examines Muhammad Tāhir Ibn Āshūr and Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī's collective *ijtihād* proposals. For the sake of showing integrity in their proposals and the points where al-Khamlishī argued something different, whole of the relevant text is provided below. Ibn Āshūr explains his understanding of collective *ijtihād* as follow:

“The first step that should be taken toward this crucial intellectual and scholarly objective is to form a specialist body of eminent Sharia scholars from all the juristic schools (*madhahib*) in the Muslim countries. The task of these scholars must be to study and discuss the vital needs of the Ummah so as to produce agreed upon resolutions on how the Muslim community should act in their respect. Then, they ought to convey their resolutions to all Muslim countries, and I do not have any serious doubt that Muslims will abide by their recommendations. Another duty of the members of this suggested body is to identify the Sharia scholars around the world who have attained or nearly attained the level of *ijtihād*. Once this is done, Muslim scholars must choose the best qualified among themselves to take the leading role in exercising *ijtihād*. In electing this group of scholars, special attention must be given to the following matter. Besides knowledge, this group of scholars must combine integrity and observance of the Sharia in their personal lives so that the Ummah has full confidence in their scholarly erudition and there will be no suspicion concerning the truthfulness and soundness of their recommendations.”⁴⁴

Al-Khamlishī does not accept pan-Islamic and global character of collective *ijtihād* as proposed by Ibn Āshūr as well as early reformist Rashīd Ridā. According to al-Khamlishī, it is not possible to limit or define “eminent Sharia scholars” or “skilled fuqaha in Sharia” from all over the world. As understood by now he is very critical about the issue of qualified authority to exercise *ijtihād* thus states ‘the more important question is who is going to decide who is ‘eminent and skilled Sharia scholars’?”⁴⁵ For him, this criterion is unrealistic and unpractical, as well as not suited to the socio-political structures of modern Muslim societies i.e. modern nation states where every state has own institutions and law-making authorities. Similar to Ibn Āshūr, al-Qaradāwī also emphasizes that collective *ijtihād* should be a global effort that above any limitation considering the Ummah, such as region, school of thought and nationality. He further explains as follows:

⁴³ Khamlishī, *al-Ijtihād*, 17.

⁴⁴ Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, *Treatise on Maqasid al-Sharia*, trans. Mohamed el-Tahir el-Mesawi (London, Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2006), 225.

⁴⁵ Khamlishī, *al-Ijtihād*, 17.

Collective *ijtihād* is a collective Islamic scientific and global effort which is honourable responsibility for Muslim jurists in the world regardless of their region or madhhab or nationality. A member who is nominated to this committee, his understanding (*fiqh*) and his devotion is not for government, the system and his closeness is not for the hakim or the leader. The committee should be completely free from any influence, threat or pressure from government or power groups in society in order to produce its decision clearly and fearlessly. It should be free from any political or social pressures. The reality is most of time there is no freedom for the committee. Members of the committee are chosen by the regional/national government or the committee is funded by the government or, at least, there is no guarantee for freedom. Government generally chooses one who is close to government or if they are not in favour of the government, it does not fund the committee. Therefore, it is better to gather Muslim scholars from all around the world in a conference in a specific time and place where they can choose the best and strongest opinion among them. This is going to be the scientific academy/gathering [*majma al-ilmī*] which we desired. If this committee agrees on an opinion about an *ijtihādī* issue, this will be accepted as consensus (*ijmā'*) of contemporary mujtahids. This is the authoritative opinion and shall be obliged for fatawa and law-making (*tashrī*). If they cannot reach consensus, the opinion of majority is preferred and there is no other place to find its shari answer.⁴⁶

Al-Khamlīshī suspects about the independence of ulama appointed in a commission as such and more importantly the authority of their decisions argued to be binding the Ummah considering *ijmā'*.⁴⁷ He discusses that if only consensus and majority of opinion are considered to have *shar'ī* authority, does this mean that minority opinion has no *shar'ī* authority and *shar'ī* bases? Furthermore, when there is a disagreement and “there is no any other *shar'ī* authority to consult” who “decides” whether the minority opinion has *shar'ī* authority or not. The answer for al-Khamlīshī is the rulers [*hukkām*] depending on the legal principle in Islamic political legal history “The rule of law resolves conflict” [*hukm al-hākim yarfa al-khilaf*]. The rulers have the authority to decide and enforce the outcome of the commission mediating between different opinions.⁴⁸ By this understanding his collective *ijtihād* conception appears to be national or regional rather than being global character.

Al-Khamlīshī also questions the expertise of ulama commission in terms of its organisation and their expertise on discussed topic. Al-Khamlīshī emphasizes that an ulama commission is not the only way to exercise *ijtihād*. He refers to the concept of *ahl al-hall wa'l-aqd* here (those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community) and its capacity of covering all *ijtihād* related issues.⁴⁹ He refers to the Qur'anic principles *shūrā*⁵⁰ and *taklīf*⁵¹ to critic ulama commission.

⁴⁶ Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, *Ijtihād fi Sharia al-Islami*, (Kuwait: Darul Qalam, 1996), 183-184.

⁴⁷ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtihād*, 17.

⁴⁸ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtihād*, 19.

⁴⁹ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtihād*, 20.

⁵⁰ “[who] conduct their affairs by mutual consultation”, al-Shūrā 42/38.

⁵¹ “We have bound each human being's destiny to his neck. On the Day of Resurrection, We shall bring out a record for each of them, which they will find spread wide open, ‘Read your record. Today your own soul is enough to calculate your account’. Whoever accepts guidance does so for his own good; whoever strays does so at his own peril. No soul will bear another's burden, nor do We punish until We have sent a Messenger”, al-Isrā' 17/13-15.

He asks “What is the shar‘ī and logical base to release Muslim community from their *taqlif* responsibilities and isolate them from their religious beliefs and understanding of texts and to regulate their life and social affairs, and to transfer all these to a “ulama commission” in the name of “*ijtihād*” and to make them binding for all Muslims without any discussion pretexting the necessity of *taqlid*?”⁵² Al-Khamlīshī also believes that it is not possible to imagine that Muslim societies will easily positively response to this decision of the ulama commission and they will leave their constitutional institutions and its regional organizations. In any other case, it will cause disruption of social cohesion and spreads seeds of *fitna*⁵³, which is very much of the reality of Muslim societies.

Today, there are different councils, commissions and official bodies practicing collective type of *ijtihād* such as the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (*Majma‘ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī ad-Duwalī*) established in 1981 in Makkah affiliated to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, in global character as proposed by Qaradawi mentioned above. The practice of collective *ijtihād* can also be directly linked to a state such as *Majlis al-iftā’* located in University of Azhar in Egypt and the High Boards of Religious Affairs within the Presidency of Religious Affairs of Türkiye. It can be practiced linked to a Non-Governmental Organizations such as Muslim World League of Ulama in Saudi Arabia. The commission may be lack of any link to state such as *Fatwa Majlis* in Europe.⁵⁴ In fact, today’s technological opportunities facilitate exercising collective *ijtihād* without any specific institutional affiliation as seen in various online platforms.⁵⁵ Al-Khamlīshī criticizes all these initiatives as not being functional and useful for Muslims hence they do not bring any real change. For him, it is because all the organizations mentioned are in the opinion that new rulings should not be contradictory to existing rulings and should apply classical legal theory. Besides, their decisions are not binding and any Muslim state can browse and adopt if they wish to do so.⁵⁶ On the other hand, contradictory independent *fatwas* have increased in number causing tension and chaos in society as well as the gap between positive law and Sharia rulings deepened.⁵⁷ This is why he proposes collective *ijtihād* to be an instrument to combine Sharia law and positive law in state’s institutional decision-making system by making law for all. It should be highlighted that unlike the others, his understanding of collective *ijtihād* is *national/regional ijtihād* that is confined to the demands of local issues within each individual state. It must be conducted continuously throughout the ages and in every region using the consensus of the Muslim community.

⁵² Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtiḥād*, 20.

⁵³ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtiḥād*, 21.

⁵⁴ For a non-conclusive list of current collective *ijtihād* institutions, see Sajila Kausar, “Collective Ijtihad: History and Current Perspective” *International Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences* 3/5 (2017), 151-163.

⁵⁵ For instance see International Centre for Collective Ijtihad (ICCI), “Collective Ijtihad” (Accessed 18 November 2023).

⁵⁶ Khamlīshī, *al-Ijtiḥād*, 21-22.

⁵⁷ Khamlichī, *Compatibility of Maqasid al-Sharia*, 14.

4. *Ijtihād in Practice: Woman and Family Law Related Issues*

In order to see al-Khamlīshī's *ijtihād* conception in practice, his general view on woman's status in Islam and definition of marriage will be examined as they are already heatedly debated issues in modern Muslim world. To begin with, for al-Khamlīshī, the on-going debate on status of Muslim woman in social life is a part of faulty approach to Sharia and undermining the distinction of its general (*kullī*) and particular (*juzī*) rulings. Particular provisions should be understood in consideration of the general (*kullī*) provisions and the main objectives of Sharia. Thus, a return to the main principles and general provisions of Sharia is needed. He states the concept of *ma'rūf* (literally; well known), which means natural way, religious and humanistic value as he defined, is used more than 20 times in the Qur'ān in relation to woman and family issues. The use of *ma'rūf* in this context, he argues, shows that *fiqh* should not make harder the relations between woman and man in society as *ma'rūf* changes with time and place. He states that there is not only religious responsibility but also social responsibility for people. Social and ontological rights and responsibilities are not only for man but also for woman. His idea of equality revolves around the idea of perfection (*takamul*) between man and woman through supporting and balancing each other. He notes traditional views on woman's education and work and argues that today *ijtihād* should be practiced on these issues in consideration of general principles of Sharia. He explains that man and woman both are *mukallaf* (who is obliged to observe religious obligations and prohibitions) and *taklif* includes not only religious responsibility but also social responsibilities, such as work and education. Another example would be his approach to woman dressing as he emphasizes *zannī* and *wāqī'* nature of the ruling. He explains that the problem is not about what is *shar'ī* dressing and what is not but it is about its definition and limitation. Dressing is not an essential (*aslī*) issue but it is social issue depending on reality (*wāqī'*) and showing cultural and particular features. Therefore, all various opinions about dressing are *zannī*. In that case, for al-Khamlīshī, consultation (*shūrā*) as demanded by the Qur'ān is needed for formulating rules that fit into society.⁵⁸

With the 2004 reforms in the Moroccan family law, known *Mudawwanah*, the definition of marriage changed as follows: "Marriage is a legal contract by which a man and a woman mutually consent to unite in a common and enduring conjugal life. Its purpose is fidelity, virtue and the creation of a stable family, under the supervision of both spouses according to the provisions of this *Mudawwanah*" (article 4). It is one of the main changes, which also regulates the rights and responsibilities of the spouses in family, introduced within the scope of 2004 reforms. In the previous code, it was defined as "a lawful pact between a man and a woman to unite and remain together in a permanent manner, its aim being integrity and chastity and the growth of the population of the nation by the founding of a family under the care of the husband, based on stable foundations, and requiring the contracting parties to bear its burdens in trust, peace, affection and respect" (article 1 of the Personal Status Law). Al-Khamlīshī states the marriage contract is defined in accordance to the Qur'ān "But if you want to replace one wife with another and you have given one of

⁵⁸ Rahma TV Channel, "Barnāmaj A'lāmu'l-Umma: Allāma Doctor Ahmad al-Khamlīshī", 00:18:12-00:27:31.

them a great amount [in gifts], do not take [back] from it anything. Would you take it in injustice and manifest sin? And how could you take it while you have gone in unto each other and they have taken from you a solemn covenant? [mithāqan qhalizā]”.⁵⁹ Al-Khamlīshī argues that the definition of marriage in classical jurisprudence is weak (*shādh*) and most of the rulings established based on this definition, such as *bud'* (vulva) and *milk al-mut'ah* (exclusive possession of pleasure) are weak (*shudhūdh*) as well. He draws attention to the current conditions of society and the issue of equality between spouses. For him, providing equality, justice and balance in spouses' rights and responsibilities is an implication of marriage being *mithāq* (covenant) and it is a way of practicing the Qur'ān (2: 187): “they are [close as] garments to you, and you are [close as] garments to them”.⁶⁰

Conclusion

Considering post independence Morocco, Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī is one of a few scholars who really worked on unification in country's legal system by showing that state law and Sharia could exist together and there is no need to eliminate the one for the other. It has not been an easy task for modern Muslim-majority states, actually there is none apart from Turkey that eliminated Sharia from their legal system or a state that does not comply with the reality of positive law. Seeing the 2004 Moroccan family law reforms introduced on the base of *ijtihād*, it can be said that al-Khamlīshī successfully delivered his task. Furthermore, he acted as a mastermind particularly in terms of the content of the reforms and their religious justifications. He adopts contextual and holistic approach by reading the revealed text in the light of reality thus acknowledging historical context of some Qur'anic injunctions. He differentiates *fiqh* and Sharia (divine law) and opposes consideration of *fiqh* as eternal part of Sharia. Within this context, al-Khamlīshī critics classical conception of *ijtihād* as well as qualifications of *mujtahid*. Like many other contemporary reformist scholars, he agrees with the claim of closure of gate of *ijtihād* and calls for revival of Islamic jurisprudence by exercising *maqāsid*-based *ijtihād* according to the lived reality and the needs and necessities of today. As *ijtihād* should be exercised continuously over time and place, *ijmā'* cannot constitute a source of law for al-Khamlīshī; therefore, the issues that jurists agreed on are open to *ijtihād* today, especially in the realm of *mu'āmalāt*. For him, every Muslim who has religiously responsible should express his/her view in a debated issue, in a way he seeks for a consensus of local Muslim community not a consensus of Muslim jurists. But only an authorized constitutional institution delivers rulings by considering different parties and views in the community as well as hearing the specialists on the subject. Al-Khamlīshī highlights *shūrā* principle and adopts it in relation to his collective *ijtihād* proposal. The commission charged with exercising *ijtihād* should include people from outside the ulama class, i.e. experts, professionals without gender specification. This is another point where his *ijtihād* understanding differs from his contemporaries. Al-Khamlīshī recognizes that one of the biggest challenges in modern Muslim societies is the authority that is entitled to formulate *shar'ī* rulings thus preventing chaos created by individual religious opinions (*fatwa*) and the clash between state law and Sharia rulings. Here,

⁵⁹ al-Nisā' 4/20-21.

⁶⁰ Khamlīshī, *Min Mudawwanah al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya 'ila Mudawwanah al-Usra I*, 71-73.

he acknowledges that the ruler plays a mediating role among different views in society and collective *ijtihād* commission as well. Thus, the ruler's ruling will be the final say on the debated subject. In the light of his views, one may argue that al-Khamlīshī's mediating role between state law and Sharia sometimes tends to lean towards the first one, that is by undermining the legal maxim "One legal interpretation does not destroy another" for the sake of another one "The lesser of the two evils is preferred". Nevertheless, Aḥmad al-Khamlīshī is a remarkable scholar with his critic of classical doctrine and his proposal for renewal of Islamic law today which diverge from his contemporaries in a number of points. Considering his contribution to family law reforms of 2004, it appears to be clear that al-Khamlīshī's views and writings need more attention and scrutiny.

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The Change of the Power in the Context of Factional Struggle in the Formation Years of the Mamlūk State

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ABSTRACT

There are numerous studies in the literature dealing with the formation years of the Mamlūk state. These studies generally focus on the issue of the legitimacy of the state due to the *mamlūk* origin of the sultans. In order to overcome this problem, the Mamluks emphasized their identity as the *guardians of Islam*. According to this narrative, being the protector of Islam would legitimise their future independent state. However, this argument largely attributes the formation of the state to successful struggles against external factors such as Crusader-Mongol attacks. This leads to the neglect of many reasons behind the formation of the Mamluk State. While it is accepted that the state derives legitimacy from its struggles against external elements, this study focuses on inter-factional conflicts and reveals that the state has become dynamic due to these struggles. In this respect, the struggle between factions, which had been active since the time of the Ayyubids, must be taken into account in the internal transformation of the Mamlūk power. In addition, although there are narratives such as *becoming sultan by killing the sultan*, which is among the arguments frequently mentioned in the Mamluks, the determining power of the elite amirs, which is one of the unwritten rules known by everyone in the functioning of the state system, should be taken into account. Because when this is missed, the results of inter-factional struggles will be ignored. In these rules/system, not only the sultan changed, but also a series of changes occurred in the elite amirs in power. The autocracy-oligarchy conflict between the sultan and the elite amirs was ever-present. Whenever one of the amirs who provided the oligarchic power became the sultan, the power struggle between the sultan and the elite amirs would begin. In this case, the sultan would be in a dilemma and would establish a new faction in order to reassert his authority. Therefore, the struggle between factions at the point of the formation of the Mamlūk State was one of the most important factors that ensured the formation of the state and the change of power. As a matter of fact, it is a known fact that Mamlūk factions such as ‘Adiliyya, Kāmiliyya and Sālihiyya held the state power *de facto*, if not officially. On the other hand, this work takes a holistic approach to the conditions that led to the statehood of the Sālihiyya-Bahriyya mamlūks in the process. It also discusses how the tensions between the sultan’s mamlūks (*al-mamālik al-sultāniyya*) and his *khushdāshs* affected the change of power. Focusing specifically on the Bahriyya-Mu‘izziyya struggle, this work examines how the formation, maintenance, and transition of power took place during the formative years of the Mamlūk state. Finally, the work focuses on the role of background conflicts between the sultan and the senior amirs, power gathering, etc. in the formation and decline of the state through the chronicles of the early Mamlūk period in general and works devoted to the Mamlūk sultanate in particular.

Keywords: Medieval History, Mamlūk State, State Formation, Civil Struggle, Bahriyya, Mu‘izziyya

Memlûk Devleti'nin Oluşum Yıllarında Hizipsel Mücadele Bağlamında İktidar Değişimi

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ÖZ

Memlûk Devleti'nin kuruluş yılları ile ilgili literatürde pek çok çalışma mevcuttur. Bunlar genellikle sultanların *memlûk* kökenli olmalarından dolayı devletin meşruiyeti meselesini merkeze almaktadırlar. Memlûkların bu sorunu aşmak için kendilerini *İslam'ın koruyucuları* kimliğiyle öne çıkardıkları anlatılmaktadır. Bu anlatıma göre İslam'ın koruyucusu olmak ileride kuracakları müstakil devletlerini meşrulaştıracaktı. Ancak bu argüman, devletin oluşumunu büyük oranda Haçlı-Moğol saldırıları gibi dışsal unsurlara karşı yapılan başarılı mücadelelere bağlamaktadır. Bu durum Memlûk Devleti'nin oluşumunun ardında yatan pek çok nedenin göz ardı edilmesine neden olmaktadır. Devletin dışsal unsurlara karşı yürüttüğü mücadelelerden meşruiyet devşirdiği kabul edilmekle birlikte, bu çalışma, hizipler arası çekişmelere odaklanarak bu mücadeleler dolayısıyla devletin dinamik bir hâl aldığı ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bakımdan Memlûk iktidarının kendi içindeki dönüşümünde Eyyübîler zamanında beri faal olan hizipler arası mücadele dikkate alınmak durumundadır. Ayrıca Memlûklar'da sıklıkla bahsedilen argümanlar arasında bulunan *sultan öldürerek sultan olmak* gibi anlatımlar mevcut olmasına rağmen devlet sisteminin işleyişinde herkes tarafından bilinen ve yazılı olmayan kaidelerden olan seçkin emîrlerin belirleyici gücü dikkate alınmalıdır. Zira bu iskanlandığında hizipler arası mücadelelerin getirdiği neticeler de göz ardı edilecektir. Bu kaidelerde/sistemde yalnızca sultan değişmiyor aynı zamanda iktidarda bulunan seçkin elit kadroda da bir dizi değişiklikler hasıl oluyordu. Sultan ve seçkin emîrler arasındaki otokrasi-oligarşi çatışması her daim yaşanmaktaydı. Ne zaman ki oligarşik gücü sağlayan emîrlerden biri sultan olur, işte o zaman sultan ile seçkin emîrler arasında iktidar mücadelesi başlardı. Bu durumda sultan açmazda kalarak otoritesini ihdas edebilmek amacıyla kendisine yeni bir hizip kurardı. Dolayısıyla Memlûk Devleti'nin oluşumu noktasında hizipler arası mücadele devletin oluşumunu ve iktidarın değişimini sağlayan önemli etkenlerdendi. Nitekim resmen olmasa da *de facto* olarak Âdiliyye, Kâmilîyye ve Sâlihîyye gibi memlûk hiziplerinin de devlet gücünü ellerinde tuttukları bilinen bir gerçektir. Diğer taraftan bu çalışma, süreç içerisinde Sâlihîyye-Bahriyye memlûklarının devletleşmesini sağlayan koşulları bütünsel bir yaklaşımla ele almaktadır. Ayrıca sultanın memlûkları (*el-memâlikü's-sultaniyye*) ile *hûşdâşları* arasındaki gerilimin iktidarın el değiştirmesini nasıl etkilediğini tartışmaktadır. Spesifik olarak Bahriyye-Mu'izziyye arasındaki mücadeleye odaklanan bu çalışma, Memlûk devletinin kuruluş yıllarında iktidarın oluşumu, sürdürülmesi ve değişiminin nasıl gerçekleştiğini incelemektedir. Son olarak çalışmada genel olarak erken Memlûk dönemine ait kronikler ve hususi olarak Memlûk sultanlık anlayışına hasredilmiş çalışmalar sadedinde sultan-seçkin emîrler arasındaki arka plan çatışmaları, iktidar devşirmeleri vb. hadiselerin devletin oluş-bozuluşunda oynadığı rol esas alınmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Çağ Tarihi, Memlûk Devleti , Devlet Oluşumu, İç Mücadele, Bahriyye, Mu'izziyye..

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Introduction

Scholars who have studied the administrative structure of the Mamlūk state, its power, and the concept of the sultanate have presented conflicting discourses. David Ayalon, who has drawn attention to this problem, has noted that the Mamlūks introduced the inheritance system from time to time and sometimes adopted policies that opposed the inheritance system.¹ P. M. Holt, pointing out the weakness of the understanding of dynasty, stated that the power to elect a sultan was realised by the consensus of the amirs who formed the victorious faction.² Amalia Levanoni acknowledged that there were some uncertainties in their decision-making procedures, noting that an anti-hereditary view prevailed.³ Ali Aktan not only accepted the fact that the inheritance system was adopted in the historical process, but also noted that it was based on the power and determination of the senior amirs.⁴ Konrad Hirscler, on the other hand, noted that the hereditary system was abandoned during the Mamlūk period and instead a practice was introduced whereby the senior amirs became sultans by creating their own power base. He also noted that *awlād al-nās* (the children of the sultans/amirs) were not favoured, but were only used as a temporary solution in the struggle between the amirs.⁵

Another prevailing view of the Mamlūk sultanate was based on the principle that *whoever kills the sultan becomes the sultan*. In fact, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khuwayṭir wrote that after the assassination of Quṭuz (657-658/1259-1260), al-Ẓāhir Baybars (658-676/1260-1277) was declared sultan by the senior amirs in accordance with *Turkish law*.⁶ Albrecht Fuess wrote that in the first Mamlūk period, the concept of Turkish law prevailed, so that whoever killed the sultan at that time ascended the throne.⁷ In this sense, Süleyman Özbek stated that it was misleading to see the hereditary system in the Mamlūk state, that it was applied with few exceptions, but by claiming that whoever kills the sultan becomes the sultan,⁸ he extended this principle to the entire Mamlūk state and gave the impression that this conception had always prevailed.

Ulrich Haarmann, who criticised the notion that whoever killed the sultan would become sultan and the assertion that the powerful and influential could become sultan, noted that he doubted

¹ David Ayalon, “Aspects of the Mamlūk Phenomenon”, *Der Islam: Journal of the History and Culture of the Middle East* 53/2 (1977), 208-209.

² P.M. Holt, “The Position and Power of the Mamlūk Sultan”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 38/2 (1975), 239.

³ Amalia Levanoni, “The Mamlūk Conception of the Sultanate”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26/3 (1994), 373.

⁴ Ali Aktan, “Memlûklerde Saltanat Değişikliği Usulü”, *Atatürk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 9 (1990), 287.

⁵ Konrad Hirscler, “He is a Child and This Land is a Borderland of Islam: Under-Age Rule and the Quest for Political Stability in the Ayyūbid Period”, *al-Masāq* 19/1 (2007), 38.

⁶ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First: His Endeavours and Achievements* (London: The Green Mountain Press, 1978), 26-27.

⁷ Albrecht Fuess, “Mamlūk Politics”, *Ubi Sumus? Quo Vademus*, ed. Stephan Conermann (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2013), 100.

⁸ Süleyman Özbek, “Memlûklerde Meşrûiyet Arayışları ve Saltanat İnşasına Yönelik Çabalar ‘Sultan Öldüren Sultan Olur’”, *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 32/53 (2013), 168.

this since neither attitude worked efficiently in the Mamlūk state. Nevertheless, the senior amirs preferred to make the man who was weak in comparison to them the sultan rather than put strong people in charge. In fact, Turanshah ibn al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb (647-648/1249-1250) was killed by Fāris al-Dīn Aqtay al-Jamdar, (d. 652/1254) the leader of the Bahriyya, but the senior amirs did not allow him to become sultan because he was one of the strongest candidates for the throne.⁹ Linda S. Northrup has argued that there was a conflict between oligarchy and autocracy in the Mamlūk state, that the oligarchy of the chief amirs usually dominated the autocracy of the sultan, and that they eliminated the sultan in question when their oligarchic power structures were threatened.¹⁰ On the other hand, Daniel Beaumont wrote that the Mamlūk state could never mention that whoever killed the sultan became the sultan, and stressed that Mu‘izz Aybak’s (648-655/1250-1257) proclamation as sultan explicitly confirmed this. According to him, Aybak was favoured by the fact that he was one of the weak and middle-ranking amirs.¹¹ Therefore, senior amirs believed that they could eliminate him immediately if he tried to seize power.

Another claim regarding the concept of the sultanate in the early period of Mamlūk rule was that the Egyptian mamlūks had a serious problem of legitimacy because they were not based on a specific dynasty. To overcome this problem, the Mamlūks preferred to adhere to the Ayyūbid lineage during the early years of the state. Indeed, Angus Stewart has noted that the administration of Shajar al-Durr (d. 655/1257) relied on her long-dead son Khalīl. Similarly, the administration of Mu‘izz Aybak was based on al-Ashraf Musa of the Ayyūbid lineage between 1250 and 1252. Coins minted for Mu‘izz Aybak indicate that he was the assistant of al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb.¹² On the other hand, Mustafa M. Ziyāda pointed out that five days after Mu‘izz Aybak was proclaimed sultan, in order to avoid both the legitimacy problem of the Egyptian mamlūks and the power struggle among the chief amirs, al-Ashraf Musa, a descendant of the Ayyūbids, was declared sultan and Mu‘izz Aybak was appointed atābak al-‘asākīr.¹³ On the other hand, Turkī ibn Fahd, without mentioning the problem of legitimacy, attributed the fall of Aybak and the replacement of his Ayyūbid successor al-Ashraf Musa to friction between the Bahriyya and Aybak.¹⁴

Finally, Jo Van Steenberg wrote that many states to which the mamlūks belonged developed a “military patronage system” between the 13-16th centuries in Central Asia, north of the Black Sea, Persia, Anatolia, and Egypt-Syria. He also explained that the main purpose of this system is to secure their existence against their enemies with extended family networks. What prolongs this

⁹ Ulrich Haarmann, “Regicide and the Law of the Turks”, *Intellectual Studies on Islam: Essays in Honor of Martin B. Dickson*, ed. Michel M. Mazzaoui (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1990), 133.

¹⁰ Linda S. Northrup, “The Bahri Mamlūk Sultanate, 1250–1390”, *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, ed. Carl F. Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 255.

¹¹ Daniel Beaumont, “Political Violence and Ideology in Mamlūk Society”, *Mamlūk Studies Review* 8/1 (2004), 218.

¹² Angus Stewart, “Between Baybars and Qalāwūn: Under-Age Rulers and Succession in the Early Mamlūk Sultanate”, *Al-Masāq* 19/1 (2007), 48.

¹³ Mustafa M. Ziyāda, “The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293”, *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Robert Lee Wolff-Harry W. Hazard (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 2/742.

¹⁴ Turkī ibn Fahd Āl-i Suūd, *Nash‘atu Dawlat al-Mamālik (648/1250-658/1260)* (al-Haram: li al-dirasāt wa al-Buhūs al-Insāniyya wa al-Ijtima‘iyya, 2017), 68.

system is the income they receive in exchange for loyalty and services. As long as the income was maintained, the political power of each sultan was maintained. In addition to the households formed by the sultans, many high-ranking amirs also had their own households. For example, al-Manşūr Qalāwūn (678-689/1279-1290) acquired many mamlūks during al-Zāhir Baybars' reign, greatly increased the number of his own households, and was able to gain superiority over the Zāhiriyya after Baybars' death thanks to their military support.¹⁵

Given the coherence of all these approaches, this paper will explore the question of how factional struggles affected the change of power in the formation years of the Mamlūk state. It will also focus on factions as a power-creating or power-destroying force, since factional struggles played an active role in maintaining power. This work will also discuss how the mamlūk factions were utilised to seize power and how the sultans who came to power through an treaty (*h̄ilf*) created their own factions in case they wanted to become absolute sultans in later times. It will reveal that even though the mamlūk factions were loyal to the sultans in question, they directly held the power in their own hands after the death of their master and appointed sultans in line with their own interests. Finally, inter-factional struggles will be pointed out as the main factor determining the state's process.

1. The Emergence of the Sālihiyya-Baḥriyya Faction

It is known that in most Islamic states there were mamlūks who were part of the retinue of maliks or high-ranking amirs. It is believed that the mamlūks, who were involved in various patronage networks, held a ruler-making position and were not simple slaves. Indeed, it was the case that the mamlūks, who were also influential during the Ayyūbid period, overthrew al-Malik al-Ādil II (635-637/1238-1240) and replaced him with his brother al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb, (637-647/1240-1249) even though the former was a crown prince.¹⁶

Although al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb conquered Egypt with the support of his father's mamlūks he did not fully trust them. At the same time, he was aware that in order to prevail against other Ayyūbid rulers, he needed to build a broad network of patronage loyal to him. According to Cāsım Muḥammad Cāsım, who pointed out the necessity of this situation, al-Malik al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb allied himself with the Khwarezmiyya on the one hand and the Baḥriyya on the other in order to assert himself against al-Malik al-Şāliḥ al-Ismaʿil, (635-643/1237-1245) şāḥib of Damascus.¹⁷ In fact, thanks

¹⁵ Jo Van Steenbergen, "The Mamlūk Sultanate as a Military Patronage State: Household Politics and the Case of the Qalāwūnid Bayt (1279-1382)", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 56/2 (2013), 193-196.

¹⁶ Ahmad Mukhtār al-Abbādī, *Qiyāmu Dawlat al-Mamālīk al-ūlā fi Mişr wa al-Shām* (Beirut: Dār al-Nahda al-ʿArabiyye, 1986), 87; Cengiz Tomar, *Memlūk Devleti'nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesi (1240-1260)* (İstanbul, Marmara Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 1996), 22; Cengiz Tomar, "el-Melikü'l-Ādil II", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 2004), 29/60; Muhammad Suhayl Taqūsh, *Tārīḥ al-Ayyūbiyyin fi Mişr ve Bilād al-Shām wa İklim al-Jazira 1174-1263* (Beirut: Dār al-Nefāis, 2008): 357; Kazım Yaşar Koprıman, "Mısır Memlûkleri (1250-1517)", *Türkler* (Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 5/110; Ziyāda, "The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293", 737.

¹⁷ Cāsım Muḥammad Cāsım, "al-Ahammiyya al-siyāsiyya wa al-ʿaskariyya li-qiyāmi Dawlat al-Mamālīk al-Baḥriyya fi Mişr ve Bilād al-Shām (648-784/1250-1382)", *Majalla Cāmiʿa Karkuk lid-Dirāsāt al-İnsāniyya* 6/1 (2011), 134.

to their military support, he defeated al-Malik al-Şālih Isma‘il in the Battle of Ascalan in Jumada I 642/October 1244.¹⁸ This clearly shows how important it is to obtain military factions in the internal struggles among the Ayyūbids.

On the other hand, Egyptian army upon the threat of Frank was stationed near Manşūra. al-Şālih Ayyūb fell seriously ill, and he died in Shaban 647/November 1249. His wife, Shajar al-Durr, kept his death a secret, informing only Fakhr al-Dīn ibn al-Shaykh (d. 647/1250) and al-Amīr Tawashī Muhsin al-Şālihī. Currently, Fakhr al-Dīn ibn al-Shaykh was atābak, Husam al-Dīn ibn Abu Ali al-Hazbānī (d. 658/1260) the nā‘ib al-saltana. Atābak al-‘asākīr Fakhr al-Dīn ibn al-Shaykh summoned Turanshah ibn Şālih Ayyūb, who was staying in Hişn Kayfā. Thereupon, a rumor circulated among the people that the sultan had died. The Franks, who wanted to use this as an opportunity, came from Damietta to the Manşūra. In Shawwal 647/February 1250, there was a major battle between the two armies. Fakhr al-Dīn ibn al-Shaykh was killed in this battle. In the following days, however, the war between the Muslims and the Franks escalated decisively. The Franks ran into serious difficulties, both in terms of equipment and street fighting in Manşūra, and suffered many losses against the army under the command of Baybars al-Bunduqdārī. Therefore, they wanted to give up Damietta and take Jerusalem in return, but this proposal was not accepted.¹⁹ As the war progressed, the Muslims blocked the Damietta-Manşūra crossing, by preventing the arrival of an aid to the Franks. It was almost time for a fierce battle between the two sides. The war with the attack of the Muslims broke out in Fariskur in Muharram 648/April 1250. The number of Franks killed had reached thirty thousand. Many prisoners were taken, including IX. Louis, king of France. Finally, an unconditional assurance (*amān*) was demanded, which was given to them by Tawashī Muhsin al-Şālihī.²⁰

The battles of Mansūra and Fariskur proved that the Şālihiyya-Baḥriyya mamlūks were politically influential in the state. However, the influence of these Mamlūk factions in the state goes back much earlier. Therefore, in addition to the successful military results, the power held by the mamlūk factions in the background should be taken into account. When al-Malik al-Şālih Ayyūb was enthroned in Egypt, he first abolished his father’s mamlūks (*Kāmiliyya*) and became the absolute sultan through the backing of their own mamlūks. He knew that he had to increase the number of his mamlūks to secure his sultanate. Also, civil wars required the existence of a military faction that would be dependent on him in any case. However, if this situation was not controlled, there was a danger that the military faction would grow and influence the functioning of the state. In fact, the uncontrolled strength and dominance of the Baḥriyya was made possible by the death of al-Şālih Ayyūb and the defeat of the Franks in the battles of Manşūra and Fariskur.

¹⁸ Jamal al-Dīn Muhammad b. Sālim ibn Wāsil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār Banī Ayyūb*, Critical ed. Jamal al-Dīn al-Shayyāl (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa’l-Wasāik al-Qawmiyya, 1957), 5/338-339; Abū ‘Abd Allah Shams al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn ‘Uthman al-Zahabī, *al-‘Ibar fī ḥabar man ḡabar*, Critical ed. Abū Hācir Muhammad al-Said (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1985), 3/242.

¹⁹ Ismā‘il Ibn ‘Alī Abū al-Fidā‘, *al-Muḥtaşar fī aḡbār al-başar*, Critical ed. Al-Sayyid ‘Abd al-Latif al-Hāṭib (Cairo: Maṭba‘a al-Husayniyya al-Mişriyya, 1907), 3/140; Muhammad Mustafa Ziyāda, *Hamlatu Lu’is al-Tāsi‘ ‘ala Mişr wa hazimatuhu fī’l-Manşūra* (Cairo, s.l. 1961), 169.

²⁰ Abū al-Fidā‘, *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/141; Zahabī, *al-‘Ibar fī ḥabar*, 3/259; Mahmūd Rızq Salim, *‘Asru Salātīn al-Mamālik wa nitācih al-‘ilmi wa’l-ādābi* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ādāb, 1962), 1/19-20; Kopruman, “Mısır Memlūkları”, 112.

2. The Massacre of al-Mu‘azzam Turanshah and the Challenges Against the Sovereignty of the Baḥriyya

After the death of al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb, al-Malik al-Mu‘azzam Turanshah was put on the throne with the support of the mamlūks under the command of Shajar al-Durr and Tawashī Muhsin al-Şāliḥī.²¹ Thus, they thought that Turanshah would be loyal to them. However, after the battles of Manşūra and Fariskur, Turanshah turned his attention to those he considered as a threat to himself. Firstly, al-Malik al-Mughith ‘Umar (647-662/1249-1263) had been arrested and imprisoned in Shawbak. Secondly, al-Malik al-Sa‘id Fakhr al-Dīn Hassan, who had fled from Egypt to Damascus out of concern for this situation, had denounced him and was arrested by Jamal al-Dīn ibn Yagmur. (d. 655/1257) He then threatened Shajar al-Durr and demanded that she immediately hand over all the property she had inherited from his father.²² On the other hand, the Baḥriyya patiently resisted all the oppressive policies of al-Malik al-Mu‘azzam Turanshah. They recall that it was thanks to them that he ascended the throne, and they expected compliments from the Sultan for their decisive role in the Manşūra. But far from being granted their rights, the Baḥriyya were seriously persecuted.²³ In the meantime, he removed the senior amirs from the state ranks and replaced them with the Mu‘azzamiyya mamlūks who accompanied him.²⁴ This meant that the income of the Baḥriyya’s *iqṭā‘* would also decrease. At this last stage, the Baḥriyya believed that the only way to find peace was to kill him. If this situation was not prevented, the Baḥriyya could be completely eliminated.

The Şāliḥiyya-Baḥriyya mamlūks wanted to resolve Turanshah’s oppressive policy once and for all. Indeed, when Turanshah ascended the throne in Fariskur, Baybars al-Bunduqdārī appeared in front of him and struck him with his sword to kill him. Then Turanshah came to Burj al-Hashb and cried out, *who has wounded me?* They replied that the Hashasis had done it. But he said, *by Allah, it can be none other than the Baḥriyya who have injured me.* The mamlūks of the Baḥriyya went to Turanshah, but he climbed to the top of the tower wounded. They shot fiery arrows at his position and he had to throw himself into the Nile from the top of the tower. Although he said to the Baḥriyya mamlūks who came to catch him, *let me go, I do not want to be sultan*, he could not escape being slaughtered on a nail.²⁵ The assassination of Turanshah was among the incidents that paved

²¹ Abū al-Fidā‘, *al-Muḥtaṣar*, 3/140.

²² Taqī al-Dīn Ahmad ibn ‘Ali al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma‘rifat duwal al-mulūk*, Critical ed. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘Atā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1997), 1/456.

²³ Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*, 10; Ziyāda, “The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293”, 740; Tomar, *Memlūk Devleti’nin Kuruluşu*, 60.

²⁴ Muhammad Jamal al-Dīn Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars ve hadāratu Mişr fi ‘asrihi* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Mişriyya, 1938), 35; Robert Irwin, *The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamlūk Sultanate 1250-1382* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 21-22; Kasım Abduh Kasım, ‘*Asru Salātīn al-Mamālik al-tārīḥ al-siyāsī wa al-ijtimā‘ī* (al-Haram: ‘Aynu li al-Dirāsāt wa al-Buhūs al-Insaniyya wa al-Ictimāiyya, 1998), 32.

²⁵ Abū al-Fidā‘, *al-Muḥtaṣar*, 3/141; Zain al-Din ‘Umar ibn Muzaffar al-Shahin Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1996), 2/178; Ziyāda, “The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293”, 740; ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mājid, *al-Tārīḥ al-siyāsī: li-Dawlati Salātīn al-Mamālik fi Mişr dirāsati tahliliyya li al-Izdihār wa al-Inhiyār* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglo’l-Mişriyya, 1988), 74; Tomar, *Memlūk Devleti’nin Kuruluşu*, 61-62; Koprman, “Mısır Memlūkları”, 117; Cāsım, “al-Ahammiyya al-siyāsīyya”, 3.

the way for the becoming a state of the Mamlūks. Nevertheless, all these were instincts to protect their own interests rather than statification with planned steps.

When Turanshah was personally invited by Shajar al-Durr to ascend the throne in Egypt after the death of his father, he acted immediately, first coming to Damascus and proclaiming the sultanate there. While he was still in Damascus, his harsh attitude towards the Baḥriyya became known. The idea was to undermine the Baḥriyya and the Turkish amirs in general and replace them with the Kurdish amirs of the Qaymariyya.²⁶ According to M. M. Ziyada, when Turanshah arrived in Damascus on 29 Ramazan 647/5 January 1250, his sultanate was first proclaimed and Jamal al-Dīn Musa ibn Yagmur was appointed nā'ib of Damascus. Thereafter, Turanshah treated the Qaymariyya amirs generously, giving them donations from his father's treasury. He then went to Egypt and was received by the Nā'ib al-saltana Ḥusām al-Dīn ibn Abī 'Ālī al-Hazbānī in Sālihiyya. al-Malik al-Mu'azzam Turanshah negotiated with the al-Amir Ḥusām al-Dīn, thanked him for protecting the throne against internal and external enemies, and gave him three thousand dinars.²⁷

In fact, events such as al-Hazbānī's distrust of the Baḥriyya, Turanshah's cautious behaviour towards the Baḥriyya when he was appointed sultan in Damascus, he made various donations to the Qaymariyya amirs and neglected the Baḥriyya. So, it can be said that there was at least an atmosphere of mistrust between Turanshah and the Baḥriyya. The mistrust between the two sides eventually led to his assassination, as Turanshah apparently tried to intimidate the Baḥriyya. In this respect, it would be misleading to see Turanshah's assassination as merely a deprivation of the Baḥriyya's income or their removal from the ranks of the state. Rather, the situation can be seen as an extension of the competition between the Kurdish Ayyūbid amirs and the Turkish mamlūks who became involved in the army during the reign of al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb. As will be mentioned later, Bilad al-sham generally abandoned its dependence on Egypt after the assassination of Turanshah, and the enthronement of al-Nāşir Yūsuf, (634-658/1236-1260) the şāḥib of Aleppo, by inviting him to Damascus by the Kurdish amirs, is one of the indicators of this conflict.

On the other hand, this time a problem arises as follows. If the tensions between Turanshah and the Baḥriyya predated his arrival in Egypt, why did the Baḥriyya bring Turanshah into the sultanate? Moreover, al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb kept his son in seclusion during his reign and, as far as is known, did not give him the title of crown prince. According to Turkī ibn Fahd, the Baḥriyya faction considered the Ayyūbid forces in the Syrian region a threat. To eliminate this threat, they invited Turanshah, whom they considered the lesser evil (*ehven-i şer*).²⁸ Thusly, they may have wanted to maintain their status quo, even though they did not want Turanshah.

After Turanshah's assassination, the Şāliḥiyya faction initially wanted to swear allegiance to Mughith 'Umar, but the latter refused, fearing that the same fate would befall him.²⁹ Then they swore allegiance to the widow of al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb, Shajar al-Durr. They had enthroned Shajar al-Durr

²⁶ Ziyāda, *Hamletu Luis et-Tāsi'*, 166.

²⁷ Ziyāda, *Hamletu Luis et-Tāsi'*, 166-167.

²⁸ Ibn Fahd, *Nash'atu Dawlat al-Mamālik*, 43-52.

²⁹ Shihāb al-Dīn Abī Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Ismā'īl Abū Shāma, *al-Dhayl 'ala al-rawḍatayn tarājimu ricāl al-qarnayn al-sādis wa'l-sābi'*, Critical ed. Muhammad Zāhid ibn al-Hasan al-Kavsari (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, 1974), 186.

and had a sermon (*hutbe*) and coins issued in her name. In a royal patent of rank (*manshūr*) and a sovereign's signature (*tawki'*), *Validatu Khalīl* was written for short. During the reign of Shajar al-Durr, 'Izz al-Din Aybak al-Chashnigir al-Şāliḥī was appointed to the position of atābak.³⁰ This situation clearly shows that the power lies with the Şāliḥiyya-Baḥriyya, but it also implies that they try not to oppose the Ayyūbid rulers. Although Shajar al-Durr was declared a *malika*, it is believed that she maintained a relationship with the Ayyūbid lineage on the one hand and tried to remain in the shadow of the Abbasids on the other. This also shows that the problems of legitimacy have not yet been resolved.

After the surrender of Damietta to the Franks in accordance with the treaty, the Egyptian army entered Cairo on 9 Safer 648/13 May 1250. A message was then sent to the amirs of Damascus asking them to abide by the decisions taken. Not only was this brusquely refused, but the Kurdish amirs of the Qaymariyya in Damascus sent a message to the şāḥib of Aleppo, al-Nāşir Yūsuf, asking him to ascend the throne.³¹ The şāḥib of the Subaiba, al-Malik al-Sa'id ibn 'Aziz, (d. 658/1260) had previously declared his allegiance to al-Şāliḥ Ayyūb, but in the face of such a situation he reversed his decision and took back the Subaiba that he had previously abandoned.³² In the same way, Badr al-dīn al-Sawwābī al-Şāliḥī, the nā'ib of Karak and Shawbak, released al-Malik al-Mughith 'Umar from prison and raised him to the throne.³³ It is clear that the Ayyūbids did not approve of the Egyptian mamluks' assassination of Turanshah and his replacement by Shajar al-Durr. However, this decision of the Egyptian mamlūks was ironically criticised not only by the Ayyūbid rulers but also by the Abbasid caliph al-Mustaşir (623-640/1226-1242). The Caliph stated unequivocally that he did not recognise the malika of Shajar al-Durr, saying: "If there is no man left to be sultan in your country, we would send one to you".³⁴

The fact that Shajar al-Durr was recognised by neither the Ayyūbids nor the Abbasids led to the political isolation of the Egyptian mamlūks. To prevent this, Shajar al-Durr ended her sultanate some eighty days later. Aybak, who had been made atabek by a joint decision of the Baḥriyya-Şāliḥiyya, was married to Shajar al-Durr on 29 Rabi' I 648/31 July 1250 and brought into the sultanate in her place.³⁵ However, on the 5th of Jumada I/5th of August, Baḥriyya-Şāliḥiyya said: "One of the Banī Ayyūb, to whom all will be subject, will ascend the throne". Among the pioneers of this movement were Fāris al-Dīn Aqtay al-Jamdar, Baybars al-Bunduqdārī, Sayf al-Dīn Balābān al-Rashīdī, (d. 677/1278) and Shams al-Dīn Sunqur al-Rūmī. In a joint decision, they agreed that

³⁰ Shihab al-Dīn Ahmad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fi funūn al-adab*, Critical ed. Najip Mustafa Fawwāz-Hikmat Kashlī Fawwāz (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 2004), 29/235; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/178; Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḥu Ibn Khaldūn: Dīwān al-mubtada' wa-l-khabar fi Tārīḥ al-'Arab wa-l-Barbar wa-man 'āsarahum min dhawī ash-sha'n al-akbār*, Critical ed. Suhayl Zakkar (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2001), 5/430-431; Tomar, *Memlūk Devleti'nin Kuruluşu*, 64-65.

³¹ Amalia Levanoni, "The Mamlūks' Ascent to Power in Egypt", *Studia Islamica* 72 (1990), 124.

³² Abū al-Fidā', *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/142.

³³ Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/179.

³⁴ Kasım, *Asru Salātīn al-Mamālik*: 22; Philip K. Hitti, *Syria: A Short History* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), 201.

³⁵ Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, 29/235; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḥu Ibn Khaldūn*: 5/431.

Aybak should become atābak again. Then they chose al-Ashraf Musa, who was still a child of the Ayyūbid family.³⁶

On the other hand, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's power and influence in Damascus had grown considerably. At the same time, he was planning to invade Egypt. In turn, Egypt, had sent an army under the command of al-Amir Rukn al-Dīn Hās Turk (d. 674/1275) to the Gaza border to counter any possible threat from the Damascus army. However, Hās Turk withdrew with his soldiers to Ṣālīhiyya and subsequently declared his obedience to al-Malik al-Mughith ʿUmar. In return, the amirs of Egypt made a strategic move, preaching in Egypt and Cairo in the name of the Abbasid caliph al-Mustaʿsim and renewing the treaty he had previously signed with al-Ashraf Musa as sultan and Muʿizz Aybak as atābak.³⁷ It cannot be said, then, that the Ṣālīhiyya mamlūks were in complete agreement with the new conditions that arose in Egypt after the assassination of Turanshah. It is clear that there are Ayyūbid sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the events, and these people have reacted to the decisions of the Baḥriyya regime.

3. The Battle of Kūra and the Official Recognition Process of the Baḥriyya

al-Nāṣir Yūsuf set out from Damascus with his soldiers to conquer Egypt and to put an end to the Turkish outrage.³⁸ At his side were al-Ṣālīḥ Ismaʿil ibn al-ʿĀdil, (634-642/1237-1245) al-Ashraf Musa, (643-661/1246-1263) the ṣāḥib of Hims, al-Muʿazzam Turanshah ibn Sultan Saladin, (d. 658/1260) and his brother Nusr al-din of the Ayyūbid lineage. At the head of the army was Shams al-Dīn Luʿluʾ al-Amīnī (d. 648/1251). The Egyptian army had also moved against them. Sultan al-Ashraf Musa was left behind in Qalʿat al-jabal, and ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak personally went on an expedition with his army. At the same time, Aybak made another strategic move. He released from prison the imprisoned children of al-Malik al-Ṣālīḥ Ismaʿil, the former ṣāḥib of Damascus, in order to use them against al-Nāṣir Yūsuf.³⁹

The Egyptian and Damascene armies continued their joint advance and met at Kūra near Abbase on 10 Dhul-Qadah/3 February 1251. At the beginning of the war, the Egyptian army was defeated, but later the mamlūks of the ʿAzīziyya betrayed al-Malik al-Nāṣir Yūsuf and turned to the Egyptian army. For the ʿAzīziyya could not come to an agreement with Atābak Shams al-Din Luʿlu and accused him of acting against own interests.⁴⁰ Muʿizz Aybak, on the other hand, remained with a small number of the Baḥriyya. The mamlūks of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf's father had strengthened them by

³⁶ Abū Bakr ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn Aybak al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar wa-jāmiʿ al-ghurar*, Critical ed. Edward Budin (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1960), 8/14; Salah al-Dīn Abū al-Ṣafa Khalil ibn Aybak al-Ṣafadī, *Wāfi bi'l-wafayāt*, Critical ed. Ahmad al-Arnawut-Turkī Mustafa (Beirut: Dāru l-hyā al-Turās al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000), 9/264; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḥu Ibn Khaldūn*: 5:431; Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhira*, Critical ed. Ibrahim ʿAlī Tarhan (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, 1963), 7/5-6; Ziyāda, "The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293", 742; R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyūbids of Damascus* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 315.

³⁷ Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/180; Humphreys, *From Saladin*, 315.

³⁸ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḥu Ibn Khaldūn*, 5/431.

³⁹ Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/180.

⁴⁰ Humphreys, *From Saladin*, 317.

going over to the Bahriyya side. When the Egyptians were defeated and the Damascene army followed them, al-Nāşir Yūsuf remained on the battlefield and did not leave his position. Aybak took the opportunity to attack with the Bahriyya and defeated al-Nāşir Yūsuf's central army. After this defeat, al-Nāşir Yūsuf fled to Damascus. Aybak, however, marched against Shams al-din Lu'lu' al-Amīnī, defeated them, and captured the army commander. He executed Shams al-Dīn Lu'lu' and al-Amir Zia al-Din al-Qaymarī (d. 650/1252). al-Şāliḥ Isma'īl, al-Ashraf Musa, and others were captured.⁴¹

Gaining superiority in the Kūra secured the process of political recognition for the Egyptian mamlūks externally, while internally they sought to create an alternative to the Bahriyya of the 'Azīziyya mamlūks, who had joined Mu'izz Aybak. Thus, as will be mentioned gradually, the process of challenging and gaining independence of Mu'izz Aybak, who was under the yoke of the Bahriyya, was initiated. After the victory, Mu'izz Aybak has supported and strengthened the Mu'izziyya against the Bahriyya with all his determination. Of course, his main purpose in doing so was to create a faction that would always remain loyal to him instead of the Bahriyya and to secure his reign.

After the victory of the Egyptian army in the battle of Kūra in 650/1252, the Caliph Musta'sim sent Sheikh Nacm al-Dīn al-Badrā'ī (d. 655/1257) as a mediator and wanted to make peace between al-Nāşir Yūsuf and Mu'izz Aybak. al-Nāşir Yūsuf lay down condition the sermon and the coin in Egypt should be in his name. Mu'izz Aybak, on the other hand, firmly refused. The Bahriyya said: *We saved Egypt and Damascus from the hands of the Franks with our swords. There can be no peace between us until we possess the places from Gaza to Aqaba.* Thusly, first negotiations between the two sides did not produce a positive result. However, due to increased Mongol activity in the Middle East in 651/1253, at least a non-aggression treaty was signed between the two sides at the caliph's insistence, and both maliks accepted each other's authority. According to this treaty, Aybak received Jerusalem, Gaza, and some places on the coastal border and in return accepted the sovereignty of al-Nāşir Yūsuf in Syria.⁴²

When Mu'izz Aybak officially became sultan and established a new formation by eliminating the sovereignty of the Ayyūbids in the region, the Arabs in the Sa'id region of Upper Egypt reacted by refusing to submit to this newly established state. In contrast, Aybak distributed various goods and gifts to those who would not accept his power in order to consolidate his rule. However, the inhabitants of the region were not willing to accept the sultanate of a slave (*al-rakk*). The rule of the Turks and mamlūks was unacceptable to them. At the same time, they demanded that the Egyptian government should remain only among the Arabs.⁴³ In fact, according to al-Abbādī, the Arabs of Upper Egypt revolted to abolish the taxes imposed on them and to oppose the rule of the

⁴¹ Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mir'at al-zamān*, 22/414-416; Abū Shāma, *al-Dhayl*, 186; Zahabī, *al-'Ibar fī ḥabar*, 3/259-260.

⁴² Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/22-23.

⁴³ Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Qādir ibn Muḥammad al-Maqrīzī, *al-Bayān wa'l-i'rāb 'ammā bi-ardi Mişr min al-A'rāb*, Critical ed. İbrahim Remzi (Cairo: Matba'at al-Ma'arif bi-Şāri' al-Fajjāla bi-Mişr, 1916), 44; Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars*, 42; Ashtor, *A Social and Economic History*, 285-286; Fatih Yahya Ayaz, "Türk Memlûkler Döneminde Mısır Halkının Siyasî Olaylara Karşı Tutumu", *Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 7/1 (2007), 54-55.

mamlûks. This revolt was not limited to the Arabs, but included most of those who were dissatisfied with the rule of those they considered slaves. Whenever Aybak went out into the streets, the people who confronted him would say, “We only want someone who is a sultan by birth”.⁴⁴ Stanley Lane Poole, on the other hand, takes a different view of the causes of this rebellion. According to him, in times of war Bahriyya acted in concert with Aybak and supported him, and in times of peace they acted autonomously in Egypt and were able to commit various acts of injustice. They attacked shopkeepers and extorted their property, entered the baths and assaulted women.⁴⁵ The Sa‘id Arabs, complaining of general chaos in the area, formed a cavalry force of about twelve thousand with the support of various tribes and placed al-Amîr Hisn al-Dîn ibn Tha‘lab, (d. 651/1253) a descendant of ‘Alî ibn Abu Ṭalib, at their head. After using the Egyptian-Damascus war as an opportunity not to pay taxes, the Mamlûk army marched against them and crushed their rebellion in short time.⁴⁶ But despite this, the Arabs in the region did not accept to be subject to Mamlûk rule except for an external threat, they sustained their rebellions at different times.⁴⁷

After gaining the upper hand against al-Nāşir Yūsuf and putting down the Arab revolt, the power and influence of the Bahriyya grew even more. The leader of the Bahriyya, Fāris al-Dîn Aqtay, had greatly expanded his influence in Egypt. His influence in the army was well known; the Bahriyya recognized no power other than Aqtay and called him al-Malik al-Jawad. Encouraged by all this, Aqtay sent letter to al-Malik al-Muzaffar, the şāhib of Hama, informing him that he wished to marry his daughter.⁴⁸ This was the last straw for Mu‘izz Aybak. For the military power of Fāris al-Dîn Aqtay continued to exist as a *de facto* administration during the first years of Aybak’s rule. Settling in Qal‘at al-jabal would now also give him political strength through this marriage, and with the courage gained from it, he could perhaps officially proclaim his sultanate.

The Bahriyya’s restrictive influence on the administration had reached an intolerable point. For Mu‘izz Aybak to become a true sultan, the assassination of Fāris al-Dîn Aqtay was almost imperative. To this end, Aybak invited him to Qal‘at al-jabal on 3 Şaban 652/18 September 1254 to seek Aqtay’s opinion on some issues. When he arrived, his mamlûks were prevented from entering with him. When he entered the corridor, a group of soldiers appeared before him. Among them were Quṭuz, Bahadır, and Sanjar, who were from Mu‘izziyya. They attacked Aqtay all together and killed him by the nails.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Ibn Taghribirdî, *al-Nujûm*, 7/13; Ahmad Mukhtar al-Abbādî, *fi Tārîḥ al-Ayyûbiyyin wa al-Mamālik* (Beirut: Dār al-Nahda al-Arabiyye, 2014), 118.

⁴⁵ Stanley Lane Poole, *A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1901), 259.

⁴⁶ Abbādî, *fi Tārîḥ al-Ayyûbiyyin*, 119.

⁴⁷ Mahmûd al-Sayyid, *Tārîḥ al-kabāil al-Arabiyya fi ‘asri Dawlatayn al-Ayyûbiyya wa’l-Mamlûkiyya* (Alexandria: Muassasa Şabâb al-Jāmi‘a, 1998), 44.

⁴⁸ Kamāl al-Dîn ‘Abd al-Razzāk ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Fuwaṭî, *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi‘a wa-l-tajārib al-nāfi‘a fi’l-mi‘a al-sābi‘a*, Critical ed. Mahdi al-Najm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2003), 209; Şārim al-Dîn Ibrāhîm b. Muḥammad b. Aydamur al-‘Alā‘î al-Mişrî Ibn Duqmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām fi Tārîḥ al-Islam*, Critical ed. Samir Tabbāra (Beirut: al-Maktabat al-‘Asriyye, 1999): 216; Abū al-Maḥāsîn Yūsuf ibn Taghribirdî, *al-Manhal al-şāfi wa’l-mustawfi ba‘d al-wāfi*, Critical ed. Muhammad Muhammad Amin (Cairo: al-Hay‘at al-Mişriyya Amma li al-Kitâb, 1984), 1/25.

⁴⁹ Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzî, *Mir‘at al-zamân*, 22/426; Fuwaṭî, *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi‘a*, 210; Ibn Fahd, *Nash‘atu Dawlat al-Mamālik*, 70; Abbādî, *fi Tārîḥ al-Ayyûbiyyin*, 120; Yusuf Ötenkaya, *Memlûk Devleti’nin Oluşumu, Yapısı ve Dinî Siyaseti (648-742/1250-1341)* (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Doktora Tezi, 2021), 74.

After Aqtay's assassination, seven hundred Baḥriyya cavalrymen under his command left Cairo out of concern for their safety. Some of them ran away to al-Malik al-Mughith ʿUmar, the ṣāḥib of Karak, and some to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. Then al-Nāṣir Yūsuf took them personally and gave Nablus to the Baybars as iqtāʿ revenue. On the other hand, the Baḥriyya members who remained in Cairo were attacked and arrested by the Muʿizziyya regime, and their property and iqtāʿs were confiscated.⁵⁰ Therefore, during factional struggles, in order to accelerate the transition of power from one party to another, the victorious faction might have to use its toughness against the other to maintain its sovereignty and reign.

4. The Years of the Exile of the Baḥriyya and the Domination of the Muʿizziyya

After the assassination of Fāris al-Dīn Aqtay, al-Malik al-Muʿizz Aybak became the absolute sultan in the state administration, albeit for a short time.⁵¹ However, it cannot be said that Aybak's negative attitude towards the Baḥriyya was very successful, for the Baḥriyya was used as a means of transferring power into the hands of the surrounding maliks. They had an important tool in their political relations with Egypt, since they had the Baḥriyya in their service. After the assassination of Aqtay, the Baḥriyya under the leadership of Baybars al-Bunduqdārī turned to al-Malik al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. However, the main intention of the Baḥriyya was not to defect to another malik out of concern for their lives, but to restore their political sovereignty in Cairo. In fact, when they arrived in Damascus, they encouraged al-Nāṣir Yūsuf to attack Egypt.⁵² On the other hand, al-Amīr ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Afram al-Ṣāliḥī, (d. 695/1296) who was one of the followers of Baybars, took over many places in the Saʿid region and preached sermon in the name of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf. He informed him of this latest situation and encouraged him to go to Egypt.⁵³ Thereupon, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf acted on the power he received from the Baḥriyya in 653/1255 and launched an expedition against Egypt. al-Malik al-Muʿizz Aybak, receiving news that al-Nāṣir Yūsuf was marching to Egypt, acted immediately and brought his army near Abbase. Although no serious war broke out between the two sides, al-Nāṣir Yūsuf managed to use the Baḥriyya as a threat and get Sahil and Jerusalem out of Aybak's hands.⁵⁴

The power established by al-Malik al-Muʿizz Aybak had been seriously shaken by recent events. The fact that the Baḥriyya joined al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, that al-Afram, who was in the Saʿid region, rebelled and then sided with al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, probably caused a crack in Aybak's side in Cairo. For the ʿAzīziyya mamlūks, who had previously sided with Aybak in the Kūra struggle, were now pursuing a policy against him. However, as soon as Aybak learned of the situation in 653/1255, he instructed the Vizier Sheraf al-Dīn al-Fāizī (d. 655/1257). Through al-Fāizī's efforts, the leaders of the rebellion

⁵⁰ Muhyi al-Din ʿAbd Allāh ibn Nashwan Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sirat al-Malik al-Zāhir*, Critical ed. ʿAbd al-Azīz Khuwayṭir (Riyad: s.l. 1976), 54; Thomas Herzog, "The First Layer of the Sirat Baybars: Popular Romance and Political Propaganda", *Mamlūk Studies Review* 7/1 (2003), 144.

⁵¹ Abū Shāme, *al-Dhayl*, 188; Abū al-Fidāʿ, *al-Muḥtaṣar*, 3/190; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/187; Poole, *A History of Egypt*, 260.

⁵² Kasım, *ʿAsru Salātīn al-Mamālik*, 42.

⁵³ Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 55; Ibn Duḫmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 223.

⁵⁴ Zahabī, *al-ʿIbar fī ḥabar*, 3/268; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/28-29; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/187.

were arrested and a major attack was prevented.⁵⁵ As is evident from the ‘Azīziyya’s sudden change of sides, there can be no question of the mamlūks’ unconditional loyalty to a sultan. It should not be forgotten that their slightest unrest can trigger great uprisings; they can suddenly come to an agreement with another malik and play a key role in the change of power.

Al-Malik al-Mu‘izz Aybak was greatly disturbed by al-Nāṣir Yūsuf’s increasing pressure lately. He wanted to marry the daughter of Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu, (d. 657/1259) the ṣāḥib of Mawṣil, both to oppose him and to literally get rid of the pro-Baḥriyya Shajar al-Durr on whom he based his power.⁵⁶ Shajar al-Durr, however, first sent a message to al-Nāṣir Yūsuf informing him that she intended to kill Aybak and marry him, thus bringing Egypt into his possession. But al-Nāṣir Yūsuf ignored this offer, believing it to be a ruse.⁵⁷

Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu realized that Shajar al-Durr was preparing a conspiracy against Aybak and warned him against it. However, Shajar al-Durr managed to act before Aybak and prepared five people, whom he selected from the Baḥriyya, to assassinate him as soon as they had the opportunity.⁵⁸ On 23 Rabi‘ I 655/10 April 1257, after the game of *lāb al-kura*, al-Malik al-Mu‘izz Aybak came to Qal‘at al-jabal. He was accompanied by Vizier Sheraf al-Dīn al-Fāizī and Qādī Badr al-Dīn Sincarī (d. 664/1266). When they reached the castle, they left the sultan alone and he went to the bathhouse. While he was undressing, Sanjar al-Jawjarī attacked the sultan, and the huddams helped him and killed him by the nails. Later, as a result of the deliberations, Shajar al-Durr wanted to make al-Amīr Jamal al-Dīn Aydogdu al-‘Azizī (d. 664/1266) the sultan. She brought al-Amīr Aydogdu, who was under arrest, out of prison and asked him to ascend the throne, telling him what had happened. But Aydogdu could not accept. Later, Shajar al-Durr met with al-Amīr ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Ḥalabī (d. 692/1293) in the same way and offered him the reign, but he too did not dare.⁵⁹ The reason why the two chief amīrs rejected such an offer was probably the power that the Mu‘izziyya mamlūks had. They may have feared that the Mu‘izziyya mamlūks, whose sultans had been slaughtered, would reactively descend upon them.

With the assassination of Aybak, Shajar al-Durr thought that the Ṣāliḥiyya amīrs who were dissatisfied with his rule might seize power. However, things turned out differently than she had hoped: After the death of their master, the Mu‘izziyya took the initiative and first put Nur al-Dīn ‘Alī, (655-657/1257-1259) their master’s 15-year-old son, on the throne and then killed Shajar al-

⁵⁵ Badr al-Din Mahmūd al-‘Aynī, *ʿIqd al-Jumān fi Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān: al-Hawādith wa-l-Tarājim min sanat 815h. ilā sanat 823h.*, Critical ed. ‘A.R. al-Ṭanṭāwī al-Qarmūṭ (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Zahrā’ li-l-ʿIlām al-‘Arabī, 1985), 1/108; Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Manhal*, 1/25;

⁵⁶ Humphreys, *From Saladin*, 329.

⁵⁷ Ṣafadī, *Wāfi bi’l-wafayāt*, 9/265; Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 1/493.

⁵⁸ Zaybak, *Abū Shāme*, 197.

⁵⁹ Ṣafadī, *Wāfi bi’l-wafayāt*, 9/265; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/32; Muhib al-Dīn Muhammad b. Khalīl Qudsi al-Shafi‘ī, *Duwal al-Islam al-sharifat al-Bahiyya*. Critical ed. Subhi Lebib-Ulrich Haarman (Beirut, s.l. 1997), 27; Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Manhal*, 1/26-27; Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*: 14; Ziyāda, “The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293”, 744; Humphreys, *From Saladin*: 330; Irwin, *The Middle East*, 29.

Durr.⁶⁰ The sermon (*hutbe*) was read on behalf of al-Malik al-Manşūr Nur al-Dīn ‘Alī and then Atābak Sanjar al-Ḥalabī with the help of the Mu‘izziyya. However, shortly after the various appointments were made, Sayf al-Dīn Quṭuz, Sanjar al-Ghatamī, and Bahadur of the Mu‘izziyya intervened and arrested Sanjar al-Ḥalabī because they considered him a threat.⁶¹ According to Ibn Taghrībardi, (d. 874/1470) one of the reasons for his arrest was that Shajar al-Durr offered the sultanate to Sanjar al-Ḥalabī. The second reason was that after she offered the rulership, the news that al-Ḥalabī regretted rejecting it was passed on to Mu‘izziyya. Thus, since they thought he wanted to remain in power, they had to act against him and arrest him. However, this situation frightened the *khushdāshs* of Sanjar al-Ḥalabī from Şālīhiyya. Each of them was worried that Mu‘izziyya would bring such disaster upon them. For this reason, most of them fled Egypt for Damascus. Al-Amīr ‘Izz al-Dīn Aybak al-Ḥalabī al-Kabīr and al-Amīr Hās Turk al-Sagir, (d. 655/1257) who did not escape, were killed.⁶² On the other hand, the Vizier Sheraf al-Dīn al-Fāizī was first imprisoned and then executed by Mu‘izziyya for offering to hand over power to al-Nāşir Yūsuf.⁶³ Therefore, Qādī Badr al-Dīn Yūsuf al-Sincari was appointed as vizier in his place. But soon afterwards, Taj al-Dīn ibn Bint al-‘Eazz (d. 665/1267) was appointed vizier. Later, al-Malik al-Manşūr Nur al-Dīn ‘Alī brought al-Amīr Aktay al-Musta‘rib to replace Sanjar al-Ḥalabī as atābak.⁶⁴ For this reason, it is understood that Şālīhiyya amirs who openly opposed Mu‘izziyya were isolated and replaced by more moderate ones or those who were not seen as a threat to Mu‘izziyya.

On the other hand, during the time of Mu‘izz Aybak, peace was made with al-Nāşir Yūsuf. Baḥriyya was not at all pleased with this peace, for their main aim was to capture Egypt. Therefore, they now sent messages to al-Malik al-Mughith ‘Umar, the şāhib of al-Karak, and joined him.⁶⁵ Then they encouraged him to seize Egypt and said: “This property belongs to your father, grandfather, and uncle.”⁶⁶ This promise was indeed enough to encourage al-Malik al-Mughith ‘Umar. However, the Egyptian army then set out under the command of Atābak Aktay al-Musta‘rib and Nā’ib al-saltana Sayf al-Dīn Quṭuz. On 25 Dhu al-qadah 655/4 Aralık 1257, two armies faced each other in the Şālīhiyya region, and the Baḥriyya-Karak armies were defeated. Balābān al-Rashidī and Qalāwūn al-Alfī were among the captives.⁶⁷

The victory of al-Amīr Quṭuz over the Baḥriyya under the leadership of Baybars al-Bunduqdārī and al-Malik al-Mughith ‘Umar, the şāhib of Karak, was occasioned both to eliminate the Ayyūbid threat and to strengthen the power of the Mu‘izziyya. After winning the battle against the Ayyūbids

⁶⁰ Abū al-Fidā‘, *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/192; ‘Aynī, *‘Iqd al-Jumān*, 1/143; Ibn Taghrībardi, *al-Manhal*, 1/27; Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*, 14-15.

⁶¹ Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/188; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḥu Ibn Khaldūn*, 5/434; Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars*, 44.

⁶² Ibn Taghrībardi, *al-Nujūm*, 7/41-42; Abbādī, *fī Tārīḥ al-Ayyūbiyyin*, 124-125; Irwin, *The Middle East*, 29.

⁶³ ‘Aynī, *‘Iqd al-Jumān*, 1/143; Humphreys, *From Saladin*, 330; Fatih Yahya Ayaz, *Memlûkler Döneminde Vezirlik (1250-1517)* (İstanbul: İsam Yayınları, 2009), 40.

⁶⁴ Ibn Taghrībardi, *al-Nujūm*, 7/43; Ayaz, *Memlûkler Döneminde Vezirlik*, 42.

⁶⁵ Ibn Duḫmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 231; Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars*, 44; Humphreys, *From Saladin*, 331.

⁶⁶ Ibn Taghrībardi, *al-Nujūm*, 7/45.

⁶⁷ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 57-59; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/30; Ibn Duḫmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 233; Zaybak, *Abū Shāme*, 200.

and the Bahriyya, he began to resolve internal problems. Firstly, al-Amīr Quṭuz arrested al-Amīr ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-Rūmī al-Şāliḫī, ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-Ḥamawī, Rukn al-Dīn al-Sayrafi, ibn Atlas Khān al-Harazmī of the Şāliḫiyya amīrs, whom he considered a threat. He had them executed and their property completely expropriated on 26 Rabiʿ I 656/2 April 1258.⁶⁸

5. The Mongol Invasion and the Return to Egypt of the Bahriyya-Şāliḫiyya

After the takeover of Baghdad and partly Bilad al-sham, al-Amīr Quṭuz deposed al-Malik al-Manşūr Nur al-Dīn ʿAlī from the throne. He took advantage of the absence of the leading amīrs of the Muʿizziyya, such as ʿAlam al-dīn Sanjar al-Ghatamī, Sheraf al-Dīn Kizān al-Muʿizzī, Sayf al-Dīn Bahadır, ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-Tajibī al-Sagīr, and Shams al-Dīn Qarasunqur (d. 683/1284). When they arrived in Egypt, he immediately had them arrested because of their opposition to him. As a result, Quṭuz was proclaimed sultan of Egypt on 22 Shawwal 657/12 November 1259.⁶⁹ Quṭuz, knowing that his sultanate would not be accepted, made a speech as follows: “I have no other aim but to fight the Mongols. This calamity cannot be eliminated without a strong malik. When we have put away this enemy, the decision will be up to you. Then you can determine whoever you want as sultan.”⁷⁰

On the other hand, Baybars al-Bunduqdārī had left al-Malik al-Mughith ʿUmar and rejoined al-Nāşir Yūsuf. In the meantime, al-Nāşir Yūsuf sent messages to Karak and Cairo due to the increasing Mongol invasions in northern Syria, asking both Mughith ʿUmar and Quṭuz for help. But al-Nāşir Yūsuf was losing power day by day, and the fear of his amīrs was growing. So, al-Amīr Zayn al-Dīn al-Hafizī said that it would be useless to fight with Hulagu Khan (653-663/1256-1265) and that he should be obeyed. Baybars al-Bunduqdārī disagreed and slapped al-Amīr Zayn al-Dīn, saying, *you are the reason why Muslims are killed*. When it was night, some of the mamlūks suddenly charged and wanted to kill al-Nāşir Yūsuf and appoint another as malik in his place. However, they failed due to the resistance of Qaymariyya and Shahrizoriyya. For this reason, they first retreated to Gaza and then joined Quṭuz. Quṭuz was glad that Baybars and the Bahriyya had joined him before the battle against the Mongols, and he granted Baybars and his retinue Qalyub.⁷¹

Meantime as a result of the Syria campaign, Hulagu Khan succeeded in gaining supremacy beyond the Euphrates by capturing the most important cities. He then sent a letter to al-Malik Quṭuz, apparently threatening him with surrender. Thereupon, Quṭuz had executed the legation consisting of forty people, and hanged at Bab al-Zuwayla. Thereafter, he proclaimed *jihad* against the Mongols and attracted many people to his side. Many groups of Arabs, Bedouins and Kurds had

⁶⁸ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm*, 7/46; Kasım, *ʿAsru Salātīn al-Mamālik*, 46; Humphreys, *From Saladin*, 333.

⁶⁹ Abū Shāme, *al-Dhayl*, 203; Abū al-Fidāʿ, *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/199; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, 29/300; Zahabī, *al-ʿIbar fi ḥabar*, 3/285; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḫi Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/196; Khuwayţir, *Baybars The First*, 16; Irwin, *The Middle East*, 32; Zaybak, *Abū Shāme*, 227.

⁷⁰ Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḫi Ibn Khaldūn*, 5/436; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm*, 7/55; Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars*, 47; Ziyāda, “The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293”, 744; Kasım, *ʿAsru Salātīn al-Mamālik*, 51.

⁷¹ Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/49; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḫi Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/197; Ibn Dukmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 256; Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, 1/509; Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars*, 48; Süleyman Özbek, “Yakın DoĖu Türk-İslam Tarihinin Akışını DeĖiştiren Bir Meydan Savaşı: Ayn Calud”, *Türkler* (Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002), 5/219-220.

obeyed him.⁷² However, some of the high-ranking amīr cadres did not agree with Quṭuz. They did not want to wage direct war on the front lines against the Mongols. Then Quṭuz said to them, *we are at a time when we are using up the property of the state. No matter what you do, I will fight against the Mongols. The sin of Muslims weighs on the necks of those who withdraw from jihad.* After this speech, the high-ranking amīrs had announced that they would fight alongside the sultan.⁷³ Indeed, in the place of ‘Ayn Jālūt, the Mongols were defeated for the first time on 25 Ramadan 658/3 September 1260. Katboga Noyan (d. 658/1260) was among those killed on the battlefield. Since this victory did not satisfy Quṭuz, Egypt army continued to attack, and the Mongols were completely driven out of Syria beyond the Euphrates.⁷⁴ This victory not only extended the rule of the Mamlūks to Syria, but also provided political opportunity to the Ayyūbids, who had been completely disintegrated by the Mongols. In other words, the Ayyūbid maliks, who were under the Mongol yoke, became directly dependent on the Mamlūks.

When Quṭuz captured Damascus, he went to Aleppo and wanted to rebuild the places destroyed by the Mongols. However, he had received news that Baybars al-Bunduqdārī and the Baḥriyya were preparing against him, and he then turned towards Egypt for safety.⁷⁵ In the same way, Quṭuz secretly sought an opportunity against the Baḥriyya. When news of this reached Baybars, they left Damascus. Both Quṭuz and Baybars were careful with each other.⁷⁶ When Quṭuz arrived in the Qusayr region on 16 Dhu al-qadah 658/23 October 1260, he went rabbit hunting with his retinue. al-Amīr ‘Izz al-din Anas managed to kill the rabbit and present it to the sultan. The sultan was very surprised at this. He got off his horse, took the rabbit, and said to al-Amīr ‘Izz al-Dīn Anas, *what do you want from me when we come to Egypt?* And he said, o ruler, I want a concubine taken from the Mongols. al-Malik Quṭuz accepted this, so he approached Quṭuz to thank him and held his hand as if to kiss it. With his other hand he grasped his sword. This was a sign among the assassins. Al-Amīr Baktūt al-Javkandārī set out and attacked Quṭuz. Al-Amīr Anas also supported him and threw Quṭuz down from his horse. On the other hand, Bahadur al-Mu‘izzī shot arrows and they slaughtered Quṭuz. However, it is also said that Baybars was the one who struck Quṭuz the first blow.⁷⁷

⁷² Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/47-48; Ibn Duqmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 262-263; Peter Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Longman Publishing, 1992), 75; Ahmet Saglam, “Memlûk-İlhanlı İlişkileri.” *Bellekten* 82/293 (2018), 87; Özbek, “Yakın Doğu”, 5/220.

⁷³ Qudsī, *Duwal al-Islam*, 30; Abbādī, *fi Tārīḫ al-Ayyūbiyyin*, 139.

⁷⁴ Abū Shāme, *al-Dhayl*, 207; Fuwaṭī, *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi‘a*, 247; Şehabeddin Tekindağ, “Memlûk Sultanlığı Tarihine Toplu Bir Bakış”, *Tarih Dergisi* 25 (1971), 9; Abdülkerim Özaydın, “Aynicâlût Savaşı”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, (Ankara: TDV Yayınları, 1991, 4/276; Ali Aktan, “Sultan Kutuz ve Ayn Câlūd Zaferi”, *Atatürk Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 10 (1991), 197; Robert Irwin, “The Rise of the Mamlūks”, *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5/616; Cüneyt Kanat, “Baybars Zamanında Memlûk-İlhanlı Münasebetleri (1260-1277)”, *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* 16/1 (2001), 31.

⁷⁵ Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*, 24.

⁷⁶ Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/60.

⁷⁷ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 67-68; Ibn al-Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/61-62; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, 29/305; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḫ Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/203; Ibn Duqmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 267; ‘Aynī, *‘Iqd al-Jumān*, 1/261-262; Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Nujūm*, 7/84; Qudsī, *Duwal al-Islam*, 33; Tekindağ, “Memlûk Sultanlığı”, 9.

After the assassination of Quṭuz, they all went to the pavilion (*dehliz*) and gathered. After long discussions, the sultanate of al-Amīr Rukn al-Dīn Baybars al-Bunduqdārī was decided. Atābak Fāris al-Dīn Aqtay al-Mustaʿrib was the first to step forward and swear allegiance to him. Later, the amīrs swore allegiance according to their rank.⁷⁸ However, Aqtay said Baybars: *The sultanate will not be completed until we arrive in Qalʿat al-jabal*. When they left for Egypt together, Nāʿib al-saltana ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Ḥillī (d. 667/1269) met them on the way. They told him what had happened, and he swore allegiance to Baybars. Thus, the sultanate of Baybars was finally sealed.⁷⁹

After Quṭuz’s assassination, Sultan Baybars had to eliminate those he considered a threat in order to consolidate his rule. First, Sanjar al-Ḥalabī, whom Quṭuz had appointed nāʿib of Damascus, rebelled against Baybars and declared his own sultanate.⁸⁰ Turning this situation into an opportunity, the Mongol army arrived in al-Bira and continued its rapid advance, capturing Aleppo and Hama on 16 Dhu al-Hijja 658/22 November 1260.⁸¹ The army, consisting of al-Manşūr, the şāḥib of Hama and his brother Ali al-Afdal, al-Ashraf ibn Shirkuh, the şāḥib of Hims, and ʿAzīziyya-Nasiriyya troops, defeated the Mongols at the Battle of Hims in 659/1261. After this victory, al-Manşūr, the şāḥib of Hama, and al-Ashraf ibn Shirkuh, the şāḥib of Hims, met with Sanjar al-Ḥalabī, who proclaimed his sultanate in Damascus. They paid no attention to him, knowing his weakness.⁸² However, Sultan Baybars sent an army under the command of al-Amīr ʿAla al-Dīn Aytakin al-Bunduqdārī (d. 684/1285) and Bahāʾ al-Dīn Bughdi to Damascus. The Egyptian army had won the war between them, and Sanjar al-Ḥalabī had taken refuge in the castle of Damascus. He then took advantage of the darkness of the night and fled to Baʿlbak, but was eventually captured. Later he was sent to Egypt to be delivered to Baybars, and he was captured there as well. The nāʿib of Damascus was replaced by ʿAla al-Dīn Aytakin al-Bunduqdārī. After the suppression of the uprising, a sermon (*hutbe*) was read in Damascus on behalf of Sultan Baybars on 13 Safar 659/17 January 1261.⁸³ This clearly shows that it was not a rule to come to power by killing the sultan. Rather, it can be said that the consensus of the elite amīrs was the main thing.

After the rebellion of Sanjar al-Ḥalabī, al-Malik al-Zāhir Baybars had the leading amīrs of the Muʿizziyya arrested. The reason for this was that Baybars received news that some of the amīrs of

⁷⁸ Abū al-Fidāʿ, *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/207; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/62; Baybars al-Manşūrī, *Mukhtār al-Akḥbār: Tārīkh al-dawla al-Ayyūbiyya wa-dawlat al-Mamālīk al-Baḥriyya ḥattā sanat 703H*, Critical ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamid Şāliḥ Ḥamdān (Cairo: al-Dār al-Mişriyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1993), 11; Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*, 26-27; Irwin, “The Rise of the Mamlūks”, 5/616; Ramazan Şeşen, *Sultan Baybars ve Devri* (İstanbul: İSAR Yayınları, 2008), 23.

⁷⁹ Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 71; Amitai-Preiss, “The Mamlūk Officer Class”, 275; Yusuf Ötenkaya, “el-Melikü’z-Zāhir Baybars’ın Sultanlığı Meselesi: Sultan Öldüren Sultan Olur mu?”, *İlahiyat Tetkikleri Dergisi* (2023), 17-18.

⁸⁰ Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḥu Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/204; Surūr, *Zāhir Baybars*, 57; Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt*, 94-95.

⁸¹ Abū al-Fidāʿ, *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/208-209; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/65.

⁸² Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 97; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/68; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḥu Ibn Khaldūn*, 5/439; ʿAynī, *ʿIqd al-Jumān*, 1/269; Kanat, “Baybars Zamanında Memlūk-İlhanlı Münasebetleri”, 33-34.

⁸³ Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 94-96; Qutb al-Dīn Abu’l-Fath Musa al-Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mirʿat al-zamān fi taʾrīkh al-aʿyān*, (Haydarābād: Dâiretü’l-Maârifil’l-Osmaniyye, 1954), 2/118; Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, 30/20; ʿAynī, *ʿIqd al-Jumān*, 1/265-266; Ibn Tagḥribirdī, *al-Nujūm*, 7/107-108; Surūr, *Zāhir Baybars*, 58; Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*, 29; Ziyāda, “The Mamlūk Sultans to 1293”, 746; Abbādī, *fi Tārīḥ al-Ayyūbiyyin*, 151-152; Zaybak, *Abū Şāme*, 278; Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt*, 95; Şeşen, *Sultan Baybars*, 25.

the Mu‘izziyya were preparing to assassinate him. Al-Amīr ‘Izz al-Dīn al-Şakallī, al-Amīr ‘Alam al-Dīn Sanjar al-Ghatamī, Bahadur al-Mu‘izzī, and al-Shuca‘ Baktūt all agreed to get rid of Baybars. However, Baybars had managed to arrest them by acting earlier.⁸⁴ In fact, the main reason why Baybars had the Mu‘izziyya mamlūks arrested was that he wanted to secure his throne. Of course, this was an instinctive behaviour rather than planned steps as Aybak and Qutuz had done before.

After imprisoning the leaders of the Mu‘izziyya, Sultan Baybars sent a message to ‘Ala al-Dīn al-Bunduqdārī, the nā‘ib of Damascus, asking him to arrest al-Amīr Bahā‘ al-Dīn Bughdi, Shams al-Dīn Aqqush al-Barlī, (d. 661/1263) and some mamlūks from the ‘Azīziyya-Nasiriyya to increase his rule in Bilad al-sham. ‘Ala al-Dīn al-Bunduqdārī captured Bahā‘ al-Dīn Bughdi, but the mamlūks of the ‘Azīziyya and Nasiriyya could not be captured because they fled along with Aqqush al-Barlī. Then al-Barlī had told them that he wanted to join the şāḥibs of Hims and Hama against Sultan Baybars. However, he said that he wanted to rebuild the Ayyūbid sultanate with his help. After receiving no positive response from either of them, he was forced to move to Aleppo.⁸⁵ With the support of Arabs and Turkmen, they prepared the war in Aleppo. Sultan Baybars, however, wishing to settle the al-Barlī issue once and for all, sent an army of three divisions under the command of al-Amīr Jamal al-Dīn Muḥammadī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Himsī, and Sanjar al-Ḥalabī. In the battle with the Egyptian forces, Aqqush al-Barlī was defeated and had to retreat to al-Bira. However, Baybars also sent an army under the command of al-Amīr Sunqur al-Rūmī to al-Bira in 660/1262. The şāḥibs of Hama and Hims assisted him. Realizing that he could not deal with this army, al-Barlī found the solution in obeying them. Baybars then appointed al-Bira to al-Barlī as amīr of sab‘in, but later changed his mind and ordered his arrest.⁸⁶

Sultan Baybars sent an army under the command of al-Amīr Badr al-Dīn Aydamīrī to Shawbak in 660/1262. After Aydamīrī captured Shawbak, Badr al-Dīn Balābān was appointed nā‘ib of the region. In the meantime, al-Malik al-Mughith ‘Umar had taken into his service a group of Shahrizoriyya Kurds who had fled Bilad al-Sham. He raised an army of them and encouraged them to attack Shawbak. Sultan Baybars immediately opposed this and attacked Karak on 8 Muharram 661/22 November 1262. Mughith ‘Umar, who was concerned about this situation, reported that he obeyed him so as not to suffer any harm from Baybars. On the other hand, Baybars had succeeded in separating them from Mughith ‘Umar by providing security for the Kurdish groups in the region. As a result, Baybars organized his second expedition to Karak on 7 Rabi‘ II 661/18 February 1263. When he arrived in Gaza, Mughith ‘Umar’s mother met with Baybars to mediate for her son. Baybars initially agreed, but then ordered Mughith ‘Umar’s arrest. After being imprisoned for some time, he was sentenced to death for his relations with the Mongols.⁸⁷ Sultan Baybars, after the murdered of al-Malik al-Mughith ‘Umar, brought his son ‘Azīz Fakhr al-Dīn ‘Uthmān to the nā‘ib of

⁸⁴ Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, 30/6; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/70; Ibn Duḡmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 274; Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Nujūm*, 7/108; Amitai-Preiss, “The Mamlūk Officer Class”, 278.

⁸⁵ Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir‘at al-zamān*, 2/119-120; Abū al-Fidā‘, *al-Muḥtaşar*, 3/211; Ibn Duḡmāk, *Nuzhat al-anām*, 274.

⁸⁶ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḍ*, 135; Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir‘at al-zamān*, 2/157-158; Ibn al-Wardī, *Tārīḫi Ibn al-Wardī*, 2/205; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḫi Ibn Khaldūn*, 5/439; Khuwayṭir, *Baybars The First*, 31.

⁸⁷ Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mir‘at al-zamān*, 2/193; Ibn Khaldūn, *Tārīḫi Ibn Khaldūn*, 5/442; Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Nujūm*, 7/120.

Karak and gave him the amīr mīa. In this way Baybars connected Karak with him in Jumada II 661/April 1263.⁸⁸

It is understood that Sultan Baybars had a harsh policy towards the amīrs who questioned his decisions, regardless of the factions to which they belonged. If one examines the historical record, one will find that there were some amīrs who opposed the arrest of Muḡhith ʿUmar. Thus, after the removal of Muḡhith ʿUmar, Baybars had al-Amīr Sayf al-Dīn Balābān al-Rashidī, al-Amīr ʿIzz al-Dīn Aybak al-Dimyātī, and al-Amīr Shams al-din Aqqush al-Barlī arrested and imprisoned in Qalʿat al-Jabal on 28 Jumada II 661/9 May 1263.⁸⁹ Hereby, Baybars got rid of the rival amīrs who had previously caused him political problems. Perhaps his experiences during his exile between 654/1254 and 658/1260 forced him to act in this way.

It is noted that during the first three years of his reign, Baybars tried to eliminate the amīrs who had been placed in important positions by Quṭuz. If one looks at the distribution of the iqtāʿ he commissioned in 663/1265, one sees that he greatly reduced the number of opponents and brought forward those who were of the Baḡriyya-Şāliḡiyya or those who were dissatisfied with the Muʿizziyya.⁹⁰ This situation obviously indicates that after Baybars ascended the throne, he attacked the amīrs of the Muʿizziyya, ʿAzīziyya, and Nasiriyya, arrested gradually many of them, and attempted to secure his power by slaughtering some of them.

Conclusion

It is obvious that the nature of the Mamlūk state, the concepts of the sultanate, and the way the foundations of power are formed, all these theories and arguments do not contradict the historical case only when they are evaluated together. However, neglecting any one of these theories and arguments in the search for an answer to the question of how power is formed leads to a narrowing of the subject and inadequate answers. Similarly, the change of Mamluk power can be understood by considering the struggles between mamluk factions.

Although there are descriptions such as becoming sultan by killing the sultan and becoming sultan by succession, it is seen that there are unwritten rules in the functioning of the state system. The most important of these principles was based on factional struggles. Indeed, in this system, not only the sultan did not change, but also the elite cadre in the ruling structure as a whole underwent changes. Therefore, the changes of power in the Mamlūks cannot be simply confined to the sultans. The autocracy-oligarchy tension between the sultan and the mamlūk factions has always existed. In order to emerge victorious from this struggle, a fierce rivalry would often arise between the sultan and those who had once been favourites of the sultan. In order to be victorious in this struggle, the sultan tried to pave the way for the mamluk faction, which he formed in his own name, and appointed them to important positions. However, even if this situation resulted in

⁸⁸ Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mirʿat al-zamān*, 2/194; Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/96; Zahabī, *al-ʿIbar fī ḡabar*, 3/301; Surūr, *al-Zāhir Baybars*, 60; Şeşen, *Sultan Baybars*, 29.

⁸⁹ Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir, *al-Rawḡ*, 169-170; Yūnīnī, *Dhayl mirʿat al-zamān*, 2/194; Zahabī, *al-ʿIbar fī ḡabar*, 3/301.

⁹⁰ Ibn Dawādārī, *Kanz al-durar*, 8/110-112.

favourable results for the sultan, it did not continue in the sultan's lineage in the following periods and caused new factional struggles to continue.

Since the end of the Ayyūbids, the Mamlūk factions, although they remained in the rear, were the *de facto* power holding power in their own hands. If the sultan acted against their interests, this usually resulted in his deposition or murder. They would appoint those whom they thought would not harm their interests to the sultanate. Of course, in this case, it is obvious that the sultan in question was a puppet. If the sultan wanted to gradually seize power with his own mamluks and become an absolute sultan, he had to be ready for factional conflicts. Therefore, it can be concluded that the source of factional struggles was based on the determination of the sultan in power or the struggle of the sultan who seized power against the opposing mamluk factions. In addition, the slightest unrest among the Mamluk factions could lead to widespread revolts or to their changing sides. As a matter of fact, during the Battle of Kūra, the 'Azīziyya mamlūks, who were uncomfortable with the policies of al-Nāṣir Yūsuf, switched sides at the most important point of the battle.

However, in the Mamlūk State, one of the elite amirs could seize power despite the opposition of his own faction. However, it is understood that this situation did not last long, as seen in the examples of Turanshah and Quṭuz. Their behaviour, which clearly contradicted the interests of the existing Mamlūk faction, led to their assassination soon after. Therefore, being an absolute sultan in the Mamlūk State was quite rare. However, power struggles between factions also had positive consequences, the most important of which was that the military system was in a dynamic state and was constantly strong. In other words, the concern to stay in power or to maintain it brought along a qualified military/bureaucracy organisation.

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